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At the beginning of the twenty-first century, what does 
it mean to talk about relationships between cultures? 
What, indeed, is meant by ‘culture’? How do we conduct 
cross-cultural conversations which lead to mutual 
understanding, rather than its opposite? And – perhaps 
most saliently – what do we need to understand about 
each other in the first place in order to talk across national 
and cultural lines? These were some of the underlying 
questions which prompted a conference entitled ‘The 
Inner Lives of Cultures’, from which the essays in this 
collection emerged. That conference, convened in Brussels 
in 2010, by Counterpoint and its director, Catherine 
Fieschi, was part of a larger project by the British Council, 
to rethink its mission of cultural relations.
This, clearly, is both a daunting, and a most 
worthwhile undertaking. Cultural exchanges are perhaps 
more central to our dealings with each other today 
than ever before; in a sense, they are a basic part of the 
realities we inhabit. For one thing, issues of cultural 
identity – understood in ethnic, or religious, or historical 
terms – are often in the forefront of contemporary political 
discourse, and sometimes, of conflict. But also, we live in a 
world in which various kinds of cross-national movement 
– migrations, travel, various kinds of both enforced and 
voluntary nomadism – are ever on the rise; and in which 
flows of fast communication are multidirectional and 
constant. If we are to meet with each other on the basis of 
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diverse; indeed, the speed of change is a major fact of 
cultural life today. And yet we each come into a specific 
culture; and each culture gives us our first existential 
map, so to speak, and our earliest templates for the basic 
elements of experience: what constitutes personhood, 
what is beautiful or disturbing, how family relationships 
are structured, or how happiness is envisioned. It was the 
formative lesson of my own emigration (to be personal for 
a moment) that culture is not only something outside us, 
that we use or respond to; rather, culture exists within us, 
and it constructs our consciousness and subjectivity – our 
perceptions, ideas and even feelings. Different cultures 
may have varying predispositions towards not only 
moral values, or forms of group affiliation, but towards 
different states of self – say, the degree of self-sufficiency 
or interdependence which seems desirable; how much 
spontaneity or self-control is valued; whether it is intensity 
or serenity which feels good, or cognitively consonant. 
What is considered healthily assertive in one culture may 
be seen as aggressive or hostile in another; certain kinds of 
personal disclosure which may seem quite unproblematic 
in one society may be seen as embarrassing or entirely 
unacceptable elsewhere. Cultural attitudes can inform 
not only the obvious parameters of behaviour, but very 
particular social forms and rites – and even responses 
which may seem purely physiological. For example, within 
an admittedly minor anthropological niche of alcohol 
studies, it has been discovered that not only are drinking 
habits different in different cultures, but that people 
experience inebriation in quite various physical ways.
Such deep values, or literally incorporated beliefs, can 
be very surprising or perplexing from the outside – partly 
because they are often taken as given, and therefore 
remain unarticulated from within. But it is such deep 
values that I think we need to understand in order to 
engage in cross-cultural relations which are more than 
Introduction
trust rather than tension or insidious indifference, we need 
to have ways of getting acquainted with each other which 
are more than cursory, or purely instrumental. But how can 
this be accomplished? What kind of knowledge is needed to 
feed meaningful cross-cultural contacts?
In considering such matters, we held two assumptions 
to be self-evident: that within our intermingled and 
simultaneously multicentred globe, it is no longer possible 
to think of cultural relations in terms of promoting ‘our 
culture’ abroad, or exporting culture from a few privileged 
centres to the putative peripheries; rather, we need to 
envision cultural exchange as a two-way – or perhaps 
even a multidirectional – process, which happens through 
dialogue and mutual participation, and which hopefully 
leads to reciprocal and fertile forms of engagement. And 
second, that our definition of culture needs to include not 
only the articulated and formal expressions of literature, or 
music, or artistic artefacts – important as these are – but 
that whole fabric of social forms and meanings which 
constitutes the lived and daily experience of culture.
At the same time, we also started from an 
awareness that on that broader plane, dialogue is hardly 
easy or straightforward; and that the kind of insight and 
comprehension it calls for does not come automatically 
or instantly. These days, we do not lack information 
about other societies and countries – although that 
information often comes in sound bites, and confines 
itself to the current moment. But to enter into the 
subjective life of another culture – its symbolic codes, its 
overt beliefs and implicit assumptions – requires, as any 
immigrant or nomad can tell you, a considerable effort of 
consciousness and imagination; a kind of stretching of 
self towards the other, and a gradual grasp of differences 
which are sometimes imperceptible and subtle.
Of course, cultures are neither static nor monolithic 
organisms – they are complex, changeable and internally 
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point from which differences can be perceived in the first 
place. But also, a superficial accommodation to beliefs one 
doesn’t really agree with violates the dignity of the other, as 
well as one’s own. One wants to give one’s interlocutor the 
respect of truthfulness – however tactfully expressed – and 
the possibility of an equally truthful response, whatever 
risk this incurs.
But more often, I believe, cross-cultural dialogue can 
lead to a kind of interweaving of languages – to a discovery 
both of difference, and of underlying similarities, or 
who knows, perhaps even certain human universals. 
After all, just as textual translation would not be possible 
without some shared linguistic structures, so we could 
not understand our cultural differences without having 
some commonalities from which to communicate across 
them – some shared language of subjectivity. In all these 
ways, I think, dialogue is central to our understanding of 
ourselves and the world. It is increasingly recognised, by 
thinkers in fields ranging from multicultural theory to 
psychoanalysis, that we become who we are by entering 
into and participating in webs of conversations, narratives, 
interpretations of our situation, or stories about our past. 
Cross-cultural conversations especially can change and 
enlarge those who are engaged in them. It can make the 
participants conscious of where they are coming from, 
so to speak – of their own unspoken assumptions and 
internalised values; but it can also increase our awareness 
of others – and the range of possible human aspirations, 
ways of being, visions of the good society or the good life. 
And what can be more exciting or interesting than that?
* * *
To begin reflecting on such questions, and at the same 
time, to embark on an experiment in intercultural 
dialogue in vivo, we decided – perhaps in the British 
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superficial. How, then, can we talk to each other across 
such differences – how can we come to know each other 
better, or collaborate in ways which are productive and 
possibly creative? I think it almost goes without saying that 
openness and mutual respect – a recognition, on the part of 
each interlocutor, of the other’s legitimacy and dignity – is 
a prerequisite for cross-cultural dialogue; without that, 
nothing much can happen. But it also seems to me that a 
full and rich engagement calls for something more risky 
and entangled – something closer perhaps to the process 
of translation. Like literal translation, cross-cultural back 
and forth requires a simultaneous receptivity to the other’s 
subjective language, and a strong sense of one’s own. And 
like literal translation, it calls for a kind of cross-checking 
between the two ‘languages’ or forms of sensibility – 
keeping conscious of what needs to be understood about 
each other, as well as alert as to what we don’t understand. 
In order to grasp another culture’s inner life, we need to 
develop some empathy for its tonalities and textures, its 
expressive palette and affective norms. At the same time, 
one’s original language has to retain some stability as a 
point of reference: a place from which to speak, and to make 
oneself intelligible to the other. As in textual translation, 
we need to acknowledge both the correspondences between 
the two languages – and the differences. Indeed, if dialogue 
is to be more than a synonym for a palliative exchange of 
niceties, it needs to include the possibility of disagreement. 
Moreover, just as there are sometimes untranslatable 
fractures among texts, so I think it has to be recognised 
that some differences in the language of values may be 
unbridgeable, or non-negotiable. In confronting these, it 
seems to me it is neither salutary nor sufficient to collapse 
one’s own cultural identity, or idiom, into ‘the Other’ – to 
delegitimise oneself, so to speak, in the name of concord 
or good manners. For one thing, to give up on one’s own 
convictions or perceptions too readily, is to lose the vantage 
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between linguistic structures, spatial imagination and 
cultural/political attitudes in the Caucasus (‘Uzbekness: 
From Otherness to Ideology’ by Hamid Ismailov), to the 
opposition between theocratic fundamentalism with 
its foreclosures of dialogue, and the pluralistic, ethical 
space of civil society (‘The Intercultural Imperative and 
Iranian Dreams’ by Ramin Jahanbegloo); from a close 
reading of the invisible practices and hidden codes 
of discourse which enable an ‘alternative’ system of 
economic and social transactions in post-Soviet Russia 
(‘Unwritten Rules, Open Secrets, Knowing Smiles’ by 
Alena Ledeneva), to the tracking of the vicissitudes of 
‘identity’, as well as various linkages between culture and 
politics, and distinctions between diversity and difference 
(‘Culture in Modern India: The Anxiety and the Promise’ 
by Pratap Bhanu Mehta); and from the tension between 
abstracting structures of modernity, and the vitality of 
grassroots inventiveness in Brazil (‘From Tristes Tropiques 
to Tropical Treats: Savage Imaginaries in Multiple Brazils’ 
by Nicolau Sevcenko), to the importance of Confucius, and 
the dialectic between imposed harmony and violent conflict 
in China (‘China in Search of Harmony’ by Shu Sunyan).
But such sound bite summaries cannot do justice 
to the multiple themes or the powerful insights of 
these essays. They are rich examples of what classical 
anthropologists and these days, airport advertisers, call 
‘local knowledge’ and their interest is to be found largely 
in the detail. Nevertheless, part of the excitement of the 
conference was to see how fruitfully its participants could 
talk across geographical boundaries and cultural, as well 
as historical, differences. Amidst the distinctiveness, 
certain common concerns began to be evident: how to 
understand ‘identity’ without being reductive; what real 
tolerance might look like; or what, beyond democratic 
forms, constitutes responsible and accountable politics. 
Moreover, what such conversations strongly suggested 
empirical tradition – to start with specificities; and we 
asked a number of leading thinkers, cultural observers, 
commentators and interpreters from various parts of 
the world, to give us some guidance and insight into 
the inner topographies and the subjective languages of 
their societies and cultures. At the same time, in order to 
avoid a sentimental or reified view of culture, we asked 
our participants to reflect on the ways in which cultural 
values in each context intersect with the contemporary 
realities and political arrangements.
As the reader will see, the responses to this 
admittedly challenging assignment were fascinating 
and varied. To provide an Ariadne’s thread to the themes 
of the conference, Tzvetan Todorov, in his opening 
address, gave us a wonderfully illuminating anatomy 
of the word ‘culture’ – its meanings, implications and 
historical derivations. The other essays collected here 
are in effect informed reports from within particular 
cultural contexts, probing and decoding different 
aspects of cultural experience. In their particularity, 
they are difficult to summarise; rather, they should be, 
one by one, pondered and relished. They range (to give 
a very rough guide to their themes) from reflections 
on the repressive hold of religious and political 
authority against the need for reform (‘Goodbye 
Orient: Resisting Reforms in the Islamic World’ by 
Hamed Abdel-Samad), to the tradition of tolerance, 
and the possibility of incorporating religious diversity 
into politics (‘Cultural Pluralism in Indonesia: Local, 
National and Global Exchanges’ by Azyumardi Azra); 
from the loss of a uniting national idea or positive 
self-image in Mexico (‘Goodbye to All That’ by Fernando 
Escalante Gonzalbo), to memories of personal resistance, 
ranging from irony to strong friendships, in Cold War 
Romania (‘Surrealism and Survival in Romania’ by 
Carmen Firan); from analysis of the subterranean links 
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world no one can any longer assume that they come to 
such exchanges from a position of putative superiority, 
or hegemonic centrality, or triumphalist certainty. 
Rather, faced with the difficult problems of our time, 
and the hyper-speeds of change, we all find ourselves in 
positions of equal uncertainty. The need is clearly to ask 
questions of each other, and to try to grasp the shape of 
our fast-metamorphosing world in common. It is in such 
intermingling that sources of creativity, solidarity – and 
perhaps even peace – can be found.
Eva Hoffman is a writer and academic who emigrated to 
Canada from Cracow aged 13. The experience influenced 
her greatly: ‘Every immigrant,’ she has said, ‘becomes 
a kind of amateur anthropologist.’ Now living in 
London, she has received the Guggenheim Fellowship, 
the Whiting Award and an award from the American 
Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters.
Introduction
is that the old divisions which have governed our world 
– between East and West, the advanced and the Third 
World, or even between the coloniser and the (post)-
colonised – no longer hold, or are at least losing their 
relevance. In the laboratory, or the microcosm of the 
conference, it was clear that we live in a multicentred 
world, and speak to each other across criss-crossing 
lines of affinity and mutual influence, from multiple 
points of reference, as well as sites of legitimacy, 
importance, and even power.
As it happens, quite a few of the participants in 
‘Inner Lives of Cultures’ are in effect bicultural – that 
is, they live abroad from their country of origin, 
or move back and forth between two countries. In 
one or two cases, this is because it is not possible to 
speak freely, or to do critical work, from within their 
countries of origin; but in most instances, it is a kind 
of overdetermined coincidence. Overdetermined, 
because people with hyphenated identities are often 
very adept at cross-cultural translation; indeed, from 
their position as simultaneous outsiders and insiders, 
such translation – whether overt or internal – is 
an intrinsic part of the bicultural condition. It was 
therefore perhaps not coincidental that one of the 
implicit – and sometimes explicit – thematic currents 
of the conference had to do with the sensitive question 
of what an external or an ‘outsider’ gaze can bring to 
the understanding of each society, or culture. Can such 
gaze ever be salubrious and heuristic, rather than cold 
or condescending? The possibility of allowing ourselves 
to be seen and sometimes even criticised by others 
is, of course, crucial to the possibility of dialogue. 
Admittedly, opening yourself to the perceptions of 
outsiders can be a psychologically difficult gesture to 
make; but what the laboratory, or the microcosm, of the 






I would like to approach the subject of cultural 
relations by specifying, at the start, the meaning 
of some key words that I would like to use. To start 
with, the pair formed by the terms ‘barbarism’ and 
‘civilisation’. It is well known that the first of these 
words, barbarism, has a long past in European history, 
and that it has been used in two distinct ways. One of 
these meanings is purely relative, and it is adopted both 
by some Christian authors who have commented on 
the subject, and by some important secular authors, 
such as Montaigne. The barbarian in this case is 
simply the person who is different from us, or who does 
not speak our language, or who speaks it badly; in a 
word, the barbarian is the foreigner. I would, however, 
prefer to keep the other meaning of the word, which is 
moral and absolute. This second concept of barbarity 
is equally legitimate and we must be able to draw on it 
to designate, at all times and in all places, the acts and 
attitudes of those who, to a greater or lesser degree, 
place outside of humanity those who are perceived 
as different, or judge them to be radically unlike 
themselves, or inflict shocking treatment on them. 
Treating others as inhuman, as monsters or savages 
is one form of this barbarity. A different form of it is 
institutional discrimination towards others because 
they do not belong to my linguistic community, or my 
social group, or my psychological type.
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from each other, nor transform the one into a means 
for attaining the other, nor indeed consider them as 
opposites that we need to choose between in an ‘either/
or’ way dictated by an exclusivist logic. A first warning 
– but a powerful one – against the illusions entertained 
by certain supporters of the Enlightenment is found in their 
most lucid French-speaking representative, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. In his first work, the Discourse on the Sciences 
and the Arts, he was already breaking away from the 
philosophes and Encyclopaedists who were his friends, 
and abandoning their belief that the spread of works 
of art and technological advances will make mankind 
morally better. Far from contributing to the progress of 
moral life and an increased benevolence towards others, 
he declared, the growth of the sciences and arts may 
become detrimental to moral progress. The vocation of 
human beings is to live (well) with others, and for that 
there is no need to accumulate a great pile of knowledge, 
nor to be what is called ‘a cultivated person’.
Civilisation is the opposite of barbarism. However, 
the meaning of the first word changes considerably if we 
put it into the plural. Civilisations no longer correspond 
to an atemporal moral and intellectual category, but 
to historical formations that appear and disappear, 
characterised by the presence of several traits linked 
both to material life and to the life of the mind. It is in 
this sense that we speak of Chinese or Indian, Persian 
or Byzantine civilisation. The two senses of ‘civilisation’, 
illustrated by the singular and the plural, are independent 
of each other. To avoid any ambiguity, I am thus choosing 
to use the word ‘civilisation’ here only in the singular, 
and to designate the sense of its plural by one of its 
quasi-synonyms, which in any case bears the same double 
meaning: this is the word ‘cultures’, in the plural.
For over two centuries now, ‘culture’ has assumed 
a broader meaning than its usual association with the 
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If we have one term with an absolute content, 
‘barbarian’, the same will be true of its opposite. A 
civilised person is one who is able, at all times and in 
all places, to recognise the humanity of others fully. So 
two stages have to be crossed before anyone can become 
civilised: in the first stage, you discover that others 
live in a way different from you; in the second, you 
agree to see them as bearers of the same humanity as 
yourself. The moral demand comes with an intellectual 
dimension: getting those with whom you live to 
understand a foreign identity, whether individual or 
collective, is an act of civilisation, since in this way you 
are enlarging the circle of humanity. In this sense – but 
in this sense only – scholars, philosophers and artists 
all contribute to driving back barbarity. In actual fact, 
no individual, let alone any people, can be entirely 
‘civilised’: they can merely be more or less civilised; and 
the same goes for ‘barbarian’. Civilisation is a horizon 
which we can approach, barbarity is a background 
from which we seek to move away; neither condition 
can be entirely identified with particular beings. It is 
acts and attitudes which are barbarian or civilised, not 
individuals or peoples.
People have often pointed out with relish that 
there is a paradox revealed by the twentieth century: 
barbarity, they exclaim, sprang from the very heart of 
European civilisation. But there is not really anything 
all that paradoxical here, once it is admitted that 
civilisation cannot be reduced to the production and 
enjoyment of works of art (with which European 
civilisation was so closely identified); and that the 
relationship between these two notions is indeed far 
from direct. Mankind’s existential, ethical and aesthetic 
achievements do not depend mechanically on one 
another, and yet they are all perfectly real. We need 
to think them in their plurality and not deduce them 
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it is, at the same time, turned towards the past and 
towards the present.
It is no accident if these two concepts of ‘civilisation’ 
and ‘cultures’, whatever the words used to designate 
them, entered European thought at the same time 
– the second half of the eighteenth century – in the 
wake of the Enlightenment. Several authors were to 
contrast ‘barbarism’ with ‘civilisation’ and conceive the 
history of humanity as a one-way process, leading from 
the former to the latter. At the same time, there was a 
growing interest in ‘cultures’. This was grafted onto an 
old tradition, which in France went back to Montaigne, 
with his insistence on the power of ‘custom’. Pascal 
said of custom that it was a second nature; he thus 
prefigured the formulas of later anthropologists. The 
travels of Europeans to the East, South and West 
became increasingly frequent in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and their protagonists would 
bring back detailed, sometimes admiring descriptions 
of the customs and manners observed in the countries 
they visited, even though these customs were far 
removed from collective European practices. At the 
same period, there was a new interest in history, and 
thus in ancient social forms, no longer perceived as 
arising from a now inaccessible golden age, nor as a 
mere, imperfect preparation for the present; henceforth, 
it was deemed that every period had its own ideal and 
its own coherence.
For a long time, Enlightenment thought served as 
a source of inspiration for a reformist, liberal current, 
which fought against conservatism in the name of 
universality and equal respect for all. As we know, things 
have changed these days, and the conservative defenders 
of a higher Western culture have arrogated this idea to 
themselves, believing themselves to be engaged in a 
struggle against ‘relativism’ that – they say – emerged 
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arts. Anthropologists have largely been responsible for 
this change. They realised that the societies studied by 
them, often lacking writing, monuments and works 
of art, nonetheless possessed practices and artefacts 
that played an analogous role within them; they called 
these, in turn, ‘cultures’. This ‘ethnological’ meaning 
has now gained ascendancy; therefore, ethnology 
is also called ‘cultural anthropology’. If the word is 
taken in this broad sense (as descriptive and no longer 
evaluative), every human group has a culture: this is 
the name given to the set of characteristics of its social 
life, to collective modes of living and thinking, to the 
forms and styles of organisation of time and space, 
which include language, religion, family structures, 
ways of building houses, tools, ways of eating and 
dressing. ‘Culture’ is thus necessarily particular, not 
universal. In addition, the members of the group – and 
we should bear in mind that there may be just a few 
dozen of them, or several million – interiorise these 
characteristics in the form of mental representations. 
So culture exists on two closely related levels, that of 
social practices and that of the images left by the latter 
in the minds of the members of the community.
It is not their content that determines the identity 
of ‘cultures’, but their diffusion: culture is necessarily 
collective. It thus presupposes communication, of which 
it is one of the results. As a representation, culture 
also provides us with an interpretation of the world, a 
miniature model, a map, so to speak, which enables us 
to find our way around in it; possessing a culture means 
having at one’s disposal a pre-organisation of lived 
experience. Culture rests simultaneously on a common 
memory (we learn the same language, the same history, 
the same traditions) and on common rules of life (we 
speak in such a way as to make ourselves understood, 
we take into account the codes at work in our society); 
20 21
The Inner Lives of Cultures
in Burgundian, French and European culture. On 
the other hand, within one single geographical entity, 
there are many different cultural stratifications: there 
is the culture of teenagers and the culture of retired 
people, the culture of doctors and the culture of street 
sweepers, the culture of women and that of men, of 
rich and of poor. A particular individual may recognise 
herself as belonging simultaneously to Mediterranean, 
Christian and European cultures.
Now – and this point is essential – these different 
cultural identities do not coincide with one another, 
nor do they form clearly separated territories in which 
different ingredients are superimposed without 
remainder. Every individual is multicultural; within 
each, cultures interact as criss-crossed alluvial plains. 
Individual identity stems from the encounter of 
multiple collective identities within one and the same 
person; each of our various affiliations contributes 
to the formation of the unique creature that we are. 
Human beings are not all similar, nor entirely different; 
they are all plural within themselves, and share their 
constitutive traits with varied groups, combining them 
in an individual way. The cohabitation of different types 
of belonging within each one of us does not in general 
cause any problems – and this ought, in turn, to arouse 
admiration: like a juggler, we keep all the balls of our 
identity in the air at once, with the greatest of ease! We 
should overcome the habit that links culture primarily 
to a specific territory.
Another characteristic of cultures, no less easy 
to identify, is the fact that they are in perpetual 
transformation. All cultures change, even if it is certain 
that the so-called ‘traditional’ ones do so less willingly 
and less quickly than those that are called ‘modern’. 
There are several different reasons for these changes. 
Since each culture includes others within itself, or 
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from the romantic reaction at the start of the nineteenth 
century. They cannot do so, obviously, unless they 
amputate the real tradition of the Enlightenment, which 
was able to combine the universality of values with the 
plurality of cultures. This doctrine should be confused 
neither with dogmatism (‘my culture must impose itself 
on everyone’) nor with nihilism (‘all cultures are pretty 
much the same’); placing the Enlightenment at the 
service of a denigration of others, which gives one the 
right to subject or destroy them, represents a wholesale 
kidnapping of the whole Enlightenment project.
The human being is born not only within nature 
but also, always and necessarily, within a culture. How 
shall we describe its distinctive features? The first 
characteristic of one’s initial cultural identity is that it 
is imposed during childhood rather than being chosen. 
On coming into the world, the human child is plunged 
into the culture of its group, which precedes it. The most 
salient, but also probably the most determining fact, is 
that we are necessarily born within one language, the 
language spoken by our parents or the people who look 
after us. Now language is not a neutral instrument, it 
is impregnated with thoughts, actions and judgments 
that are handed down to us; it divides reality up in a 
particular way, and imperceptibly transmits to us a 
vision of the world. The child cannot avoid absorbing it, 
and this way of conceiving reality is transmitted from 
generation to generation.
Another trait of the cultural affiliation of every 
individual is immediately obvious: we possess not 
one but several cultural identities, which may either 
overlap or else present themselves as intersecting 
sets. For example, a French person always comes from 
a particular region – Burgundy, for instance – but 
from another angle this person also shares several 
characteristics with all Europeans, and thus participates 
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the disappearance of a previous state of culture and its 
replacement by a new state.
However, for reasons that are easy to understand, 
members of a group often find this obvious fact 
difficult to accept. The difference between individual 
and collective identities is illuminating here. Even if 
we dream of discovering one day within us a ‘deep’ 
and ‘authentic’ self, as if it awaited us patiently lurking 
somewhere in the depths of our being, we are conscious 
of the changes, wished for or not, that our being 
undergoes: they are perceived as normal. Everyone 
remembers the decisive events from his past. We can 
also make decisions that send our identities off in a new 
direction, when we change jobs, or partners, or countries. 
A person is nothing other than the result of innumerable 
interactions that mark out the stages of a life.
Collective identity works in a completely different 
way: it is already fully formed by the time the young 
child discovers it, and it becomes the invisible 
foundation on which her identity is built. Even if, seen 
from outside, every culture is mixed and changing, for 
the members of the community that it characterises, 
it is a stable and distinct entity, the foundation of their 
personal identity. For this reason, all change which 
affects culture can be experienced as an attack on 
my integrity. One need merely compare the facility 
with which I agree, if I am capable of it, to speak a 
new language while on a visit to a foreign country 
(an individual event); and the disagreeable feeling I 
have when, in the street where I have always lived, 
only incomprehensible words and accents can now 
be heard (a collective event). What we have initially 
found in the original culture is not shocking even if 
this in itself is the product of many changes, since 
this has helped actually to shape the person. On the 
other hand, what changes by force of circumstances 
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intersects with them, its different ingredients form an 
unstable equilibrium. For example, granting women 
the right to vote in France in 1944 enabled them to 
participate actively in the country’s public life: as a result, 
French cultural identity was transformed. We also need 
to take into account the pressures brought to bear by 
the evolution of other elements that are constitutive of 
the social order: the economic, the political, even the 
physical. The most eloquent image of the variability of 
cultures I can find is that of the mythical ship of the 
Argonauts, the Argo: each plank, each rope, each nail had 
to be replaced, since the voyage took so long; the ship that 
returned to port, years later, was materially completely 
different from the one which set off, and yet it was still 
the same ship Argo since it assumed the same function 
for the sailors, and at the same time allowed each of them 
to keep the same representation of their ship. Only dead 
cultures don’t change any more.
If we keep these two characteristics of culture 
in mind, its plurality and its variability, we see how 
disconcerting are the metaphors most commonly used 
to evoke it. We say of a human being, for instance, that 
she is ‘uprooted’ and we pity her for it; but it is not 
legitimate to equate human beings with plants, since 
a human is never the product of just one culture, and 
in any case the animal world is distinguished from the 
vegetable world precisely by its mobility. Cultures have 
no essence or ‘soul’, in spite of the fine works that have 
been written about these things. Or else people talk of 
the ‘survival’ of a culture (this time humanising the 
representations instead of dehumanising mankind); by 
this they mean its conservation in identical form. Now, 
a culture that has stopped changing is by definition a 
dead culture. The expression ‘dead language’ is much 
more judicious: Latin died on the day it could no longer 
change. Nothing is more normal, more common than 
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in this respect that our democracy is liberal: the state 
does not entirely control civil society, and within certain 
limits each individual remains free. That’s why national 
cultural identity is independent of the laws, and is made 
and unmade on a daily basis by the actions of millions of 
individuals living in this or that country.
The moral and political principles to which we 
are attached are, on the other hand, both fragile and 
irreplaceable. It is in the name of these principles, that 
can be shared by all peoples but which are practised by 
just a few, and independent of our particular culture 
as well as of the state whose citizens we are, that – to 
take a few current examples – we are ready, today, to 
defend intransigently: the freedom of women to organise 
their personal lives the way they see fit; or secularism, 
understood as the separation of the theological and 
the political, which confines the exercise of faith to 
the personal sphere alone, the corollary of which is the 
freedom to criticise religions; or else the banning of 
physical violence, whether it be domestic or practised 
illegally in the name of raison d’état, such as torture.
These principles happen to be integrated into the 
Constitution or the laws and institutions of several 
countries, but they do not belong to them intrinsically. 
The dissociation between this set of values and the 
national frameworks is all the more obvious these days 
in Europe since the majority of the inhabitants of the 
European Union demonstrate that they are attached 
to them, whereas the states themselves preserve 
their borders and their sovereignty. We can go even 
further: many of these ideals today feature in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and inspire 
the legislative systems of other cultural or national 
traditions; conversely, we must remember that the 
European heritage contains many elements other than 
the defence of human rights.
over which the individual has no power is perceived 
as a kind of degradation, for it makes our very sense 
of being feel fragile. The contemporary period, during 
which collective identities are called on to transform 
themselves more and more quickly, is thus also the period 
in which groups are adopting an increasingly defensive 
attitude, and fiercely guarding their original identities.
Cultural identity has to be distinguished both 
from civic status and from our attachment to specific 
moral and political values. No one can change his or 
her childhood, whereas it is perfectly possible to change 
our civic loyalties without any damage. The state is 
not a ‘culture’ like others, it is an administrative and 
political entity with well-established frontiers, and it 
obviously includes individuals who are the bearers of 
several different cultures, since in it we find men and 
women, young people and old, of every profession and 
every condition, from various regions, indeed origins, 
and speaking different languages, practising several 
religions, and respecting different customs. This 
does not mean that belonging to one specific state is 
insignificant. It is within the nation that the great social 
solidarities find a place. It is the taxes paid by all citizens, 
at least in democratic states that make medical care 
available to those who cannot afford it. It is the work of 
the active citizens which enables retired senior citizens 
to pick up their pensions. It is their contributions, too, 
which help to supply a fund for the unemployed. It is 
thanks to national solidarity that all children in the 
country benefit from a free education. Now, health, work 
and education all form an essential part of everyone’s 
existence. However, a democratic state cannot require 
from its citizens that they love it, only that they remain 
loyal to it. It is for every individual to look after his or 
her own affective choices; neither the government nor 
Parliament have any reason to meddle with them. It is 
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and civic values as embodied in law. It is thanks 
to distinctions of this kind that other non-Western 
countries have managed to adopt the principles of 
democratic government without having to renounce 
their traditions and customs. The separation between 
laws and values on the one side, and culture and 
spirituality on the other, can become (in the West, 
too) the point of departure for a politics adapted to 
contemporary society.
On the other hand, in order to submit to the law, 
we need first to know it. ‘Ignorance of the law is no 
excuse’ – true, but in practice, there are many adults 
who are ignorant of the law, and who transgress it 
unknowingly – something that is especially easy if they 
are acting in agreement with an ancestral custom. In 
the contemporary world, it is for the state to ensure that 
the inhabitants of the country, whatever their origin, 
have some idea of the great principles on which the 
laws rest. Basic education should be free and obligatory 
for all, as it is for the native-born children. And this, 
in turn, requires a basic knowledge of the country’s 
language. Pondering how best to respond to these 
demands, and what might be asked in exchange, could 
well be the task of a modern liberal state, which is 
necessarily a multicultural one.
Are we threatened today by a ‘clash of civilisations’? 
I am personally unable to see in what sense cultural 
differences are the source of contemporary international 
conflicts. Thus I don’t believe that the remedy for these 
tensions will come from a debate on culture. Western 
countries can help ease these tensions in other ways. 
Present interactions do not occur in a vacuum, and the 
centuries of history that have preceded them cannot 
be erased – centuries in which Western countries 
have dominated the rest of the world. So we can see 
what demands can be addressed to the political and 
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If certain persons living in a European country 
these days refuse the state of law, oppress women or 
systematically resort to physical violence, they are to be 
condemned not because such types of behaviour are 
foreign to European cultural identity (they are not), but 
because they transgress the current laws, which in turn 
are inspired by a core of moral and political values.
How can we distinguish between what is 
acceptable insofar as it forms part of a tradition, 
and what is not acceptable insofar as it contradicts 
the constitutive values of democracy? The answer 
is in principle not difficult, even if its application in 
particular cases poses problems: in a democracy, law 
is higher than custom. This precedence does not affect 
Western, or European, or even French culture, but 
constitutes the basis of the values to which each country 
is faithful. The values of a society find their expression 
in the Constitution, the laws or indeed the structure 
of the State; if custom transgresses them, it must be 
abandoned. The Universal Declaration of UNESCO, 
adopted in 2001 and confirmed by the UN in 2002, says 
in article 4: ‘None may invoke cultural diversity in order 
to attack the human rights guaranteed by international 
law, nor to limit their effectiveness.’ We could add: ‘nor 
to attack any of the rights guaranteed by the legal code 
of a democratic country’. If the law is not broken, this 
means that the custom in question can be tolerated: it 
can be criticised publicly, but it should not be forbidden. 
For example, marriages in which the choice of partner 
is imposed by the family become a crime only if they 
are imposed by force; if they are accompanied by the 
consent of the bride, they may be regrettable, but they 
cannot be treated as being against the law.
The members of a multicultural society would do 
well to draw a very clear line between cultural identity 
and political choices, between forms of spirituality 
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and constitutive of a basic identity, but concerns rather 
rules of life that can easily be accepted as varying from 
one country to another. The clash of civilisations is 
definitely not our unavoidable destiny.
Tzvetan Todorov was born in Sofia, Bulgaria and is a 
historian, essayist and Directeur de Recherche Honoraire 
at the CNRS in Paris. He has taught as Visiting Professor 
at various American universities and is the author of, 
among other titles, The Conquest of America, On Human 
Diversity, Facing the Extreme and Hope and Memory.
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intellectual elites in the West, if they desire sincerely 
to take part. The first requirement here would be 
that they cease to consider themselves an incarnation 
of the law, virtue and universality, of which their 
technological superiority would seem to be the proof; 
so they should stop setting themselves a priori above 
the laws and judgments of others even if those seem 
to violate some of their habits. Moreover, the right 
to military intervention that certain Western powers 
have arrogated to themselves is not only without any 
basis other than force; it risks suggesting that the 
ideals defended by Westerners – liberty, equality, 
secularism, human rights – are merely a convenient 
camouf lage for their will to power, and thus are not 
worthy of any respect. Freedom cannot be promoted 
by constraint, nor equality by subjection. If our 
political leaders wish these Western ideals to remain 
active, for example in the Middle East, they must 
begin by withdrawing their troops from the countries 
in which they are intervening (Iraq and Afghanistan), 
close down illegal prisons and torture camps, and 
help set up a viable Palestinian state.
Every society is multicultural. The fact remains 
that, nowadays, the contacts between populations of 
different origins (especially in the cities), migrations 
and travels, and the international exchange of 
information, are all more intense than ever before; 
and there is no reason why this tendency should 
be reversed. Good management of this growing 
pluralism would imply not that we assimilate others 
to the culture of the majority, but that we respect 
minorities and integrate them into a framework of 
laws and civic values common to all. That objective is 
simultaneously important, since it has to do with the 
life of the whole collective, and accessible, insofar as it 





Claude Levi-Strauss was 26 when he arrived in Brazil, 
in 1935, as a member of a group of distinguished French 
scientists and intellectuals, the so-called Mission Française, 
coming straight from La Sorbonne, University of Paris, 
to be the founding fathers of its tropical branch at the 
University of São Paulo. He rented a nice house that 
he could share with his wife and his father, both as 
eager as he was to flee the European chaos, where the 
rise of Nazi-Fascism pointed to dark times, intolerance 
and war looming close on the horizon. That house was 
peculiar in many senses. It was a nice, spacious house, 
recently built by an Italian capomastro in a Roman 
geometric style, which was a regular occurrence in a city 
whose population was mostly comprised of European 
immigrants, the majority of them Italians.
The house also had a wide backyard, displaying an 
orchard full of tropical plants and trees. There were palm 
trees, ferns, mango and papaya trees, to which Levi-
Strauss himself added many other tropical species, found, 
selected and planted by him, among them a magnificent 
group of banana trees. In time, he would populate that 
backyard with a multitude of birds and animals that he 
would bring from his escapades to the rural outskirts of 
the city: macaws, parrots, parakeets, monkeys.
Even more interesting than that was the location 
of the house. The city of São Paulo is crossed by a ridge, 
dividing the urban area into two wide slopes, one to 
From ‘Tristes Tropiques’ to Tropical Treats:  
Savage Imaginaries in Multiple Brazils
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of Mestiço populations (Caipiras, people with mixed 
White and Native blood) in old colonial towns in the 
backlands of the State of São Paulo. After two years 
of teaching, he decided to take his greatest gamble: 
the expeditions to meet Native communities in the 
most remote lands of central Brazil, in the unknown, 
unmapped areas known as o sertão (uncharted 
backlands). Once he set off with his little expedition, 
anthropology in particular and the human sciences in 
general would never be the same again.
The incompatibility between Levi-Strauss and his 
Brazilian academic and intellectual colleagues couldn’t 
have been greater. Brazilian intelligentsia, especially those 
involved with the creation of the University of São Paulo, 
were mesmerised by the lure of modernisation. The main 
ambition of São Paulo’s elite was to become the Chicago 
of South America, the capital of industry, market, finance, 
science, new technologies and industrial arts. After the 
First World War, their cultural reference was still Europe, 
particularly France (not for too long though), but their 
business ideal was the USA. Within the very small ruling 
elite of the State of São Paulo, there was a tacit pride at 
having extinguished the last Native communities almost to 
oblivion in the State, as well as having alienated completely 
the former Black slaves and their descendents from the 
process of economic growth, giving preference to new 
masses of European and Asian immigrants. The richest 
state of the Brazilian Federation, the most powerful, the 
one with enough voting power to choose the next president 
on its own, the most advanced in terms of technologies, 
finance, education and culture, wanted to be seen as 
virtually Native-free, Black-free and Caipira-free.
It wouldn’t be a surprise then, how shocked and 
outraged this Paulista elite felt when, after the Second 
World War, in 1955, Levi-Strauss (who had left Brazil 
in 1939) published his seminal book, Tristes Tropiques. 
the southwest the other to the northeast. The dividing 
line at the very top of the hill was paved, becoming the 
most scenographic urban feature, Avenida Paulista, 
with rows of stately houses on both sides. The southwest 
slope comprised the posh area, planned by an English 
company engaged in selling overseas picturesque 
commercial versions of the original Garden City project 
of Ebenezer Howard. The houses were exotic models 
of colonial English bungalows mixed up with Spanish-
Californian estancias architecture. Directly opposed to it, 
the northeast slope comprised the poor side of town, the 
so-called Liberdade District, reminiscent of the colonial 
area where slaves and cattle were kept, where the prisons, 
the pillory, the gallows, the humble chapels and the 
cemetery exclusive to Black people as well as the stables 
and the slaughterhouses were concentrated. The most 
fascinating thing about the house chosen by Levi-Strauss 
was that its façade was facing Avenida Paulista while the 
backyard was turned to Liberdade. Needless to say which 
side was Levi-Strauss’s favourite.
Levi-Strauss’s father was trained in the visual arts 
and was a professional photographer, keen on being 
supplied with excellent photographic equipment, which 
he shared with his son, whom he had instructed in his 
métier. Levi-Strauss therefore soon became a brilliant 
and accomplished photographer. Whenever his duties at 
the University of São Paulo permitted, he would venture 
with his cameras to the streets, always attracted towards 
the northeast slope, walking his way towards the 
historic centre of the city, with his interest concentrated 
particularly in the Liberdade District and the black 
communities. That’s how he registered scenes of 
Carnival, street dances, funerary ceremonies and rituals 
of spirit possession being performed in the public areas 
of Liberdade. During holidays he would travel away 
from the city limits, looking for ancestral ceremonies 
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free from foreign influences as well as from literary 
sources, different levels of cultural configurations took 
shape, some based on Native mythologies and rituals, 
some on Sub-Saharan African religion and rhythms, 
some on Caipira conflations of the many sides of 
mestiçagem. Adding to that, the kind of poor Portuguese 
peasants who came to be settlers in Brazil, mostly 
coming from the poorest areas of Trás-os-Montes in 
the north of Portugal, were adepts and survivors of 
the heresy of the Holy Spirit (the same group as the 
Alumbrados in Spain, the Albingensis in Provence 
and the Fraticelli in northern Italy, decimated by the 
Crusaders under the orders of the Papacy). The basic 
element in common between these different groups 
(Natives, Africans, Caipiras, Trasmontinos) was the 
fact that they believed in rituals by which they could 
incorporate and be possessed by Divine entities in their 
multiple manifestations, dispensing absolutely with the 
tutelage of the Catholic Church or any kind of permission 
from the Crown authorities.
That new generation of intellectuals and artists of 
the 1950s and 1960s just mentioned above was living and 
acting in the aftermath of the Second World War, under a 
wave of new technologies that invaded the daily life of the 
urban populations, defining new routines – mechanised, 
automatised, standardised – and moved by the dynamics 
of publicity and consumerism. However, they rejected 
the pressures to conform to this new planned and robotic 
world, looking forward to an alternative future. What 
then became the object of their deeper desires was 
that legacy of free-floating imaginaries, spontaneous, 
independent, rebellious, oriented towards the flows of 
the cycles of nature on the one hand and to the instinctual 
demands of the pulsating body on the other. That turned 
out to them to be the real treasure of Brazilian culture, 
a precious and fleeting heritage to be redeemed, to 
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It soon became one of the key books of the twentieth 
century. It was entirely based on the experiences lived 
in São Paulo and the expeditions led by Levi-Strauss in 
the backlands of central Brazil. It changed not just the 
way anthropology was written and thought about, but 
more than anything else redefined the way Western 
society and culture were conceived. In his classic Race 
and History (1952), part of his works commissioned by 
the United Nations to denounce the legacy of racism and 
eugenics, he had already stated his beliefs in cultural 
diversity, stressing the riches, the wisdom and the 
beauty of many non-Western traditions. But it was in 
Tristes Tropiques that he dived deep into mythological 
thinking, ritual and rhythmic performances, and 
symbolic figurations as sources of alternative thinking 
and intuition, articulated in a kind of bricolage process, 
which deserved as much respect and appreciation as 
Western science and philosophy.
Coincidentally, by that same time in the 1950s 
and 1960s, a new generation of Brazilian artists and 
intellectuals came to the fore, who were decidedly 
suspicious of modernity and modernisation, denouncing 
its deleterious effect upon popular traditions, especially 
those preserved by the Native, the Black and the Caipira 
communities. Brazilian history was marked from its very 
origins by a sort of strong insularity. The Portuguese, 
always terrified by the danger of strong foreign powers 
threatening to invade and steal their richest colony, were 
resolutely averse to any form of contact with foreigners of 
any kind, who were forbidden to enter into the colony’s 
territory. Both the Portuguese Crown and the Church 
were also afraid of the ‘dangerous ideas’, be they those of 
the Reformation or later on those of the Enlightenment 
and liberalism, infiltrating Brazilian minds, so the 
authorities did whatever was possible to prevent the 
spread of literacy within the colony. As a consequence, 
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the overpowering spread of the new rationality of 
planning, economic exploitation of all available natural 
resources and the submission of all peoples, mostly the 
younger ones, to massive campaigns for the eradication 
of illiteracy and mandatory education according to 
a standardised national curriculum devised by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture in Brasília.
Since then there had been strong resistance from 
many rather isolated groups to this federal imperative 
to reduce many popular imaginaries to one single 
national culture. But historical change as it took its 
course, especially from the middle of the 1970s onwards, 
unleashed a dynamic that rendered this process virtually 
irreversible. A new wave of technological innovations 
evicted huge multitudes from the sertão and the rural 
areas, forcing them to internal migrations, which would 
inevitably end up by their settling into sub-human 
slums in the outskirts of the main capital cities. In 
fact Levi-Strauss in Tristes Tropiques saw it coming, the 
whole book sounding as a kind of bittersweet swan song. 
Communities dissolved, families broke up and were 
separated, social bonds disappeared, cultural traditions 
were lost. People alienated from their native backgrounds 
and deprived of their emotional ties turned to the new 
ascending media personalities, trusting their best hopes 
to populist politicians. When Levi-Strauss returned to 
Brazil for a very brief visit in the company of President 
Mitterand, in 1985, he couldn’t even visit his beloved 
Liberdade, because the cab got stuck in a gigantic traffic 
jam. By leaving the country for the last time he declared, 
‘the Brazil that I knew doesn’t exist anymore’.
The advantage of trying to figure out these 
complex historical changes from the perspective of 
the new generation of artists and intellectuals of the 
1950s and 1960s is particularly interesting because 
they not only could understand quite well what was 
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be cherished as much as to be translated and updated 
according to the demands of an alternative culture 
in the growing metropolis. That was the living raw 
material which could give symbolic as much as 
corporeal, sensorial and communitarian substance to 
social and cultural projects oriented towards a more 
balanced, equalitarian, caring, playful and pleasurable 
post-affluent society.
The main target of the cultural criticism articulated 
by these new artists and intellectuals was the new 
rationality applied to urban planning models, based on 
the American concept of the sprawling suburbs, grid-like 
functional zoning, and the mainstream architectural 
trend of high towers and huge car parks called the 
International Style. Many of the most important 
Brazilian capital cities were reconfigured according to 
these new paradigms: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo 
Horizonte. But its most iconic manifestation was the 
brand new capital of the federation, prodigiously built 
up entirely within five years, from 1956 to 1960 in the 
middle of the sertão, at the heart of uncharted central 
Brazil, the city of Brasília. That futuristic city, dubbed 
‘the capital of hope’ and ‘the most modern city in the 
world’ by the proud authorities who built it, was actually 
the nemesis of those artists and intellectuals who got 
in tune with the popular imaginaries representing the 
liberating legacies of the pensée sauvage.
Brasília was therefore presented, not only to 
Brazilians but to the entire world, as the colossal display 
window of post-Second World War advanced capitalism, 
putting a definitive end to the last terra ignota and its 
respective barbarian populations and cultures. The 
new capital was connected to a plethora of express 
highways and airports penetrating deep in all directions 
of the territory as well as establishing international 
communications. Nothing else was supposed to escape 
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To no one’s surprise, as soon as Brazilian 
independence was declared in 1822, one of the first 
measures taken by the brand new Nation-State was to 
make it illegal for anyone to speak any languages other 
than official Portuguese or other recognised European 
languages, under the penalty for transgressors of 
being brutally flogged and imprisoned. As a follow-up 
in the same direction a national Instituto Histórico e 
Geográfico was created, designed to rearrange all facts 
related to the social and cultural experiences lived 
in the former colony in direct connection to the new 
Nation-State. Whatever by any means concurred or was 
interpreted as concurring with the achievement of the 
independent Nation-State was deemed relevant, the rest 
inconsequential; whatever concurred with the unified 
Brazilian national culture was significant, the rest 
discarded as meaningless. In parallel a new Academia de 
Belas Artes (obviously based on the Academie des Beaux 
Arts of France) was inaugurated, declaring all versions of 
popular Baroque or Native arts as barbarian, despicable 
and shameful to the cultivated nation.
The artistic generation of the 1950s and 1960s on 
the other hand was the first to abandon the centrality 
of the Nation-State and Western civilisation as 
historical or cultural parameters according to which 
everything would have to be weighed and measured. 
Their aim was to dive deep into whatever remained of 
the legacies of the many popular imaginaries which 
thrived in colonial times. For them, therefore, there 
was no such thing as Brazil or to put it another way, 
there were many Brazils, within and without the actual 
Brazilian territory. These artists were keen on learning 
to think in mythological terms, to speak with gesture 
and body movement, to express feelings and emotions 
through colours, flavours and smells, to establish social 
and affective bonds through rhythm and sound, to put 
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going on, but they were also in a privileged position 
to consider what other historical alternatives were 
still available, conceivable or desirable. According 
to their view, the main source of the processes of 
cultural impoverishment was the institutionalisation 
of the Nation-State, with its ensuing pressure for 
educational reform and cultural homogenisation. In 
a sense, Europe underwent a similar process during 
the Renaissance, when the national languages were 
formalised according to fixed grammatical rules. This 
set the stage for the canonical ordering of cultural 
values from which national cultures were composed. 
Therefore, European Baroque was accordingly a period 
of centrifugal absorption of cultural production under 
the tutelage of Church and Crown.
In Brazil, however, moving in the opposite direction 
during a rather extended Baroque period that lasted 
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the 
presence of the Portuguese Catholic Church and the 
Crown authorities was so limited and concentrated in 
a few port cities, that all over the territory a centripetal 
effect occurred, a multiplicity of local cultural formations 
sprung up all over the territory and even across the 
borders, feeding themselves on Baroque symbols, 
images and motifs, but in fact switching them into 
something totally other. There was, for instance, a 
Guarany rebellious proto-republic to the south; a large 
Tupinambá community to the southeast; a Sertanejo-
Caipira (by the way, the only variation of the Portuguese 
language that Levi-Strauss learned in Brazil) culture 
by the central plateau; a vast Congo-Kimbundo nation 
spreading from Rio de Janeiro to the adjoining areas; 
a Yorubá-Nagô-Hussuá nation on the northeast coast; 
a Tapuia-influenced culture in the pastoral backlands 
of the northeast; a huge Nheengatú federation in the 
Amazonian area, to mention but a few.
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for instance that of the ‘magic peacock’ (pavão misterioso) 
or the ‘enchanted bull’ (boi encantado), exist today only 
in Siberia and in the sertão of Brazil. On the other hand, 
we have mythic-poetic elements coming from Congo 
and Yorubá sources, mixed with Tupi-Guaraní, Tamoio, 
Tapuia and Gê cultural legacies. All of these Guimarães 
Rosa would elaborate in a richly complex experimental 
prose that tries to conglomerate into writing the subtle 
and multifarious memories and linguistic layers of 
millenarian oral traditions.
Clarice Lispector, on the other hand, mixes 
these elements of Brazilian popular oral tradition 
with the legacy of linguistic wonder of the Hassidic 
and Kabala culture she brought from her inheritance 
of the Russian and Ukrainian shtetls. So fond of 
allegories and parables, like her spiritual brother 
Franz Kafka, she nonetheless transcends the basic 
Hassidic fundament of her fascination with the powers 
of the spoken and body language by the way that 
she engages the syncretic and ritualistic elements of 
Brazilian popular culture. Her treatment, for instance, 
of the quintessential theme of the relationship 
between the woman and the sea, that is to say the 
relationship between women and the source of life, 
refers as much to the Hebrew myth of Lilith, as to 
the Semitic representation of Ashtarté, as well as to 
the classical figure of Aphrodite and, of course, to the 
all-powerful Afro-Brazilian godly figure of Yemanjá. 
Her compassion for the rural population that was 
being crushed into massive eviction, followed by a life 
lived under sub-human conditions in urban slums, 
was represented by images of insects and wild animals 
being systematically exterminated by a social policy 
of prophylactic paranoia. It was hygiene turned into 
ethics, in the same sense as in the 1930s and 1940s 
eugenics was enforced as State policy.
play, pleasure and happiness at the centre of the social 
experience of daily life and to live in harmony with 
nature, natural cycles and all creatures.
There were many artists that could be mentioned 
as comprising this new 1950s and 1960s generation, 
representing different forms of artistic expression, from 
music to architecture, from sculpture to dance. For 
reasons of brevity in this paper, however, I will limit my 
references to four, certainly the four more prominent 
of them all: writers Guimarães Rosa and Clarice 
Lispector, as well as visual artists Hélio Oiticica and 
Arthur Bispo do Rosário. To be sure, there were very 
few things in common between these artists, each one 
of them living a life totally separated from the others. 
What they shared then, making them utterly relevant to 
the culture of the second half of the twentieth century, 
was an acute awareness of the intrinsically anti-human, 
anti-social and anti-environmental values which 
became the dominant credo of post-war culture. The 
prevalent obsession with consumerism, entertainment, 
geometric precision, planning, automation, fast cars 
and planes, domestic cleanliness and efficacy, and above 
all the idea that the American way of life was superior 
and therefore the only model destined to shape the 
future of the entire humanity and of the planet, was to 
them senseless and offensive.
Guimarães Rosa’s fictional works are completely 
immersed into the oral narratives of the illiterate people 
of the sertão of north-central Brazil. His refined and 
very sophisticated prose tries to recreate oral traditions 
composed of mythic-poetic material coming from 
medieval and ancient Europe and Asia, as well as from 
Indigenous and African traditional sources. His stories 
refer to the Arthurian and Charlemagne legends, as 
well as to German, Slavic, Mongol, Indian and Trans-
Himalayan mythologies. Certain mythological themes, 
42 43
The Inner Lives of Cultures From ‘Tristes Tropiques’ to Tropical Treats
or training in his entire life. That was because his 
family belonged to a long tradition of committed 
anarchists. He was therefore educated by members 
of his own family. But what a family that was! His 
mother was an accomplished musician, singer and 
piano player. His many aunts were choreographers, 
dancers, musicians and actresses. His older brother was 
an architect, his grandfather was a poet and playwright 
and his father was internationally acclaimed as both a 
biologist and an artistic photographer. Hélio Oiticica 
was therefore a man of many talents, so that when he 
decided to dedicate himself to the visual arts, he started 
by working with the abstractionist/concretist group of 
artists who counted as the avant-garde in Rio de Janeiro. 
The big surprise though came quite soon, when he 
decided to shape his art in accordance with the daily life 
and oral culture of the poorest layers of the population 
of Rio, living in the favela slums and in the dire 
settlements spread across the outskirts of the city.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, as you may 
remember, the city was being modernised in line with 
the new standards of American urban planning and 
International Style architecture. For the same reasons, 
huge multitudes of people from the rural areas were 
being evicted from their native regions, having no 
alternative but to look for jobs in metropolitan areas. 
To face this massive invasion, the authorities of Rio 
were relying on the police and repressive forces to keep 
these undesirable people from spoiling their beautifully 
refashioned scenario. Hélio Oiticica knew exactly 
what he was doing. By living and getting integrated 
with people in the favelas, to the point of becoming 
one of the most acclaimed samba dancers of Rio, as a 
member of the legendary Mangueira School of Samba, 
he started shaping a brand new situational art. His aim 
was to learn and express the ingenious manners by 
Arthur Bispo do Rosário was a very poor Black 
and barely literate man, born in the backlands of the 
northeast area. Being detached from his family since 
his childhood, he would live mostly as a beggar until 
he was the age to enrol in the Brazilian navy. But he 
would soon be discharged from the navy on account 
of what was considered his mental instability. He tried 
for a while to have a career as a boxing fighter, but with 
very little success. So eventually he returned to begging 
in the streets of Rio de Janeiro, until at the age of 30 he 
was sent to a mental institution, where he would remain 
until the end of his life in 1989. There, solitary in his 
cell, he would start unpicking the old uniforms of other 
inmates, in order to make a series of astounding pieces of 
embroidery. He would translate into works of textile and 
embroidery all the wondrous mythic-poetic imaginary 
of the popular woodcuts prevalent all over the backlands 
of the northeast, as a visual support to its oral culture. 
It came all of a sudden from inside Bispo do Rosário, 
as a volcanic overflow of prodigious artistic expression 
that became incessant and ever surprising to his very 
last days. Bewildered by his talents, the medics of the 
institution would permit him, from time to time, to roam 
the streets of Rio collecting pieces of garbage, discarded 
objects, industrial waste, junk and rags, which he would 
meticulously elaborate into deeply symbolic objects, 
discriminating panels (which significantly he would 
call ‘display windows’ or ‘archives’), banners, streamers, 
drapes, garments, cloaks, mantles and the most subtle and 
delicate compositions of textiles: colours, shapes, textures, 
knots, cords, fringes, studs, pendants and embroideries. 
Bispo do Rosário combined the uniforms of the mad 
and the garbage of the streets of Rio into one of the most 
sublime artistic treasures Brazil has ever had.
Although Hélio Oiticica was born into a middle-
class family, he never had any kind of formal schooling 
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according to American academic criticism, they were 
becoming highly praised by some of the most decisive 
critical voices in North and Latin America, as well as in 
Europe. The stream of critical debate seemed at long last 
to be turning to their favour. Paradoxically, therefore, 
they couldn’t predict it, but from the last decades of the 
twentieth century onwards, history took a surprising 
turn, undermining the role and powers of Nation-States 
at the same time that global and local interactions were 
reinforced. Perhaps then, their best hopes and dreams are 
not lost at all. Perhaps now, more than ever, we could learn 
with them that the moment has come when we shall say 
good-bye Brazil, hello Brazils.
 
Nicolau Sevcenko is a public intellectual and journalist 
currently teaching at Harvard University as a Professor of 
Romance Languages and Literatures. Author of nine books 
and numerous articles in the Brazilian weekly magazine 
Carta-Capital, Sevcenko has written on history, linguistics, 
music, technology and politics, with a particular emphasis 
on Brazil’s national and cultural history.
which these segregated people were re-inventing, every 
day and in every way, a relentless praxis of resilience, 
capable of circumventing the repressive apparatus 
of the authorities, at the same time that they would 
be celebrating their own cultural values of vitality, 
sensuality and spirituality. That was the source of the 
parangolés of Hélio: a kind of elaborate fancy dress, 
each person could make their own, full of different 
textiles, plastics, meshes, nets, embroideries, stamps 
and written messages, destined at the same time for the 
public and collective dance of samba and for the display 
of messages of protest against the authorities, as well 
as pleas for civil rights and for the enfranchisement of 
people. Thus art would entail a ludic interplay between 
daily life, politics and popular festival. When Hélio tried 
to show the parangolé at the Museum of Modern Art, he 
was confronted and expelled by the Director along with 
his samba dancing friends. Nonchalantly, Hélio took his 
entire group to the external gardens of the Museum, at 
the very heart of the newly beautified Flamengo Park and 
danced the parangolé all night long under the lights of 
torches brought by his friends. That was one of the most 
legendary and unforgettable parties that Rio has ever 
had. After that, Hélio had to flee, living a political exile 
that would last almost to his death in 1980.
So Levi-Strauss’s basic aim in Tristes Tropiques  
– to affirm the originality, richness and rather generous 
character of the diverse Brazilian indigenous and popular 
culture – was taken to a sublime dimension, as well as to a 
very articulated expression, by the artists of the 1950s and 
1960s generation. Apart from the disjointed heyday of the 
baroque period, since the inception of the Nation-State, 
never before had indigenous and popular culture played 
such a seminal role in the highest artistic output in the 
country. Although these artists were generally reviewed 




China in Search of Harmony
Shu Sunyan
‘The idea of a Harmonious Society will be China’s biggest 
contribution to humanity.’ 
So said a senior Chinese minister, addressing a 
Cambridge University audience recently. He seemed 
to place it above our four great inventions – paper, 
gunpowder, printing and the compass. And right now 
China is gripped by Harmonious Society mania. It 
is on the lips of every Party official, in every single 
government document and on the billboards of every 
Chinese city, town and village. It is in the air we breathe, 
in the water we drink, in the food we eat, and in the 
dreams we dream.
Apparently the Communist utopia is no more, and a 
Harmonious Society is now China’s ultimate goal. Besides, 
a harmonious China would pose no threat to the world.
This idea seems nothing but extraordinary at first 
sight, coming from the country with the world’s longest 
history of authoritarian rule. And it comes at a time when 
many people – in China and overseas – believe that this 
is the dawn of a new China, and the Chinese themselves 
should be joyful and ready to take part. After all, the 
Chinese characters for ‘democracy’ (民主) mean ‘putting 
the people in charge’, just like the Greek original.
So the big question is, what is meant by a Harmonious 
Society? Has China come up with something even better 
than Fukuyama’s End of History?
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virtue. Once we understand it, we are at one with nature; 
and the relationship between men should be no different. 
Therefore Laozi advocates a Utopia where men should 
also follow his vaguely defined law of nature, which 
he calls ‘the Way’. ‘Returning to nature is the Way. 
Ignorance of it will lead to wanton action and disaster. 
But knowledge of this eternity will enable one to be 
tolerant, fair and unselfish. A man with these qualities 
will be the leader who understands the law of heaven and 
earth, and who rules as just and fair-minded as heaven 
is all encompassing of everything under the sun. This 
is close to the Way. With the guidance of the Way, peace 
and stability, longevity and eternity will prevail.’
Laozi’s idea of harmony was too daring for the 
Chinese rulers, although it is always somewhere 
to retreat for the Chinese – personal refinement, 
detachment and consolation for those who perhaps 
are not so successful. Confucius, a contemporary of 
Laozi, was more influential. Born in 551 bc, when 
China was a collection of rival and unruly warring 
states, Confucius was horrified by the violence and 
chaos he saw. He roamed the warring states to preach 
moderation and restraint. The Middle Way, one of 
the Confucian classics, gives especial importance to 
achieving harmony through balance and moderation. 
‘With this harmony, heaven and earth will do what they 
are supposed to do, and everything will prosper.’ Dong 
Zhongshu, the man who revived Confucianism, put it 
unambiguously: ‘Not too tough, not too soft, this is the 
best government. If this is not the Middle Way, what is? 
Those who can govern by the Middle Way, their virtues 
will spread. Those who can look after themselves this 
way will enjoy extreme longevity.’
But even if it could be argued that harmony was this 
strong in the Confucian tradition, it had all but vanished 
700 years after his death, when he was elevated to be 
The Chinese government thinks so, and there 
is no shortage of scholars desperately trying to prove 
that harmony has long been at the heart of Chinese 
philosophy and political thought. The Book of Changes, 
one of our earliest written books, dating back 2500 
years, is all about harmony between man and nature. 
It centres on the concept of yin and yang, the balance of 
opposites – moon and sun, night and day, heaven and 
earth, men and women. ‘Yin and yang are the way of the 
world,’ says The Book of Changes. With harmony between 
men, politics will be unnecessary – everyone will have 
the same goals; with harmony in the family, society will 
be prosperous; with harmony between states, there will 
be peace on earth.
Two and half millennia on, The Book of Changes 
is still the work mostly frequently consulted when the 
Chinese want their fortunes told. And the concept of 
harmony is deeply rooted in popular Chinese culture, 
commonly finding expression in our idioms. ‘Harmony 
brings money’, or ‘we might both prosper if we live in 
harmony’ – that is enough to stop anyone fighting. Even, 
after a long winter, ‘a spring breeze brings the air of 
harmony’. To describe an amicable person, we would say, 
‘He is all harmony’. And when we describe a successful 
person, we say he has three harmonies: heaven is on 
his side, i.e. he has the right timing; earth is on his 
side, i.e. he is in the right place; and he has the support 
of his fellow men. Being in the right place at the right 
time is important, but nowhere near as important as the 
harmony of people. For every Chinese who wants to get 
somewhere in the world, this is the first precept to learn.
Harmony between heaven, earth and men is 
most clearly and eloquently expressed by Laozi in his 
Daode Jing, The Book of the Way. The Way is the law of 
nature, the balance of yin and yang, which gives rise to 
everything. Understanding this law of nature is called 
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was that music is composed of different voices, each 
sounding its correct note. If everyone sings the same 
note, that is unison, not harmony. Of course they found 
support for this liberal interpretation in The Analects: 
‘Gentlemen can maintain harmony even if they disagree; 
unrefined souls cannot, whatever they may say.’
Sadly unison, not harmony, has been the rule 
throughout China’s long history. The first emperor who 
unified China in the second century ad decreed that 
all roads should have the same width and that all coins, 
weights and measures should be the same everywhere. 
And everyone had to have the same thoughts. Most 
books from previous times were burnt; scholars who 
dared to express different opinions were buried alive. 
Fast forward to the twentieth century: the last emperor 
abdicated in 1911, but in a few decades Mao became a 
new emperor in all but name. He even boasted that the 
first emperor buried only 460 scholars, while he sent 
over one million intellectuals to labour camp. They were 
encouraged to speak their minds in 1957, but when they 
did, he could not bear the criticism. His Little Red Book 
was all you could have on your shelf in the decade of the 
Cultural Revolution – a decade during which the Red 
Guards burnt nearly all the existing copies of the classics, 
including Confucius’s.
In between the first and the last emperor, unison 
rather than harmony was made possible by another 
unique Chinese invention, the Imperial Exam. Seeing how 
effective Confucianism was in providing an ethical basis 
for a strong and stable government, the imperial rulers 
decided to use it as the essential criteria for selecting 
officials to run the country. Such is the origin of the 
Imperial Exam. Every three years the exam took place at 
district, provincial and national level in the Confucian 
Hall in every town and city in the country. Successful 
candidates went up to the next level, and the final winners 
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the supreme teacher of the nation. His thoughts were 
made the only ideology of the day, and remained so for the 
next two thousand years. If there was one book that any 
educated Chinese read, it was The Analects, the sayings 
of Confucius compiled by his students. But in truth it 
was not harmony, but order that was the catchword for 
Confucius. And the essence of this Confucianism is li, 
ritual. If society can be organised according to li so that 
everyone knows their place and behaves appropriately, 
there will be order, which is the Confucian term for 
‘harmony’. The emperor should be benevolent, the officials 
loyal, the children filial, the father kind, and women 
chaste. So benevolence, loyalty, filial duty and chastity 
were deemed to be the essential Confucian, and therefore 
Chinese, qualities for two thousand years, providing an 
ethical basis for a strong and stable government.
In this hierarchical ordering of society, the emperor 
had a special role, as the fulcrum connecting heaven and 
earth; as such his position was central to underpinning 
Chinese society. It was in the emperor’s interest to 
make sure that Confucianism was not just a set of 
philosophical thoughts but social, moral and political 
obligations, permeating every single aspect of Chinese 
culture and society. It became the highest principle of 
imperial China and could not be broken, like a law of 
nature. If anyone stepped out of line, they could expect 
condemnation or ostracism; infringing the moral code 
incurred heavier punishment than breaking the law. 
With everything laid out so clearly, no wonder the 
Chinese used to say, ‘With half a copy of The Analects, 
the emperor could rule the world.’
This hierarchical order is not what Confucius 
meant by harmony, some scholars argue. They have 
drawn attention to the original meaning of the Chinese 
characters for harmony. They refer to the vibrations of 
an instrument used as a tuning fork. The implication 
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the core of China’s literary and artistic outpouring. Some 
of the most accomplished calligraphers, poets, painters, 
novelists and musicians were also high officials and 
prime ministers who had come top in the Imperial 
Exam. Even today, we can admire their writings carved 
on stone steles in temples, monasteries and imperial 
burial grounds. But they normally created their best 
works of literary and artistic merit after they were sent 
into exile for taking initiatives, speaking their minds or 
criticising certain government policies – the Confucian 
taboos. It was no coincidence that the peaks of artistic 
creativity in Chinese history were in the fifth, the tenth 
and the fourteenth centuries when China was in total 
chaos from uprisings or changes of dynasty, or when 
China was ruled by the nomadic people from the north, 
as during Chinggis Khan’s conquest of China. During 
those times, the Confucian grip was broken and the 
educated elites were freer to think beyond their Imperial 
Exams and the Confucian orthodoxy. But these times 
were few and far between in Chinese history. For most 
of the time, Confucianism reigned supreme.
Yet it is this very Confucianism that the 
Communist Party has made the core of its harmonious 
society. A Confucius mania is stalking the land. 
Confucian classics are prominently displayed in 
bookshops; Confucian MBA courses for the new rich 
are mushrooming; a blockbuster film on Confucius’s 
life and teaching, starring the famous actor Fat Chow 
from Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon, is guaranteed 
a massive audience. Confucius from the Heart by Yu 
Dan, a professor of Media Studies in Beijing, has had 
a record ten million sales in China. She tells us how 
Confucianism is relevant to the modern world and can 
make us happy. ‘The higher state requires that a person 
must not only accept poverty peaceably… they must also 
be possessed of a calm, clear inner happiness, the kind 
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were rewarded by the emperor to become the elite who 
ran the country at every level. Although the content of 
the exams varied throughout the ages, just Four Books 
and Five Classics, all attributed to Confucius and his 
disciples, were the core of the exams, and, in the last 700 
years, their only content. Winning the Imperial Exam and 
holding office became the goal of almost every Chinese 
scholar, and rote learning of the Confucian classics 
was fundamental to success in the exams. Texts of over 
400,000 characters had to be thoroughly memorised 
if a candidate was to have any hope of success, even at 
the district level. This meant that the local elites and 
ambitious would-be members of those elites across the 
whole of China were taught with the same values to be 
dedicated believers in Confucianism.
No other country in the world allowed itself to 
be ruled by bureaucrats selected on such a strict and 
restrictive basis. Not only that, for 400 years, these 
works had to be interpreted according to a single source, 
a commentary by the fifteenth-century Zhu Xi, whose 
most famous remark was ‘Preserve the heavenly order 
and annihilate all human desires’. Even that was not 
enough. Each answer had to have the same number of 
paragraphs (eight), the same length – 700 characters – 
and the same prescribed form for the beginning, middle 
and end. The Imperial Exam may have kept China as the 
world’s longest lasting continuous civilisation – but how 
stifling, and at what a cost.
The Confucian grip on Chinese art, literature, music 
and culture was no less complete. Calligraphy, literature, 
music and painting had always been regarded as the 
required qualities of the educated elites, rather than separate 
disciplines. They were partly what made them junzi, men of 
integrity, which is the Confucian ideal of a morally correct 
person. In them Confucianism found its most eloquent and 
powerful advocates throughout history, for they contributed 
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desecrate an ancestor’s tomb is the most heinous of 
crimes for the Chinese, and that was just what was 
done to Confucius.
We did nothing so daring in our school. The 
Confucian temple in our city – there used to be one 
in every Chinese city and town – had already been 
ransacked at the height of the Cultural Revolution. But 
we had to join in – it was simply not good enough to 
sit there and listen to the teachers listing Confucius’s 
crimes. So I wrote a paragraph every week to put on 
wall posters, finding fault with a saying of Confucius, 
mostly from the Analects. The trouble was the Analects 
were in classical Chinese and we had no idea what 
the words meant (classical Chinese is like English 
before Chaucer). So the teacher had to tell us what 
to say. One criticism is still clear in my head to this 
day. An important thought of Confucius was that 
‘everyone should be educated’. But the teacher told us 
that he charged the students ten slices of dried beef for 
teaching them. How could the poor afford it? Under 
Communism, children of peasants and workers could 
all go to school. Down with Confucius! I ended every 
essay with this declaration.
This was not the first attack on Confucius in 
our history. In 1919 at the end of the First World 
War, the May 4th Movement completely rejected 
China’s Confucian tradition. The movement was an 
angry response to the Versailles Treaty, which gave 
the German concession zones on Chinese territory 
to another imperialist power, Japan, despite China’s 
having fought alongside the Allies during the war. 
This seemed the final insult after the British gunboats 
which forced their way into China, the Opium War, the 
unequal treaties, and the division of China into interest 
zones run by warlords bankrolled by all the Western 
powers. How had China fallen so far, become so weak? 
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of happiness that cannot be taken away by a life of 
poverty.’ Or ‘true peace and stability come from within, 
from an acceptance of those that govern us’ – surely this 
is music to the government’s ears.
It is not enough that China relearns the Confucian 
lessons. The world has to do so too. To that end the 
government is opening Confucius Institutes around 
the globe, like the branches of the Alliance Française, 
the Goethe Institutes or the British Council. Of course 
it helped when a Nobel physics laureate announced 
that ‘If humanity wants to survive in the twenty-first 
century, it must draw from the wisdom of Confucius 25 
centuries ago’.
This is not the Confucius I grew up to know. In 
1974, as a Red Pioneer in primary school, I joined a 
nation-wide campaign against Confucius. I never knew 
of his existence until then and it puzzled me why he 
had suddenly become the enemy of the people two and 
half thousand years after his death. The headmaster 
told us that Confucius had wanted to bring back 
slavery and his Analects were the manifesto of his 
reactionary scheme, ‘full of poison, complete nonsense, 
and totally unreasonable’. ‘Restrain yourself and 
comply with rituals – that is benevolence,’ Confucius 
told his disciples. How ridiculous. This was during 
the Cultural Revolution when Mao called on the Red 
Guards to rebel and turn everything upside down. 
To prove their loyalty to Mao, the Red Guards from 
Beijing Teachers’ University ransacked the cemetery 
where Confucius, all his 72 direct descendants and 
over 100,000 blood relatives have been buried for the 
past two and half millennia. They smashed the stone 
steles bearing the inscriptions of successive emperors 
who came to pay their homage. They blew up the tombs 
and stole all the valuables to fund their revolutionary 
activities, leaving the skeletons hanging on poles. To 
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glanced at another man, she was considered to have 
shamed the family and should blind herself or even 
commit suicide. Then her clan would erect a chastity 
arch for her, many of which still stand in towns and 
villages across China. In one county alone in Anhui 
Province along the Yangtze River, over 65,000 women 
were commemorated this way.
The Movement uncompromisingly rejected 
China’s Confucian tradition. In its place they called 
for science and democracy. Only Dr Science and Dr 
Democracy could cure the ills of China so that it could 
be rejuvenated and take on the Western powers on their 
own terms. They were unwilling to accept the norms 
and assumptions of Confucian culture. So instead of 
the veneration of old age and wisdom, they praised 
youth and individualism. The May 4th Movement also 
campaigned to change the language that had always 
been the preserve of the elite, and use ‘plain language’, 
colloquial Chinese as it was spoken by ordinary people. 
On the central Confucian virtue of moderation, Lu Xun 
had this withering verdict: ‘Moderation was merely a 
codeword for tolerance of abuse and turning a blind eye 
to corruption.’ Other values, such as freedom, liberty 
and the rule of law, were also hotly debated. ‘Human 
rights and science are the two pillars of modernity,’ 
declared Chen Duxiu, the founding father of the Chinese 
Communist Party. It is worth noting that the May 4th 
Movement was a crucial catalyst in the birth of the 
Chinese Communist Party, and science and democracy 
were very much part of the vocabulary of the early 
Communists, including Mao.
China’s search for modernity in the twentieth 
century has been long and arduous, full of struggle and 
bloodshed, from 4 May 1919 to the students’ movement 
in 1989 when the government opened fire on its own 
people. We have learned how difficult and painful 
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The Emperor could not be blamed; he had abdicated 
in 1911. It must have been Confucianism which had 
dominated China for so long.
A key figure in the May 4th Movement was Lu 
Xun, the most famous writer in modern China and the 
most uncompromising critic of Confucianism. He was a 
trainee doctor but decided to give it up. ‘Medical science 
was not so important after all… The most important thing 
was to change their spirit, and since at that time I felt that 
literature was the best means to this end, I decided to 
promote a literary movement.’ He tried to prescribe what 
he thought would be the cure for the ills of society and the 
lethargic mentality of the people.
Diary of a Madman is Lu Xun’s most well-known 
story. It tells of an unnamed man slipping into 
madness. He came to believe that his fellow-Chinese 
were all cannibals. ‘It has only just dawned on me that 
all these years I have been living in a place where for 
four thousand years human flesh has been eaten.’ He 
looks up the history of cannibalism in history books, 
but all he finds are the two phrases, ‘Confucian virtue 
and morality’ and ‘cannibalism’. This is reminiscent of 
another fierce critic of the Confucian tradition, Danzhen 
of the Qing Dynasty: ‘The so-called moralists are no 
different from brutal legalists. While the latter kill by 
law, Confucianism kills by morality.’ In Chinese history, 
cannibalism implies a society whose values have lost all 
morality, and for Lu Xun to assault the entire basis of 
Chinese tradition using this metaphor was a powerful 
indictment indeed.
Lu Xun and the May 4th Movement also directed 
a scathing attack on the treatment of women in the 
Confucian tradition. Women had their feet bound so 
they could find a husband, but it also made them unable 
to escape from arranged marriages. Later on a woman’s 
position became so extreme that if she so much as 
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to have had the right idea long ago. As China is leaving 
want behind, is freedom from fear too much to hope 
for, to ask for?
What if Chinese people begin to take the concepts 
of the Harmonious Society seriously, as they surely will? 
If they are genuinely allowed to speak their minds and 
make their voices heard, as our ancestors told us to do 
when they devised the characters for harmony more than 
three thousand years ago, we are already a step closer to 
the harmonious society.
Sun Shuyun is a writer and filmmaker who has directed 
and worked on numerous BBC and Channel 4 programmes 
such as The Great Wall, People’s Century and The First 
Emperor. Hoping to promote a better understanding of 
China in the West through her films and writing, her 
five-part documentary series A Year in Tibet and book have 
appeared in more than 40 countries.
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reform can be – republicanism, nationalism, Fascism 
and Communism each seem to have brought more 
suffering to the Chinese. Now we are at a crucial 
juncture again. Chinese economic reform has been 
with us for 30 years. Great gains have come, but 
we also see corruption at every level, cut-throat 
competition, extreme concentration of power in 
the Communist Party, huge unemployment, absent 
social services, environmental decay, a mounting gap 
between the rich and the poor, the hinterland and the 
coastal provinces, and the city and the countryside, 
and glaring limitations of the rule of law – an 
intervention by the Communist Party secretary can 
easily overturn a court’s verdict. People feel uncared 
for and no one gives a damn. They are puzzled, 
confused and angered. When they look for solace they 
find the much discussed ‘spiritual vacuum’. Chinese 
society is on the brink of major upheaval. It is in 
desperate need of harmony.
The Harmonious Society is a commendable ideal 
not only for China, but for any society. It could even be 
the ultimate goal for mankind. The question is: how is 
China going to get there? Surely Confucianism, with its 
skewed emphasis on hierarchical order and stability based 
on obedience, is unlikely to lead us away from the rule 
of men to the rule of law, and ultimately the harmonious 
society we all seek. As we say in Chinese, it is a bit like 
‘looking for fish on the roof’.
Perhaps we could start by looking again at the 
Chinese characters for harmony (和谐) – they may mean 
‘tuning instrument’ but the first character actually 
signifies ‘rice’ and ‘mouth’, the second ‘speak’ and ‘each’. 
This can be simply construed as saying everyone must 
have enough to eat and everyone must be able to speak 
their mind – just like Roosevelt’s freedom from want and 
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Reforms in the Islamic World 
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When a man does not know what harbour he is making for,  
no wind is the right wind.
 Francis Bacon
Talking about the future of the Islamic World 
is just like talking about climate change or the 
expansion of the universe: no matter how much reliable 
research we have about them, we cannot be free from 
speculation, belief or even superstition. No matter 
how much we know about the history of Islam and the 
demographic statistics of the Islamic World today, we 
still cannot anticipate which developments to expect 
from this part of the world in the coming decades. 
The only thing we can assume to know is this: there 
are considerable processes of dissolve and even decay 
within the traditional structures in large parts of the 
Muslim World. Rigid traditional authorities are losing 
both power and legitimacy, leaving behind them a 
huge vacuum, which has not been replaced or filled yet 
by alternative structures. Iran is one example; Egypt 
is another where we notice growing individualisation 
processes, with millions of young people losing trust in 
older structures and searching for individual solutions 
for themselves. Walking along the streets of Cairo, 
everyone can feel a strong youth energy searching for 
new structures. Yet this energy is seldom invested in 
or canalised. From the laws of physics we learn that 
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anthropologist looks at the world as history not as nature, 
and sees cultures governed by the cycle of time (youth, 
growth, maturity, decay) – a view that he might have 
copied from the Tunisian historian of the 14th century, 
Ibn Khaldun. You might agree with the Syrian poet, 
Adonis, who sees Arab culture already in the final 
stage of decay, predicting its irreversible downfall 
soon. He argues that Arab culture has already passed 
its zenith and has ceased to offer any civilizational 
contribution to humanity and therefore does not 
deserve to exist anymore. Considering the marginal 
Arab modern contributions in technology, science and 
art to the world heritage, one might not find it difficult 
to agree with Adonis.
You might agree with Dan Diner’s Lost in the 
Sacred. Why the Muslim World Stood Still. After leading 
in the fields of science, philosophy and medicine, the 
Muslim World lost its momentum because of the nature 
of the sacred which penetrates all aspects of the life of a 
Muslim. The sacred in Islam, according to Diner, suspends 
the acceleration of social time, hinders change, and 
circumvents secularisation and modernity. Diner sees the 
time-suspending impact of Arabic as a sacred language as 
one of the key reasons for stagnation in the Arab World.
If you are an optimist, you will prefer to believe in 
the estimations of Immanuel Todd and Youssef Courbage 
who reach the conclusion that Islam will go through an 
accelerated process of modernisation very soon. In their 
book, Le rendez-vous des civilisations, Todd and Courbage 
study the demography of the Muslim world and figure 
out that the increase in literacy among women leads to a 
decline in the number of children, which will lead to new 
dynamics and social mobility. They see fundamentalism 
not as a sign of the omnipotence of religion, but as a 
nervous reaction towards the increasing secularisation 
of the societies.
non-canalised energy ends up in uncontrollable chaos. 
The law of entropy, though, does not exclude a system’s 
capacity for spontaneous change.
If you are a pessimist, you could compare larger 
parts of the Islamic world today to the Titanic a short 
time before its legendary sinking, and you might 
discover several parallels between the two. You will 
see the overcrowded ship standing lonely and broken 
in the middle of the cold ocean of modernity and 
wondering where rescue will come from. The third-
class passengers are still asleep downstairs and know 
nothing about the coming catastrophe. Rich people try 
to save themselves in the few rescue boats available on 
board. Religious leaders do not get tired of repeating 
the same hope-giving mantras. Disorientation, anarchy 
and self-justification are dominating. The so-called 
Islam-Reformers might remind you of the three 
musicians who kept playing until the ship went down, 
to communicate the illusion of normality.
You might discover one single difference between 
the Titanic and the Islamic world. You will see that the 
Islamic ship was old and full of holes from the moment it 
entered the ocean, even though many Muslims believed 
it was unsinkable. The heavy ship drifted many centuries 
with no compass and no harbour of destination. No 
heavy clash, but a slight friction with an iceberg called 
modernity was enough to throw it off its balance. Since 
then, large parts of the Islamic World seem to have fallen 
into a deep lethargy that they cannot overcome.
If you are a pessimist, you might re-read Oswald 
Spengler’s book about the decline of the West and apply 
his thesis to the Islamic World. During World War I, 
Spengler saw European culture declining in favour of a 
cold, overurbanized civilization. He saw all areas of life 
becoming artificial and materialistic. The European soul 
was losing its fire, fleeing to classicism. The German 
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Standing on the top of the Olympia-Berg, I was able 
to construct my own understanding of civilisation as 
‘the ability to transform something ugly into something 
aesthetic, and the ability to disarm history’. The German 
people could have spent years crying over the ruins of 
Berlin, Munich, Dresden and Hamburg, complaining 
about the atrocities of the Allies. Instead, they were 
clever enough to recognise that crying over spilled milk 
does not help. They decided to rebuild their country 
with the help of their former enemies. Germans did 
not lack pride or patriotism, but they recognised that 
a part of their misery was self-made; therefore they 
saw that the culture of resistance was not the right 
answer. Large parts of the Islamic World, in contrast, 
are still feeling the bitterness of defeat and humiliation 
towards the West. When asked about the reasons for 
the backwardness of Islamic culture and lack of reform, 
many Muslims still identify colonialism and the 
influence of the West as the main reasons.
Going down the hill I saw many people, young and 
old, men and women, jogging, Nordic-walking, biking 
or simply taking a walk. Of course some inactive, likely 
jobless people, that the welfare society can still afford, 
were also hanging around enjoying their beer. As I came 
down to the park I saw a young, likely Gulf-Arab family 
coming towards me. The husband and his wife, in their 
mid-thirties, were walking slowly, their East Asian maid 
behind them, pushing a baby carriage. The husband 
was watching the hips of a young German lady passing 
him, the wife, in the traditional black gown and veil, was 
looking with resentment at the object of pleasure of her 
husband. She said nothing to him, but turned to her maid 
and started shouting at her without a clear reason.
No doubt such a situation could happen with any 
other family whether Muslim or not, but still it tells us a 
lot about the dynamics of a Muslim family and its triple 
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In this paper, I will not accumulate empirical 
facts and statistics, but will try to offer an intuitive, 
semi-sociological estimation of the situation in Egypt 
as a trendsetter in the Islamic World when it comes to 
both modernisation and radicalisation. I will discuss 
elements in Egyptian society that resist reforms and 
lead to stagnation. The Islamic image of God, the 
understanding of hierarchy and political authority, 
as well as the position of women and the concept of 
honour, will be related to the objectives of education 
in Egypt to get a larger picture of how change is 
vehemently resisted.
Disarming history
One of my favourite places in the city of Munich, where 
I live, is the Park of the Olympic Village where the 
Olympic Games took place in the summer of 1972. 
Especially, the so-called ‘Olympia-Berg’ has a strong 
symbolic character for me. It is not a real mountain, 
but a small hill less than 100 metres high over an area 
of about 1,000 metres. It is a beautiful green hill with 
many roads leading to the top, where visitors to the Park 
can enjoy a beautiful panoramic view over the whole city. 
But the special thing about this hill is not only the nice 
panorama, but also the story behind the construction of 
the hill. It is an artificial hill built from the rubble of the 
houses of Munich destroyed during World War II.
I have been reading many definitions of ‘Civilisation’ 
recently, none of which really satisfied me, as most 
of those definitions connect civilisation to urbanism, 
developed systems of transportation, writing and 
standards of measurement. Most of those definitions 
refer to the material achievement of a group of people, but 
neglect their state of mind, their self-image and image of 
the other, which for me are the core of any civilisation.
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Alexandria in the year 1798, an asymmetric struggle 
started between a technically superior West and a 
culture caught in traditional Islamic thinking. The 
emergence of the ‘Other’ made Egyptians aware of their 
weaknesses. Traumatic experiences of colonialism and 
exploitation were engraved in the collective memory of 
Egypt and increased this gap between Islam and the 
West. The Syrian philosopher Georg Tarabishi calls this 
asymmetric meeting ‘an anthropological injury’ of the 
Islamic World – a chronic feeling of humiliation that still 
persists. A psychological distance towards the West and 
its thoughts has been the result of that.
But it would be a naïve simplification to believe that 
reforms in the Islamic World were not pushed forward 
only because of colonialism and hostility of the West. 
The Islamic understanding of innovation and the rigid 
authorities could also be considered responsible for the 
failure of modernisation. The Arab word for modernity is 
hadatha. It is semantically related to the word muhdatha, 
or ‘something new’, which has very bad connotations 
in Islamic religious discourse. The prophet Mohamed 
once said: ‘The worst among things is the muhdatha, for 
every muhdatha is an invention, and every invention leads 
to confusion, and every confusion ends up in hell.’ Even 
though the word muhdatha, as mentioned by the prophet, 
is meant in the first place as ‘renewal of religious rituals’, 
it is still building a psychological barrier towards any 
kind of renewal. If we compare the Arabic expression for 
modernity with the Japanese one, we might recognise the 
difference in attitude towards innovation. The Japanese 
word for modernity is bunmei kaaika (文明開化), which 
reads as ‘to open up towards civilisation’. The process 
of modernisation in Japan was called ‘Leaving Asia and 
going to Europe’. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a prominent political 
theorist of the Meiji period wrote an essay called ‘Datsu 
a ron’ (Goodbye Asia) in 1885, to explain to Japanese 
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attitude towards the West (fascination, scepticism and 
bitterness). It tells us much about the concept of modesty 
and the limits of Islamic morality.
The Olympia-Berg is, in general, a nice metaphor 
for cultural transformation – a process that the Islamic 
World is missing when it deals its own history. Reading 
school History textbooks in Egypt, for instance, we 
discover a clear split between a glorified history of Egypt 
and the Arab World on the one hand and an insistence on 
the role of the victim on the other. Muslims are depicted 
as the creators of a great culture that led the world for 
centuries before it lost influence because of Western 
aggression. History is looked at as a continuity of linear 
development: Islamic dominance and progress, then the 
Crusades, colonialism and Israel, which came to stop 
this glory through a global conspiracy against Islam. 
These textbooks are not telling students anything about 
the homemade problems and mistakes that led the 
Islamic culture to decline. Students are injected with 
mistrust and subliminal hostility towards everything 
Western. This state of mind determines the attitude of 
many Muslim countries towards modernity and science. 
Instead, a culture of honour and resistance is implanted 
into the minds of the students – a culture which I 
hold responsible for the backwardness of many Arab 
countries today.
A genuine feeling of helplessness and humiliation 
determines the relation of the Islamic World to the West. 
This sense of material inferiority is being compensated 
for by a sense of moral supremacy and dreams of 
omnipotence. This strange mixture leads to a real 
paranoia that dominates the educational systems in 
many Arab countries.
For generations, the Islamic World has been 
nourishing a feeling of bitterness and powerlessness 
towards the West. As Napoleon landed with his fleet in 
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glory of Islamic culture and the continuous aggression 
of the West through the Crusades, colonialism, war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. This might explain why many 
Muslims react nervously and angrily when criticism 
of Islam comes from the West. The reactions to the 
Mohamed cartoons, the speech of Pope Benedict XIV 
in Regensburg about Islam and violence, and the ban 
of minarets in Switzerland are some examples of that. 
Even slight incidents, like that of a British teacher 
in Sudan who called her teddy bear Mohamed, or a 
German soccer team which says in its song ‘Mohamed 
was a prophet who knew nothing about soccer’, were 
enough to inflame the rage of many Muslims and 
occupy Arab media for days. All of these events are 
often put in one line with the Crusades and colonialism 
to prove that the West is nothing but one mass that is 
determined to destroy Islam.
Under this resentment, many Muslims isolate 
themselves from the world and barricade themselves 
behind an exclusive, inflexible identity. Their technological 
and material inferiority towards the West is often 
compensated for by a sense of religious arrogance that 
looks down at Westerners as dehumanised unbelievers.
Besides, the majority of young people in many 
Muslim countries are unsatisfied with the economic 
and political situation in their countries. The rulers, 
who are in most cases despotic monarchs or military 
generals, feel the anger of the frustrated masses and 
distract them from time to time with an outside enemy. 
Controlled demonstrations and tirades of hatred against 
the West help the masses in Egypt and elsewhere to get 
rid of their energy, so that they refrain from protesting 
against the ruler.
Wrong canalisation of energy is one of the key 
reasons for stagnation in Egypt. More than 70 per cent 
of Egyptians are under the age of 30. Many of them do 
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people that the wind of Westernisation was blowing, 
carrying a chance for Japanese people to taste the fruits 
of civilisation or make the choice to be left behind in 
their destiny. Rationality, and accepting the spirit of 
the time, helped Japan to become a major player in the 
twentieth century, without being necessarily separated 
from its own tradition.
Insisting on the past and adhering to the tribal 
culture of honour was the choice of major parts of the 
Arab World. Almost all attempts at modernising religious 
thinking ended up losing against an irreconcilable 
religious orthodoxy. Even in the so-called golden time of 
Islamic civilisation (eighth to twelfth centuries), when 
science and philosophy flourished, a bitter fight between 
rational and religious thinking was taking place which 
ended with the victory of orthodox thinking. Since 
then, no more processes took place that we might call 
comprehensive reform. Of course, there have been now 
and then some brilliant thinkers and single attempts to 
refresh Arab thinking, but they were like small rivers in 
the desert that dried up in the sand, and could never come 
together to be a strong stream grabbing everything in its 
way in an irreversible process called enlightenment.
No doubt the aggressive power-politics of the 
West during and after the colonial time led to a huge 
gap between the West and the Islamic World, but I 
see another decisive reason for the chronic feeling of 
humiliation perceived by Muslims. The core for me is the 
Muslim self-image. Muslims still look at themselves as 
carriers of a high culture with a mission for humanity. 
They cannot come to terms with the fact that they lost 
power a long time ago and that they themselves are to 
blame for that. ‘Islam could not bear losing power’; this 
is how the French writer Abdelwahab Meddeb puts it in 
his book La Maladie d’Islam. This leads to a tense reading 
of history as an explosive continuum that witnesses the 
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them the old Islamic utopia with the dreams of milk and 
honey. Hatred against the West, against the unbelievers 
and against religious minorities in Egypt is a main part 
of the discourses of these religious groups.
The Islamic image of God  
and the unquestionable authority
Since its birth, Islam has tried to dissolve the old Arab 
understanding of belonging based on blood. The prophet 
Mohamed dreamed of a community based on belief, not 
on ethnic belonging and he was proud of having all skin 
colours and ethnic backgrounds among his first followers. 
But he recognised very soon that he could not unify Arabia 
without appealing to Arab honour and pride. To spread 
his message, he had to reconcile monotheistic thoughts 
inspired by Judaism and Christianity with old Arab pagan 
traditions, such as the rituals of pilgrimage to Mecca. He 
also relied on his tribe and made alliances based on ethnic 
backgrounds to defeat his enemies. The Islamic image of 
God therefore does not deviate much from the concept of 
the tribe leader. God in Islam is a strong patriarch elevated 
above the community. He never negotiates, only dictates. 
He watches human beings like big brother, punishes them 
for their mistakes, but cannot be questioned or criticised. 
He is frequently angry and jealous and does not allow any 
Gods beside himself. Taking a closer look at the history 
of authority in Islam, one can easily recognise that most 
Islamic rulers throughout history acted the same way as 
that God. Therefore it would not be exaggerated to claim 
that the history of tyranny and dictatorship in the Islamic 
world is deeply rooted in the basic understanding of 
Muslims of their relation to God.
Soon after the sudden death of the prophet, a severe 
civil war led to a split in the Islamic Uma. The supporters 
of Mohamed’s cousin Ali separated themselves and 
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not have a permanent job and cannot afford to run an 
independent household until the age of 30. According 
to Islamic morality no sexual relations are permitted 
outside marriage. That means that the majority of 
Egyptians are living in a state of sexual emergency. This 
sexual suppression is a part of a code which is pre-
Islamic. The whole concept of hierarchy and honour is 
based on the idea of continuity and therefore resists any 
changes or questioning. ‘Support your brother, no matter 
if he is right or wrong’ is the core principle in Arab 
tribal culture. Honour means keeping the genealogical 
family line and being able to recite the names of one’s 
ancestors and their great deeds. Only the woman can 
guarantee that no ‘strange blood’ comes into the tribe; 
therefore she should be watched and controlled by strict 
moral laws, by the veil and by FGM (female genital 
mutilation). No surprise that the Arabic word for ‘civil 
war’ and the one for ‘seduction by a woman’ are one and 
the same ( fitna). In the Qur’an it is written down, ‘Fitna 
is worse than killing’.
Therefore everything new is often seen as a 
potential for fitna, a danger for continuity and for 
saving honour. Any questioning from inside could be 
understood as treason; any criticism from outside is 
often seen as a declaration of war. But there can be no 
progress without self-criticism and no enlightenment 
without breaking taboos.
Even in the twenty-first century the majority of 
young people, male and female, are still caught in the 
trap of strict moral codes which are against the nature 
of human beings. Sexual frustration might be seen as 
one of the key reasons for the radicalisation of young 
Muslims in Egypt. While their society gives them the 
impression that they are not needed, radical Islamic 
groups give young people the feeling of being grown-ups 
and members of the army of Allah. They restore for 
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was still a child of 14 years, and she was a very smart 
and promising student at school. I failed again and 
could not convince her parents, as Wafaa’s marriage 
was nothing more than a repetition of her parents’ own 
story, a repetition of millions of stories that happen every 
day in Egypt. Almost everyone believes that the early 
marriage of a girl guarantees her protection. Most men 
prefer to marry an inexperienced woman to guarantee 
her obedience and loyalty. Marriage under the age of 
16 is forbidden by law in Egypt too, but this was also 
no problem: the marriage procedure was held without 
official papers. Wafaa married, but could not stand the 
sexual violence of her husband and left his house after 
one month. She was already pregnant. She had a child 
named Mohamed at the age of 15. Her husband tried to 
take her back home with the child, but she refused. The 
husband decided not to recognise the child, as there are 
no official marriage papers; therefore, Wafaa could not 
get a birth certificate for her baby because the moral 
government of Egypt does not recognise children of 
unregulated relationships.
A few months ago Wafaa called me and told me that 
she wished to go back to school, but her father did not 
agree to this. He was afraid that everyone would know 
that Wafaa’s marriage failed, which is considered to be a 
great shame for a young lady. Wafaa asked me if I could 
help her. I called her father immediately and told him in 
an undiplomatic way, ‘Listen, you committed two crimes 
already against your daughter: FGM and child-marriage, 
and I will not allow a third one. How come that you care 
about what people might say more than caring about 
your daughter’s feelings and future?’ I tried to convince 
him that going back to school would save Wafaa from a 
second marriage with an old man, which is the natural 
fate of every divorced woman in Egypt, especially if she 
has a child. I wanted Wafaa to go back to school to be a 
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founded the Shia faith, while the tribe of Umayyad took 
the power and founded the first Islamic dynasty. Under 
the trauma of these of these events, Sunni theologians 
called on the faithful to follow Umayad leaders who took 
power over Muslims and to never revolt against them, 
in order to avoid any fitna, or civil war. Since then, there 
is a close relation between the authority of God and 
the authority of a Muslim monarch. This authority is 
felt everywhere today in the Islamic World – not only 
between the monarch and the people, but also between 
the father and his children, between the teacher and his 
students, and the boss and his employees. A culture of 
negotiation and questioning, which is the basis for every 
democracy, is missing. What everyone expects from 
his subordinates is not efficiency in the first place, but 
loyalty. Women especially have a tough time trying to 
cope with this unquenchable need for loyalty.
A girl called Wafaa
Wafaa is a young woman from a village near Cairo. She 
has not celebrated her sixteenth birthday yet, but she is 
already a mother of a young boy, divorced and remarried. 
You must have read or heard one of those horrible 
reports about child marriage, but what I am telling you 
is not a story I read, but a story I was directly involved 
in. Wafaa is my niece. Five years ago I was fighting to 
save her from FGM, but I failed. Her father who is a 
high school teacher and her mother, my sister, who has 
a basic education, said that Wafaa could not marry in the 
future if she was not circumcised. Although FGM has 
been forbidden in Egypt for some years, Wafaa’s clitoris 
was cut away as one of the many sacrifices a woman has 
to offer for a childish culture of honour. Two years ago, a 
32-year-old man from the village asked to marry Wafaa. 
I intervened again to stop this marriage, because she 
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of unneeded information make many students use the 
school just as a bridge. The school cannot afford to teach 
students independent thinking and the skill of making 
judgments, as this will endanger their authority. If this 
is what the school wanted or the fathers wanted, Wafaa 
might have been able to defend herself and resist. Who 
should change this if the teachers themselves are a 
product of the same vicious cycle? Most of them are more 
influenced by what they hear in the mosques than what 
they read in the books.
A little story of a teacher in the city of Alexandria 
shows how education and authority are tightly related. 
In a regular exam, the teacher introduced a short 
text about the ‘blessed river Nile’ to his high school 
students. He posted the following multiple choice 
question: ‘What is the opposite of blessed: dirty, hated 
or cursed?’ He was punished because of this question 
by being degraded from a high school to a preparatory 
school teacher. What was his crime? The word ‘blessed’ 
in Arabic happens to be the name of the president of 
Egypt, Mubarak, a very common adjective indeed in a 
society relying on blessings. This was not the end of the 
joke. The way this teacher was sued is even funnier. To 
make the punishment seem democratic, the educational 
authorities said that a student of this teacher suffered 
from deep depression after taking this exam, because she 
felt that the teacher was offending the president who is a 
symbol of the nation. Maybe the president himself would 
not act like this or would not pass such a judgment, but 
the educational authority sensed the atmosphere and 
internalised this understanding of hierarchy so that they 
became more royal than the king himself.
The new Egyptian minister of education said 
in a speech in front of members of the senate at the 
beginning of February 2010 that he is unsatisfied with 
the performance at Egyptian schools; therefore he was 
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role model for every girl who is divorced, to show them 
that being divorced does not mean the end of the world. 
Her father was not convinced; therefore I decided to use 
heavy munitions. I told him, ‘I am not going to negotiate 
with you anymore. I will give you a couple of weeks, 
and if you will not send your daughter back to school I 
will sue you for agreeing to the child-marriage of your 
daughter and I will publish the story in the newspaper 
that I write for in Cairo so that not only the people of the 
village but all Egypt will talk about Wafaa’s case.’ Less 
than four days later, Wafaa’s school papers were in order 
and the fees were fully paid. She went back to school and 
was very happy for that. Less than 40 days later, Wafaa’s 
mother had a sixth child. The father could not afford the 
costs of Wafaa and her child and took her again from 
school and sent her to her ‘husband’ after he agreed to 
recognise the child as his own.
This story shows that liberal laws are not enough 
to modernise a society if its mentality is resisting 
change. Wafaa had to seek the help of tribal and family 
ties to find a way out of her misery, but even that did 
not help her much.
Teaching loyalty: the crises of Egyptian education
Even education has become a tool to sustain authority. 
Despite technical modernisation in many schools in 
Egypt, the educational system does not seem to have 
any vision for those millions of students. Nobody 
seems to know what the educational planners want 
to get out of the masses they teach and what to teach 
them. They teach them theories about citizenship and 
democracy, but show them something else in practice. 
The main objective of the curriculum seems to be to 
inject the students with loyalty towards their country 
and the ‘leader’. Learning by heart and accumulation 
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took power soon after it was founded and carried the 
responsibility of passing legislation and rules for daily life. 
The multiple functions of the prophet as a religious and 
political leader and lawmaker made a separation between 
state and religion almost impossible. He could never say, 
‘give Caesar what belongs to Caesar and give God what 
belongs to God’, as he was both Caesar and the messenger 
of God at the same time. One more argument, which 
is used by conservative scholars in Egypt today against 
secularism, is that Christianity needed to go through 
the process of secularisation because the church was 
against science, but Islam was never against science. Such 
scholars say that Arabs used to be barbaric tribes who were 
fighting against each other until the prophet came and 
reconciled them with civilisation and knowledge. Because 
of Islam, they say, Arabs became leaders in the fields of 
science and philosophy.
In fact, it was not Islam that was responsible for 
the scientific renaissance in the Middle Ages, otherwise 
Mecca and Medina would have been the centres of the 
sciences at that time. Instead, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus 
and Cordoba were the centres of knowledge – cities 
that had experience with former cultures. Most of the 
first Arab scientists and philosophers were in fact not 
Arabs, but Persians, Syrians and Jews who built on the 
knowledge they inherited from their own cultures. The 
Islamic culture was capable of producing knowledge in 
the Middle Ages as it accepted diversity and translated 
the knowledge of other cultures. Averroes, the great 
Arab philosopher of the thirteenth century, translated 
the works of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle 
as a basis for his own philosophy. He used to call 
Greek philosophers ‘the ancestors’. Averroes invented 
the formula of ‘double truth’ to separate religion 
from science. He said there are two different truths 
independent of each other: the truth of the revelation of 
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thinking of allowing teachers to beat students again, 
which was forbidden just a few years ago. He said that 
by doing so he wants to restore the authority of the 
teacher in the classroom. The minister concluded his 
argument by saying proudly that he himself was beaten 
as a child at school, and that this did not harm him. 
But his way of arguing alone shows how much he was 
harmed. Only after the opposition media criticised his 
plan heavily, did he take it back.
What went wrong?
More than 1,000 years ago Cairo was one of the biggest 
educational centres in the world. In the mosque of 
Al-Azhar students not only learnt the Qur’an and 
Hadith, but also chemistry, mathematics, medicine 
and philosophy. In all the schools of Cairo there was 
a peaceful and fruitful coexistence between religious 
and natural sciences. Today, Egypt has distanced itself 
from science in a dramatic way. Young people consume 
technological products as far as they can afford them, 
but they do not know how they function or how to 
manufacture them. They buy satellite dishes to watch 
religious Sat-preachers who are very sceptical about 
science. Some of them even feel malicious joy when 
modern science fails, for instance when a space shuttle 
falls down or when an expert on genetic engineering dies 
because of having cancer. Religious preachers offer their 
advice also as experts on religious medicine.
So, what happened? What has changed in the 
last 1,000 years that has led to this distance between 
Egyptians and science? To answer this question we need 
to go back to the early time of Islam.
One can say that the Islamic culture had an easy 
birth, a turbulent childhood, a short, fruitful youth and 
a long, lethargic aging period. Unlike Christianity, Islam 
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seems to be really interested in innovations, especially if 
these innovations might call into question the authority 
of the president. One of Egypt’s most famous scientists is 
Professor Ahmed Zewail, professor of chemical physics 
at the California Institute of Technology and the only 
Nobel Prize Laureate in science from the Arab World. 
Zewail has been fighting with Egyptian authorities for 12 
years to build a scientific Centre of Excellence in Egypt 
which would apply the latest scientific standards. The 
authorities do not accept his plan, because he wants the 
Centre to be independent from the Egyptian government. 
Last year, Zewail was chosen to be Barack Obama’s 
senior scientific advisor.
Democracy
The famous Muslim-Brother preacher Wagdy Ghoneim 
was teaching his followers via a Saudi-funded satellite 
channel, saying that democracy means decadence. He 
gave the spectators an example to illustrate to them how 
democracy works. ‘A hundred people sit in a room and 
discuss gay marriage. If sixty of them say, OK, then 
it becomes a law that a man can marry a man. How 
stupid!’ This is how the religious discourse looks at 
democracy. How about secular parties? Another Egyptian 
Nobel Prize Laureate is Mohamed El-Baradei, former 
president of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
He decided to go back to Egypt to serve his country and 
he received a warm public welcome. In an independent 
TV show, El-Baradei said that Egypt lacks real democracy 
and needs an educational system with a clear vision. 
Since then, he has never appeared on TV again. After 
his name was suggested as a possible candidate for the 
next presidential elections in 2011, a sewer campaign 
was launched against him by the state-run media. Even 
opposition parties started to distance themselves from 
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the holy text which is responsible for metaphysics, and the 
scientific truth which is based on intellect and observation. 
Neither of these truths can prove or exclude the other; 
therefore they should remain separated. Today many 
Muslims look at the ‘Other’ only as an enemy outside (the 
West) or a religious minority inside (Copts, Bahaii, Jews, 
etc.) that should be controlled and intimidated to show 
more loyalty. Modernity, science and secularism are 
seen by many as products of the infidels. The weaker 
the Islamic World gets, the more power the text of the 
Qur’an acquires.
Even in the eighth century in Baghdad, a theological 
school called mutazilite could discuss the nature of the 
Qur’an as a created book with a human side that could 
be analysed or even criticised. For a similar approach, 
the Egyptian Professor of Literature and Arabic Studies 
Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid was considered an apostate, and 
was divorced from his wife by a court sentence and had 
to leave Egypt some 20 years ago. Another professor was 
shot dead by Islamists in front of his house in Cairo in 
1991 because he said the Qur’an is not a book of law, and 
cannot be seen as a basis for civil legislation.
The decline of education in Egypt started in the 
eleventh century when the fatimide monarchs had no 
more money for their warlords. Instead they offered them 
large pieces of land to buy their loyalty. The warlords 
invented the system of waqf, a religious foundation with 
a mosque, school and other charity institutions. These 
schools were not interested anymore in teaching natural 
sciences or philosophy, but concentrated on religious 
sciences. Every warlord could intervene to change the 
contents taught at his school, in order to polish his own 
image and ensure the loyalty of the students. He did the 
same with the mosque, as well. Looking at the state-run 
schools and mosques in Egypt today, we will see that they 
are still working according to the same principle. No one 
80 81
The Inner Lives of Cultures
is seen as the unchanged word of God, as long as the 
words of God are part and parcel of a political authority,  
I see no chance for any reform.
We are all obsessed with the Qur’an. Militant 
Islamists search it for verses that justify violence and 
segregate Muslims from the ‘unbelievers’. Reform-
oriented Muslims search in the holy book for words of 
peace that make coexistence possible. Even critics of 
Islam search for the same verses that fundamentalists 
love, to prove the brutality of the Qur’an. By doing so, 
each is giving the Qur’an more authority as a political 
document. The solution, as far as I am concerned, 
cannot be a modern interpretation of the Qur’an, but 
a neutralisation of the holy book and banning it from 
the political discourse. We do not need to be pro or 
contra Qur’an. It is enough to agree on the fact that 
it was revealed for a pre-modern community in the 
seventh century with different needs than ours today. 
We need no holy texts to live together. In multireligious 
and multiethnic societies, it is impossible to consider 
religion as a basis for the rules of living together. If 
everyone insists on the visibility of his religious symbols 
in the society he lives in, public space will be sacralised 
and will turn into an arena for religious conflicts.
Reform could only be a result of an act of terror 
against the chain that sustains an old system – a chain 
that connects religion to political authority and to the 
concept of honour. The dynamite to blast this chain is 
made out of rationality and common sense. It contains 
no quotations from the holy scripture except one single 
verse from the Qur’an: ‘God does not change people until 
they change what is inside themselves’.
The real heretic is not the one who writes polemics 
about the Qur’an, but the one who offers alternatives to 
it. The greatest heretic of our time is called Facebook. 
It is also the greatest democrat. Young people in Egypt, 
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him. To run for president in Egypt, one needs to be a 
candidate for a political party or have the approval of two 
thirds of the members of parliament as an independent 
candidate. None of these options is possible, as the 
opposition parties themselves are run by the same 
patriarchal mentality relying on the one-person-cult. 
Many oppositional leaders have been sitting in office 
for as long as Mubarak has. The bestselling author Alaa 
Al-Aswani compared the Egyptian opposition parties to 
frozen chickens which melt only in the time of elections. 
The Parliament will never approve El-Baradei as a 
candidate, as it is controlled by the national party whose 
leader is President Mubarak and whose second man is 
his son, Gamal Mubarak, who is likely to be the one and 
only candidate for the next elections. Both the Al-Azhar 
religious institution and the Coptic Church showed clear 
support for the son to follow his father.
Heresy as a chance; or,  
Towards a post-Qur’anic discourse
There is no illusion like that of so-called Islamic reform. 
For hundreds of years Qur’an scholars have been trying 
to twist the verses of the holy book to make them fit 
our time. But none of them have achieved any success. 
The mutazilites of the eighth century, Averroes of the 
thirteenth century, and Abu Zaid at the end of the 
twentieth century, all failed. They all were only isolated 
rivers in the desert that lost their waters in the sand 
before they could come together to form a big stream 
capable of sweeping everything with it, to make for an 
irreversible process of reform. All of these reformatory 
waves were broken time after time on a stubborn rock 
called orthodoxy. They all failed, because the problem 
was never what is written in the Qur’an, but the attitude 
Muslims have towards the Qur’an. As long as the Qur’an 
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which has passed its zenith. Violence, re-Islamisation 
and disorientation are side effects of the dissolving 
of that old system. My intellect is on the side of 
Adonis’s prophecy that the Orient is collapsing. My 
heart is following Todd and Courbage’s view about 
the rapid modernisation of Islam. Todd was the one 
who predicted the downfall of the Soviet Union at a 
time when no one believed in that. No matter which 
prophecy will be right, ‘Goodbye Orient’ will be the 
motto of the next decades. But it depends who is going 
to say it to whom. Are Muslims going to say it to an old 
system as the Japanese said it to Asia on their way to 
modernity? Or is the world going to say it to a sinking 
ship that refused to recognise that it is going down?
Hamed Abdel-Samad is a writer and thinker who, 
though born in Giza, Egypt, now lives in Germany 
where he is a Research Fellow at the Department of 
Modern History at the University of Munich. Focusing 
on the mobilization and radicalization of Muslims in 
Europe in his academic research, he has also written an 
autobiography, My Departure from Heaven, published in 
both German and Arabic.
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who do not believe in the promises of the old authorities 
anymore and search for individualistic solutions, are 
addicted to Facebook. They go online and chat about 
religion, politics and sex. They watch porno movies, 
listen to Beyoncé and Bin Laden. Yes, fundamentalists 
have also discovered Facebook. The largest groups are 
those of religious preachers. ‘Ahmed Ali invites you to 
be a fan of Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi’ was a Facebook 
message that I received recently. Muslim brothers in 
Egypt have their own Wikipedia.
I happened to be in Egypt on the night of 31 
January 2010. Egypt had just won the soccer Africa 
Cup for the third time in a row. All Egyptians, men and 
women, young and old, went to the streets to celebrate. 
All societal rules seemed to be suspended for one night. 
Cars were honking, children were painting their faces 
with the Egyptian flag, and veiled women were dancing 
in public until the early hours of the morning. I was 
looking at the happy faces of young people, feeling their 
energy and desire to be a part of something beautiful. 
I was saying to myself: ‘Those who built the pyramids 
must have been young enthusiastic Egyptians, just as 
these ones today, so what are they lacking?’ The answer 
for me was: they are lacking a national project that they 
believe in and a responsible leadership that could help 
them to invest their energy in the right place. They 
need to remove this thick layer of mud that covers their 
awareness and common sense.
We are experiencing the growing up of a generation 
that got more education than their parents and knows 
more about the world than what their parents knew; 
therefore the young cannot accept the elders’ authority 
so easily. The political authority has lost its legitimacy 
but not the tricks of controlling the masses. The 
traditionalists feel that the old structures are falling 




Culture in Modern India:  
The Anxiety and the Promise
Pratap Bhanu Mehta
What I require is a convening of my culture’s criteria, in order 
to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and 
as I may pursue them; and at the same time to confront my 
words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture’s words 
may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along 
the lines it meets in me. 
 Stanley Cavell
Talking about the ‘inner life of culture’ in India must 
seem like a presumptuous enterprise indeed. At one 
level, the culture remains prodigiously inventive in a 
bewildering variety of ways, across a range of social 
groups. India embodies deep layers of historical depth 
and a capacity to deeply internalise the various cross-
cultural currents that have left their deep imprint 
on it. But it is constantly improvising, adapting and 
creating new cultural forms. One paper could not 
even begin to describe the cultural ferment in India 
and I am not going to even try. What I shall do in 
this paper rather is something less ambitious. I am 
going to chart some of the anxieties that have marked 
discourse about culture in India, and I suspect more 
broadly as well. I shall offer four ‘provocations’. First, 
that the inner life of culture is in part the association 
of culture with the ‘inner’, a particular space that is 
resistant to the rationalising impulses of modernity. 
Second, I shall argue that Indian pluralism is a 
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with references to conceptions of human perfection. 
Relatedly, it came to acquire a cluster of associations 
to do with the general body of arts or the intellectual 
development of society as a whole. The second register of 
culture was more anthropological, where it came to refer to 
a whole way of life in all its historical interconnectedness, 
where the material, spiritual, intellectual and artistic all 
meshed into one seamless whole.
This history is important because this 
understanding of culture became part of the repertoire 
of the self-understanding of different cultures as well. 
Just to take the anthropological register first. The 
anthropological conception of culture generates three 
questions about cultural identity. First, is simply this: 
what does it mean to have a cultural identity? What 
is the quest for an identity about? There is a dizzying 
variety of ideas that is often condensed into the term 
identity: identity can operate on a political, cultural, 
social, psychological or even psychoanalytic plane. 
At one level the identity of a culture is a question 
about the relationship between the individual and 
the larger collectivity. How are the emotional and 
affective bonds that form the basis of identification 
composed? How do they motivate people to form a 
larger social connection in which individuality is 
renounced or attenuated into a larger group called the 
nation? How does this identification induce manifest 
acts of sacrifice, altruism and even violence? Without 
such emotional identification, the concept of identity 
remains an abstract idea; it does not structure or 
motivate political action. The production of such 
emotional identification is an extremely complex 
and ill-understood matter, but it is fair to say that the 
modern Indian nation has produced its fair share 
of identification with the idea of India. Probably the 
most central element in this emotional imagination 
negotiated achievement, sustained through politics. 
In that sense the space for cultural pluralism depends 
upon that larger negotiation of India’s political 
identity; a successful political negotiation allows deep 
forms of pluralism to be sustained. Third, I shall focus 
on the anxiety over language and its relationship to 
culture. And finally, I shall argue that globalisation, 
contrary to what critics had feared, might produce a 
less anxiety-ridden cultural discourse in India that 
might defuse radical cultural nationalism. These 
are more in the nature of ruminations than a settled 
argument. But I have tried to present them in a way 
that might lend itself to cross-regional conversation.
From the inner life of culture to culture as inner life
There is an interesting paradox associated with the 
concept of culture. While ‘a’ culture is thought of 
as particular, ‘Indian’ or ‘Chinese’ or whatever the 
appropriate qualifier may be, the concept itself seems 
to have acquired a universality, roughly at the same 
historical moment. The genealogy of the concept 
is complex, and would require a long detour into 
intellectual history. But elements of that history are 
necessary for understanding the inner life of culture 
in India. As Raymond Williams has perceptively 
noted, the concept of culture itself was a response to 
a dramatic crisis; we become aware of culture only 
when culture begins to come into question. Before 
the nineteenth century culture was associated with a 
teleology: the idea of natural growth, and by analogy, a 
process of human training. This use usually referred to 
a culture of something. But in the nineteenth century 
we began to speak of culture as such. We began to 
speak of culture associated in two registers. The first 
was the register of value. Culture came to be associated 
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one hand it seeks to mobilise it in a political project, on 
the other hand it can colonise culture in an insidious 
way. The most insidious way in which nationalism 
colonises culture is by reversing an order of priorities. 
In the nationalism view of culture a compelling reason 
for certain practices, beliefs or ways of life is that these 
are mine. They are to be followed because they belong to 
a group, and make them what that group is. In this view 
there is an obligation to follow practices because of their 
origins in the fact of possession, to defend them because 
they are ours. But while this provides impetus for culture 
it also destroys it. For now culture is no longer embedded 
in the space of reason, it is driven by the imperatives of 
identity. They are defended not because they are good but 
because they are ours.
Almost all cultures, not just postcolonial ones, 
have had to combat the pressures of nationalism and its 
ability to colonise the question of value, and its ability 
to place identity over reason. The life of culture will 
crucially depend therefore on the political character 
of the nationalism in which it is embedded. There 
have certainly been powerful attempts in India to 
align culture with identity. But for the most part these 
have been politically defeated, and for the most part 
a liberal democratic space has been preserved. But 
in any society, genuine culture will be threatened by 
considerations of identity politics and the precarious 
politics of self-esteem that goes with it. To put it 
somewhat crudely, nothing jeopardises culture more 
than a quest for cultural identity.
While certain strains of Hindu nationalism and 
Muslim nationalism have on occasion threatened 
genuine culture in this way, the character of India’s 
anti-colonial nationalism and its enduring legacy sought 
to transcend traps of identity politics. In fact, it is often 
forgotten that Indian nationalism, across a wide range 
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is the idea of territoriality that transcends different 
nationalist imaginations.
The second aspect of identity is a sense of specificity. 
Identity is bound to something that makes you different, 
makes you the being that you are and not someone else. 
A good deal of the challenge of cultural identity is that 
we seek an answer to the question: what makes a culture 
the thing that it is? In short what is its ‘essence’? The 
challenge of articulating a conception of a culture that can 
also do the work of being an identity is that it inevitably 
produces anxieties over essentialism.
The third aspect of forming a cultural identity is the 
maintenance of boundaries in the process of creating the 
perilous pronoun ‘we’. What are the patterns of exclusion 
and inclusion that the process of identity formation 
entails? Who is the outsider and who is the insider? 
What are the terms on which citizenship and political 
standing is defined? This is a question of both legal and 
political status. Legally at any rate, India has adopted a 
republican conception of citizenship, where citizenship 
rights are not tied to any substantial benchmarks of 
ethnicity or religion. But politically there have been 
occasional attempts to define the boundaries of exclusion 
and inclusion based on some substantial notion of what it 
means to be an ‘authentic’ Indian.
The anthropological conception of culture as 
essence, specificity and identity was deeply aligned to 
both colonialism and nationalism. Ideologies of ‘culture’ 
legitimised forms of colonial rule by simultaneously 
asserting the superiority of some cultures, at the 
same time as insisting on their irrevocable distance. 
Nationalism, in some ways, had to make a similar move: 
to insist on the specificity of a culture and its unity. This 
is not the occasion to go into complex arguments about 
the relationship between nationalism and culture, but 
nationalism poses two challenges for culture. On the 
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extent this location of culture within a realm of reasons 
succeeded is an open question. But I want to dwell on 
the challenges this conception of culture faced.
In the register of values, the operative contrast 
in the nineteenth century was between culture and 
civilisation, where civilisation referred to the ‘outward’ 
registers of progress, like material prosperity and 
political life. Culture, by contrast, was that realm of 
animating values that often had to be tended against 
the forces of civilisation. What is striking about Indian 
reflections on culture is that, from the nineteenth 
century onwards, they produce roughly the same 
distinction in several languages. In Hindi, noted 
writers like Mahadevi Verma and Nirmal Verma made 
the contrast between sanskriti (culture) and sabhyata 
(civilisation) central to their reflections on culture. 
In nineteenth-century Bengal, for example, there is 
a rich vein of thinking from Bankim to Tagore that 
deploys a version of this contrast to explain the modern 
predicament. In this view, the force of civilisation, 
particularly modern civilisation, was an irrevocable 
force with two particular features. First, it produced a 
split. On the one hand there is the realm of ‘objective’ 
necessity that governs our material life. On the other 
hand there is a realm of subjective freedom, and the 
two are in experiential conflict. There are also two 
modes of experiencing agency. On the one hand we 
can experience agency as actors on nature or in history. 
Or we can experience a sense of agency by standing 
outside of it, as it were. The former was a part of 
‘materialism’, the latter of ‘spiritualism’. I am greatly 
simplifying a complex line of thought, but what is 
striking is a common, pervasive theme that appears in 
Indian reflections on culture. The location of culture 
was in this realm of subjective freedom; it is, if you 
like, located in the perfection and realisation of the 
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of thinking from Aurobindo to Gandhi, Tagore to 
Nehru, legitimised itself on the plane of an alternative 
universality. The legitimacy of the nation was to be 
grounded not on the fact of its identity but on its ability to 
remain an exemplar and repository of values. Whatever 
one may think of the history of modern India, the fact 
that a strong ideological strain in Indian nationalism 
resisted the temptations of a suffocating identity politics 
has a lot to do with the fact that India not only survives 
as a liberal democracy for the most part, but also creates 
a context where culture does not always have to bear the 
weight of identity.
When the claims of culture were being re-
legitimised, it was on the grounds that Indian culture 
was offering a much richer and deeper alternative 
universality to the claims that were being made on 
behalf of European modernity. To be sure, much of this 
moral core had long been buried under unconscionably 
unjust social forms, but it did exist and can provide 
an alternative axis for shaping one’s sense of self and 
society. Gandhi and Tagore were two prominent and 
best-known examples of this tradition. But it is striking 
the degree to which this ambition informed so much of 
the literary production of twentieth-century India. To 
put it simplistically, in this mode of thinking culture 
was to be defended not because it was mine, but 
because it was good. It again sought to place culture 
in a normative space, where cultural ideals broadly 
stood within the space of reason. This move had three 
advantages. It at least sought to reposition culture as 
the inheritance of all humankind, potentially accessible 
to all others and contributing to their well being. It 
provided the space for criticism. For once, culture tried 
to occupy the realm of the normative: it was at least 
open to discussion. And third, this view of culture 
was often an antidote to cultural nationalism. To what 
92 93
The Inner Lives of Cultures
to strenuously hold on to their toilet habits because in 
the long run this would be the only site at which they 
could assert a real sense of a different cultural identity. 
This was a bit indelicate, but not entirely off the mark. If 
the economy and politics are governed by their own logic 
and imperatives, and colonise more of the realm of daily 
existence, where exactly will culture be located?
There is a popular Hindi song, ‘My shoes are 
Japanese, my pants are English, my red cap is Russian, 
but my heart is Indian’. What is interesting about this 
song is the location of ‘Indianness’ in an intangible 
interior space. No less real or important, but intangible 
and interior nonetheless. It is not an accident that the 
most powerful articulations of Indian culture retreat to 
the realm of the ‘inner’, or are articulated as its ‘Spirit’, 
signifying the material limitations modernity might 
place on culture.
Under conditions of modernity, endowing an 
ongoing way of life with cultural significance is an 
altogether more abstract gesture. As many observers 
have noted, cultural identities are no longer connected 
to participating in distinct cultural practices. In fact, 
cultures and nations have, for good or for ill, ceded so 
much space to the modern economy, the modern state, 
and often the egalitarian aspirations of modernity, that 
it is more difficult to hold on to a sense of difference that 
is embodied in a concrete way of life. Or to put it slightly 
more precisely, much of the realm of public collective 
action, especially the polity and the economy, is not the 
site for expressing culture. Rather culture is expressed 
more in confined spaces – private spaces or in particular 
spheres of activity that have their confined place: art, 
music, literature. It is precisely because substantive values 
and horizons of meaning are shrinking that greater and 
inordinate weight is placed on markers of difference. As 
Valentine Daniel put it, ‘nationalism is the horripilation 
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Self. But this realm of culture is very self-consciously 
pitted against the ‘outer’ realm of necessity and material 
determination. It is not an accident that ‘spirituality’ 
in its widest sense came to be seen as the essence of 
Indian culture. But the creation of this as an essence 
was to locate culture outside of history, or even against 
it. It was largely a product of an imagination that 
thought that the Self could be ordered, even if the world 
could not. What made the Gandhian project peculiar 
was that it was the only large ideological attempt to 
argue that the ordering of the Self would lead to an 
ordering of the World. It tried to approach the question 
of historical agency and social transformation through 
a transformation of the Self. With the historical collapse 
of that project, the split between the inner and outer, 
material and spiritual, came to be reinscribed as the 
essence of culture.
Second, the advance of civilisation tended to fragment 
human experience. The economy, politics, art, religion, 
morality: each had their own internal logic and integrity 
that could not be subsumed under the logic of any other 
mode of experience. The essence of politics was violence; 
the essence of the market, commoditisation; the essence 
of religion, the sacred; the essence of art, a form of 
non-instrumental creation and so forth. There was no 
underlying thread that could bring these different modes 
of experience into one harmonious whole. In modern 
conditions, we were bound to remain fragmented. Culture 
in this context became an interstitial concept: it occupied 
particular spaces. It was an attempt to order the self in 
a context, where the world could not be rendered into a 
harmonious whole. To put it somewhat provocatively, it 
was not so much that culture had an inner life, it was that 
culture could now be articulated and grasped only in an 
‘inner life’. This is an old anxiety about modernity. Bhudev 
Mukhopadhyaya, the great Bengali poet, enjoined Indians 
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not by themselves signal greater diversity. Rather, 
invocation of identity may be a sign that diversity is 
decreasing. We often want to put ourselves under God’s 
Yoke the most when we feel his presence the least.
The further challenge to ‘culture’ comes from 
interrogating culture as a site of power. As egalitarian 
aspirations spread, a suspicion was cast on culture as the 
means through which the relationship of subordination 
and exclusion are perpetuated and maintained. 
Women, Dalits, and a whole range of hitherto 
subordinated groups began to make the argument that 
the very sources of culture were also sources of their 
subordination. Cultural forms are in part maintained by 
associations with structures of authority. The very act 
of authorising culture, of marking realms of value, of 
trying to assign meaning to particular roles in society, 
of consecrating rituals, created relationships of power. A 
shadow begins to be cast upon culture because it is seen 
as an instrument of domination. This was particularly 
easy in a society where access to cultural authority was 
so closely associated with forms of social stratification. 
But this critique generated several different responses. 
The first might be described as the detachment of 
culture from particular social forms. In this view, what 
culture afforded was a repertoire of value and meaning. 
It was precisely this repertoire that allowed a society 
to critique its own social practices. The critique of the 
‘injustice’ of culture could come from the resources 
of the culture itself. While this motivation generated 
an astonishing burst of creativity – readings of the 
tradition, literary retellings of classics, and so forth – it 
had the paradoxical consequence of increasing precisely 
the distance between culture and social forms that 
modernity was imposing. For it was saying something 
like this: do not identify culture with particular social 
forms. Culture, rather, refers to a realm of value 
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of culture in insecurity and fright’. Finally, in the realm 
of culture, it is often argued that culture is to be valued 
because it is constitutive of someone’s identity. This 
alignment of culture with identity can be misleading in 
a couple of ways.
First, the minute we are talking of identity we 
are talking of difference rather than diversity. It is 
possible for individuals or groups who are alike in most 
respects to have a profound sense of having a different 
identity, a different sense of who they are. Indeed, as 
many have argued, we see more and more identity 
conflicts not because of the objective diversity between 
people, but because of their increasing likeness. Stress 
on difference becomes a way of defining identity in 
the face of narrowing differences in other spheres of 
life. It is a commonplace experience of the modern 
world that, contrary to what Arjun Appadurai argues, 
culture, politics and economy get disembedded from 
each other. After all, it is not an accident that when 
defending ‘culture’ very few are defending the right of 
a society to be governed by a Hindu view of the division 
of labour, or for the economy to take on board to run 
on Islamic principles of usury or power to be allocated 
by Confucian conceptions of elite. While it is true that 
religion is not simply an add-on to material resources, 
it is palpably misleading to argue that culture, economy 
and politics cannot to some degree be disembedded 
from each other. This is a greater functional 
differentiation that modern societies produce.1 In this 
context, it is quite possible that individuals and groups 
are sharing more and more, and are embedded in 
similar matrices of political and economic institutions, 
yet want to assert their sense of difference. In fact, 
as Michael Ignatieff has argued, following Freud’s 
insight that conflicts born of the ‘narcissism of small 
differences are most acute’, identity differences do 
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organised collective existence in India. The resources 
of history and culture, rather than providing comfort 
and continuity, would themselves be the first categories 
to be subject to intense political scrutiny. Whatever 
anyone may claim about the identity of India, what 
its historical essence consisted in, what the sources 
of its unity were, the simple fact was this: whether or 
not republics had existed in ancient India, whether or 
not democracy had cultural roots, in 1951 for the first 
time in Indian history all Indians were declared to be 
citizens. Henceforth they would themselves, within 
the arenas and opportunities for struggle provided 
for by the constitution, define their own collective 
identities, negotiate and renegotiate the terms of social 
cooperation, and as republican citizens take charge of 
their own destiny.
Universal adult suffrage was going to have 
social implications far beyond its immediate 
political significance. As one of the most thoughtful 
commentators of the time, KM Pannikar, put it, ‘many 
social groups previously unaware of their strength, and 
barely touched by the political changes that had taken 
place, suddenly realised that they were in a position 
to wield power’. The right to participate in choosing 
one’s electors was the most dramatic way of affirming 
the equality of all citizens. Although the right to vote 
is seen by many as a meagre right, whose exercise is a 
periodic ritual that does little to enhance the well being 
of those who exercise it, that right itself transforms the 
meaning of social existence. It is an assertion that all 
authority is a conditional grant; that suffrage establishes 
the sufferance, as George Kateb so eloquently put it. 
Democracy, as its earliest observers were quick to note, 
represents the dissolution of inherited modes of authority, 
indeed of the whole concept of authority itself. Democracy, 
once instituted, is an incitement to politicise all areas of 
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that stands over and above social forms, judging 
them. In short, it began to turn culture from a social 
phenomenon into a normative ideal. But the second 
response is a retreat from the realm of culture into a 
new political vocabulary of justification. It opens up 
culture to serious political contestation all the way down. 
Rather than culture being the product of a normatively 
secured consensus, it comes to be formed in the context 
of various political struggles. In that sense, culture 
becomes not so much a realm of values or claims of 
perfection but a terrain of political conflict.
Identity and politicisation
The ‘Idea of India’ is the repository of an immense 
range of contending hopes and fears. For all its 
antiquity and depth, its sense of geography and 
territoriality, and its intricate cultural linkages, modern 
India had to fashion a new identity for itself. The 
distinctness of this new identity was that politics was 
going to be at the centre of this process in more than 
one sense. Although Indians frequently appealed to 
its traditions, cultures and civilisational values, these 
had to be interpreted in light of aspects of modernity 
that were shaping India in equal measure: the 
presence of the modern state, the rise of democratic 
politics, the aspirations of egalitarianism and the 
ambitions of industrialisation. But India’s identity 
came to be politicised in a deeper sense. The invention 
of republican citizenship in India was indeed a 
momentous event, and a rupture with the past. While 
many had hoped that the new constitution would simply 
be encased within the supposed historical identity of 
India, its diverse and complex cultural sympathies, few 
imagined that the opportunities afforded by republican 
citizenship would intensely politicise all areas of 
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The point of this possibly banal truism is that it 
always has been and will be very difficult to give an 
interpretation of Indian identity in what might be called 
substantialist terms. This is a conception of identity that 
privileges some substantial trait – religion, race, culture, 
ethnicity, shared history, common memory – that can 
be objectively identified and then configures an identity 
around it. Indeed threats to India often arise from trying 
to give its identity some substantial meaning in this 
sense. There is an old joke about India’s identity: it does 
not occur to most Indians to doubt it until someone 
begins to give arguments to prove its existence. This 
joke captures something profound about the way in 
which Indian identity has been constituted, and also the 
circumstances under which this identity is put under 
stress. But the thorough politicisation of identity suggests 
that Indian identity will not be constituted necessarily 
through shared attributes or aspirations but through 
what Khilnani once called ‘interconnected differences’. 
Does all this mean that India does not have an identity? 
If this demand implies that there is something we all 
unequivocally share, the answer is no. But it does not 
preclude the thought that we all have lots of different 
reasons and ways in which we define our relationships 
to each other. There is no ‘unity’ in diversity, rather we 
are diverse in our unities, and we might identify with 
connections to India, each in our own way.
It is for this reason that there are grounds to be 
suspicious of any authoritative narrative of Indian identity, 
including one that emphasises its pluralism. I think 
pluralism is the de facto reality of India, and Indian 
politics has a remarkable capacity to negotiate difference 
and plurality. Faced with exclusivist cultural nationalism, 
we often try and imagine other more complex identities. 
We try to imagine an India where, instead of singularity 
we emphasise plurality, instead of purity we emphasise 
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social life; it introduces, over time, a process of critique 
that questions and subverts all certainties of social life 
including culture.
The process of democratisation will thus always 
produce radical uncertainty about authority and identity 
alike. As the legitimacy of old ways of instituting 
authority and recognising identities dissolve, without 
being replaced by new norms and conventions, the 
experience of democracy will be profoundly confusing. 
As Tocqueville put it incomparably: ‘Obedience, then, 
loses moral basis in the eyes of him who obeys; he no 
longer considers it as a divinely appointed duty; and he 
does not yet see its purely human aspect; in his eyes 
it is neither sacred nor just and he submits to it as a 
degrading though useful fact. There is an unspoken 
intestinal power between permanently suspicious rival 
powers. The lines between authority and tyranny, liberty 
and license, right and might seem so jumbled and 
confused that no one knows exactly what he is, what he 
can do and what he should do.’
The experience of democracy has opened up 
numerous points of dissent, new conflicts of values and 
identities and a permanent antagonism of meaning 
and interest that often leaves Indians with a sense that 
society is flying off in many different directions at once, 
and the unity of reference points seems to vanish. But 
it could be argued that new bonds have been created 
through this politicisation of all aspects of life. It is 
through the process of intense argument that a new 
shared public is being created. The important thing 
about the experience of modern India is not that Indians 
always necessarily have a shared conception of identity 
but that they have agreed to argue about the question. 
The story of modern India is the story of Indians 
constantly struggling to articulate, discover and debate 
what it means to be Indian.
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complexity of Indian identity, and can resist the violent 
abridgement of identities that takes place in the name of 
more singular conceptions. The locus classicus of such 
sentiment is Jawaharlal Nehru’s, which celebrates a 
cultural miscegenation, describing India as:
An ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought 
and reverie had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had 
completely hidden or erased what had been written previously.
This is, in so many ways, an attractive conception 
of Indian identity. It allows for the possibility that the 
garb of modernity will continue to coexist with the 
many layers already inscribed on Indian civilisation. It 
allows Indians to transcend tradition without making it 
despicable. And it accurately reflects the de facto reality 
of modern India.
But this conception should not be taken as an 
authoritatively settled account of Indian identity, or a 
widely accepted political conception, for a number of 
reasons. First, de facto pluralism is not the same thing 
as de jure identification with that pluralism. Whether the 
reality is accepted as the norm depends upon concrete 
political choices. While most Indian cultural practice 
conforms to this Nehruvian vision, this claim can be and 
is often politically challenged by forces such as Hindu 
nationalism that regard this pluralism as a source of 
weakness and regret. It is worth emphasising that this 
critique of Indian identity will remain a powerful force in 
Indian politics. It is also part of the million mutinies, the 
numerous attempts to redefine India’s identity, that still 
dot the public space.
Second, even an acceptance of pluralism can be 
made quite incompatible with high degrees of violence 
and intolerance. The constitution of India into plural 
groups opens up the possibility of political competition 
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the essentially hybrid character of all identity, instead of 
exclusivism we emphasise syncretism and so on. We thus 
prefer a different range of adjectives to describe cultural 
states of being: syncretist, pluralist, hybrid, liminal, 
incomplete, interdependent, composite, become terms in 
vogue. The point of these categories is both political and 
conceptual. Conceptually we try and show that the binary 
oppositions on which exclusivist identities thrive (say, 
Hindu–Muslim) are subverted by the complex experience 
of history. It often becomes meaningless to describe 
some cultural artefact, like a particular form of music, as 
exclusively Hindu or Muslim; elements of both converge 
to produce a new musical form altogether. Some 
identities are described as liminal, inhabiting that zone 
where they cannot be described as either/or. We try and 
construct a shared history around these moments: hybrid 
cultural forms become more politically respectable than 
pure ones, and so forth.
Politically, the hope is that subverting the binary 
oppositions that exist between categories that demarcate 
people into separate groups will somehow lead people to 
acknowledge the webs of interdependence that bind people 
together. It will lead them to recognise that the cultural 
forms that they inhabit owe a good deal to cultures they 
are about to stigmatise as inferior, foreign or impure. 
Once it is shown that different cultures have commingled 
to produce new cultural forms, we will be relieved of the 
allure of singular identities. To recognise the many layers 
that constitute our own selves and our history is to find 
space for acknowledging all the complex contributions that 
have made us what we are. This acknowledgement then 
allows us to open up to difference: it allows us to see that 
those whom we stigmatise as foreign are also themselves 
part of our identity. Thus a good deal of weight is placed 
upon describing India as ‘composite’ or ‘syncretist’ for 
these are the only terms that can accommodate the true 
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tries to impose a single version of Indian national 
identity or actively subverts democracy. Challenges of 
regionalism have proved more tractable whenever the 
Indian State has gone in for democratic incorporation 
or accommodation. Indeed, secessionist movements 
have proved to be more intractable in precisely those 
states – Kashmir and the Northeast – where the Indian 
Government has found it difficult to break the cycle 
of authoritarianism and excessive intervention. Even 
the brutal insurgency in Punjab was brought to an end 
because the possibility of democratic incorporation 
always existed. Kashmir is a special case because of 
its peculiar history. But even here, it could be argued 
that it is authoritarianism from the Indian State that 
gave the secessionist movement its political lease of 
life and provided an opening for internationally backed 
militants. Now, when for the first time in more than 15 
years there is a semblance of peace in Kashmir and a 
real political process underway, it is because the Indian 
Government finally managed to conduct free and fair 
elections, not just for state assemblies but for civic 
bodies as well. The political conflicts in Kashmir are far 
from over, but democratic incorporation affords the best 
chance of peace.
The second mechanism is simply the size and 
power of the Indian State. There is some truth to the 
proposition that it is very difficult to mount collective 
action against the Indian State. It makes the costs of 
contemplating taking on the state immensely high. 
India is large enough to sit on any problem long 
enough without a real threat of the central state itself 
imploding. Most nations collapse, not because of social 
forces, but because of the implosion of central authority. 
That has never been a serious possibility on India’s 
horizon. The potential internal power of the state has 
given solidity to Indian identity.
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between them that can often result in violence. 
Indeed, one of the paradoxes of the modern Indian 
experience is that cultural acceptance of difference is 
quite compatible with political conflict between groups. 
Third, this pluralism is also an ‘objectifying’ bird’s eye 
view of India. It does not pay adequate attention to the 
fact that a society can look pluralistic, while its various 
constituents are not. It would be too premature to see 
India’s conception of its own identity as settled in any 
way. But the process of churning is itself producing a 
myriad of interconnections on the basis of which it could 
be argued that the Indian Union is stronger even if the 
identity remains contested. The strength of the Union 
depends upon four key mechanisms. And there is every 
reason to think that these mechanisms have only grown 
stronger rather than weaker.
The sinews of union
India is one of the most astonishing political 
experiments in recorded human history. A billion 
people, a significant proportion of whom remain 
unlettered and unpropertied, constituting themselves 
into a republic; a bewildering variety of languages and 
religions weaving themselves into the tapestry of a 
single nation; a society in which political equality and 
universal suffrage has preceded the introduction of 
social equality. For the most part India has managed its 
diversity very well. This diversity has been facilitated 
by four mechanisms. The first is simply democracy. 
It can be confidently asserted that India has stayed 
together as a nation because of democracy. The threat 
of secessionism or regional conflict is invariably 
more a product of the authoritarian moments of the 
state, rather than its democratic tendencies. The 
threat of secessionism arises usually when the centre 
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politically privileged, or others sought to be abridged, 
the potential for resistance was great. If the threat of 
privileging one element was removed, the possibilities 
for accommodation were profound. Indeed, the way in 
which actual linguistic practices are now evolving in 
many parts of India, with languages and vocabularies 
bleeding into each other, at least at the level of mass 
culture, is a sign of the possibilities of cultural fusion. 
Salman Rushdie once described Mumbai street 
language as HUG ME (Hindu, Urdu, Gujarati, Marathi, 
English), making the point that, if culture is left free 
of political superintendence, if the anxieties of identity 
are not placed upon it, it will evolve in its own merry, 
impure and messy way.
The fourth mechanism is the actual practices of 
politics that allow for a good deal of power sharing 
between the provinces and the centre. While India’s 
federalism privileges the centre, and the formal powers 
of the central government have been growing in a 
vast majority of areas, informal practices of politics 
allow for considerable power sharing. This is done 
through two mechanisms. First, the state has very 
rigidly adhered to an impartially applied mechanical 
formula in the transfer of resources from the centre to 
the states. The fact that an independent commission 
recommends these allocations has probably reduced 
the bargaining burden on politics between the centre 
and the states considerably. There is some worry that 
the palpably growing inequality between clusters 
of states might put pressure on the Indian Union. 
Over the last decade and a half the states of Southern 
and Western India have done considerably better on 
most measures of economic and social performance 
than the states of the Hindi Belt and Eastern India. 
While growing regional inequality is a matter of some 
concern there is reason to suppose that this will not 
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The third mechanism is an imaginative construal 
and negotiations over rights. The manner in which 
linguistic differences were accommodated became a 
benchmark for a more imaginative conception of the 
nation. After independence Hindi speakers, the single 
largest language group in the country, began to press 
for the adoption of Hindi as a national language, a 
demand that elicited fierce opposition from states of 
the South. Nehru engineered a pluralist compromise 
where a dozen or so languages were given official status 
with the possibility of adding others to the list; states 
were demarcated on linguistic lines to give political 
recognition to the status of some languages; schools 
were asked to introduce a three-language formula, 
and English was retained as the language of the state, 
to be phased out over a long period. The important 
thing about this compromise was that it refused to 
anchor Indian identity to any single privileged trait. 
Indeed, the source of resistance to an Indian identity 
came from attempts to tie it to a single privileged 
trait; as soon as the threat of that vanished, so did 
the resistance. Indeed it is arguable that, by granting 
political recognition to competing demands, the Indian 
state defused the force of vernacular nationalism in 
two ways. First, it accommodated them in a spirit 
of democracy. Second, over time the linguistic 
orientation in these states began to be determined 
by the imperatives of the economy rather than by the 
requirements of cultural identity. To take an example, 
two states, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, which had 
postponed the teaching of English until grade 5 on 
grounds of cultural nationalism, recently reintroduced 
English at the primary level to make their students 
more competitive. India’s linguistic arrangements gave 
expression to the idea of a layered Indian identity, an 
accretion of different elements. If one element was 
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to education), not just between them. Most political 
formations in India survived through linguistic 
eclecticism: the language of commerce, the language 
of legitimising political power, the language of the 
sacred, the languages of the literary and imagination 
and the grammar of emotions could be distinct for the 
same individuals. Even the much maligned colonial 
state, while it promoted English, had to simultaneously 
promote, not just ‘Oriental Languages’ but a whole 
range of indigenous literary forms as well. Despite 
linguistic diversity, different languages could share 
literary forms, a common intellectual culture and 
through a range of common references even develop in 
relation to each other.
The States Reorganisation Commission was an 
inspired response to the challenges posed by this 
alignment of language and politics. It saved India from 
that fate of every multilinguistic society that has tried to 
impose a single language on the country: civil war. To that 
extent it was remarkably successful. But there is a danger 
that we might misinterpret the true lesson of the success 
of 1956. That lesson is not diversity, but freedom.
We are at a new juncture in the politics of 
language and statehood. First, there is great pressure 
for so-called linguistic states like Andhra and 
Maharashtra to be broken down further. Many of 
the arguments calling for the creation of new states 
like Telangana and Vidarbha make sense in light 
of the realities of these regions. But granting them 
recognition will involve modifying the 1956 vision. 
Rather than thinking of states along linguistic lines, 
we will have to commit to the proposition that not 
even all the South Indian states will bear the hallmark 
of a linguistic logic. Languages often need political 
recognition in a state to f lourish. Just think of the 
appalling state of Urdu simply because it fell through 
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politically weaken the Indian Union for a number 
of reasons. The sheer economic interdependence of 
these states, the actuality of significant and large-scale 
internal migration (a great leveller) and India’s slow but 
steady moves towards creating an integrated national 
market are more than likely to offset the pressures 
generated by this inequality. India has also made a 
political compromise to defuse the issue. I do not want 
to dwell on issues of regional inequality here. The point 
is simply that creating a context for cultural pluralism 
requires intelligent political negotiation.
The babble of Babel: identity and language
One distinctive issue in India has been the politics 
of language. The States Reorganisation Commission 
Report was a remarkable exercise in political acuity. At 
one stroke it defused a catastrophic politics of linguistic 
nationalism by recognising India’s linguistic diversity 
and giving it some political expression. It also recognised 
that, to some degree, the language question cannot be 
resolved by insisting on singular solutions emanating 
from the centre, and premised on the thought that a 
nation has to speak a single language.
As Sheldon Pollock has pointed out in his 
magisterial The Language of Gods in the World of Men, 
India’s linguistic history is distinctive in many respects. 
In India, language was historically never harnessed to a 
political project, religion played little part in the choice 
of language, there was no concept of mother tongue 
in pre-modern India and no sense of a language tied 
to a group identity or a particular ethnos. There was 
no sin of Babel. Linguistic diversity was considered in 
some sense natural, not a deviation to be corrected. The 
important point is that the diversity was meant to flow 
through individuals (or at least those who had access 
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project where other linguistic groups – Tamil or English 
or Konkani – are disadvantaged or deprived of their 
choices is quite another.
Another casualty of the 1956 settlement was a 
remarkable idea of Nehru’s: he thought of genuinely 
multilingual areas like Hyderabad, Bombay [now 
Mumbai] and Madras, as something like cosmopolitan 
zones, a standing riposte to the idea that language, 
territory and ethnicity should coincide. These would be 
the zones where languages and identity would seamlessly 
meld into each other, creating all sorts of new languages 
and possibilities. The great virtue of modern India is that 
in some ways what Nehru thought was true of places like 
Bombay is increasingly coming to define more of India. 
The lines of different languages run through each one 
of us rather than between us. A time might come where 
the alignment of language, territory and identity will 
seem as ineffectual as attempts by snooty custodians of 
language to preserve its purity. But, as the rest of India 
becomes more diverse, it is precisely these cosmopolitan 
zones that have become hostage to the politics of identity. 
Perhaps there is an argument to be made, both in 
linguistic and economic terms, for carving out these 
dense concentrations of populations as administrative 
zones in their own right.
The politics of language in India will remain 
paradoxical for many years. Take Gurgaon, where most 
geographical markers have names like Hamilton, 
Regency, Ridgewood, Windsor, Princeton, etc. You 
cannot help feeling sympathy for those who engage in 
the politics of renaming. But the inhabitants of these 
same anglicised buildings are giving their children the 
most complicated Sanskrit names you can imagine. 
The growth in vernacular press and the burgeoning 
demand for English are both realities of modern 
India: identity and instrumentality will both have to 
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the disjuncture between geography and language. But 
this is not a premise that should forever stand in the way 
of new political and administrative possibilities.
But the second challenge is more complex. The 
reorganisation of states along linguistic lines also 
gave some momentum to identifying language with 
ethnicity: the issue was no longer simply the preservation 
of Kannada, or resisting the imposition of Hindi, but 
the whole political fashioning of a Kannadiga identity; 
Maharashtra went through a similar process during the 
1970s and 1980s. This process can manifest itself in the 
often meaningless politics of renaming. After all, when a 
culture begins to bother about so many names, there is a 
real suspicion that all that might be left to the politics of 
that language is names. But increasingly, this alignment 
is restricting the choices of citizens: many states, for 
instance, require university professors to be proficient in 
the native language to be eligible for increments, in some 
states there is a periodic assault on English language 
schools, and the possibility of Tamil–Kannada tension 
remains more than remote. This is where it is important 
that we draw the right lessons from 1956.
The moral imperative behind 1956 was not 
simply diversity; it was respect for the principle of 
non-coercion. No language would be imposed upon 
any state against their will. Diversity and non-coercion 
are different things. The principle of non-coercion 
suggests that people should be able to exercise their 
linguistic choices, logistical constraints apart, in 
a non-discriminatory way. Whatever diversity that 
emerges as a result is to be cherished, but choice should 
not be diminished in the name of diversity. This is a 
principle that states would do well to remember as the 
preferences of their own populations get more diverse. 
The creation of a Kannada state to give expression to 
Kannada aspirations is one thing. To turn it into a 
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What is happening to bilingualism or trilingualism, 
which seemed like a genuine possibility three decades 
or so ago, is this. While nominally the number of 
bilinguals is rising (or if you count acquaintance with 
Bollywood Hindi, even trilinguals), the balance between 
languages is clearly shifting. The vernacular languages 
are coming to be increasingly confined to particular 
and narrowing spaces. For instance, while literary 
production in these languages remains strong, these 
languages are not participating in the production of 
‘knowledge’. One striking example of this is the fact 
that even vernacular papers are increasingly relying on 
translations from English, to fill their op-ed spaces on 
anything that has to do with ‘knowledge’ – economics, 
political science, international relations history, rather 
than literary expression.
Judging by what is happening in schools, this trend 
is likely to worsen. We can speculate on why this is so: 
the complete unimaginativeness with which Hindi 
is taught; the obtuseness of the Hindi establishment 
itself, which prevented the growth of the language 
by defending a very narrow literary conception of the 
language; the fact that, unlike in the case of Tamil Nadu, 
Bengal or Kerala, the self-definition of elites in north 
India was premised on a distance from the vernacular 
rather than an identification with it. But this loss of 
bilingualism is not an unimportant cultural fact of our 
times and will impact our relation to our own past.
The second disjuncture is within the world of Hindi 
itself. If market trends are any guide, there is a growing 
demand for Hindi works and newspapers. The success 
of the wonderfully readable Hindi translation of Harry 
Potter speaks of new opportunities. But Hindi had deep 
discontinuities between its small literary world and the 
larger reading public. To a certain extent, this is true of 
all literary traditions, but the discontinuity seems greater 
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blend. The strongest demand for English now comes 
from hitherto marginalised groups, like Dalits, who see 
access to English as a medium of empowerment. There 
is no question that the demand for English has grown at 
a phenomenal rate and will remain a dominant cultural 
force. Sometimes it is all right to wonder whether we 
confuse the virtues of Babel with the qualities of babble. 
Linguistic anxiety will haunt us. But the solution is to 
draw the right lesson from 1956: the Indian project is not 
about diversity, understood as the need to confine people 
to their linguistic origins. It is about something deeper. 
It is about giving each one the freedom to be whomever 
they wish to be, in whichever language they choose. 
But one hopes this process takes place imaginatively, 
to allow citizens to take full advantage of the diversity 
India has to offer.
Why is there anxiety that there will be new stresses 
and strains on India’s linguistic imagination? India’s 
elites, particularly in north India, are no longer bilingual 
and have no capacity to navigate vernacular materials. 
The paradox of our times is that there is a sense in which 
Hindi readership is growing, because more people are 
becoming literate; English still continues to flourish and 
the demand for it is increasing. But what we had hoped to 
achieve in our language policy, the creation of genuinely 
bilingual modes of being, is now simply an illusion. 
Thirty years or so ago, our middle-class elite would have 
still related to vernacular literature, and followed it; now 
it is incapable of doing so. Even in the 1970s, both the 
Illustrated Weekly of India and Dharamyug were part of 
the same social universe in that middle-class homes 
would read both; the elite could have related to both 
English and vernacular literary worlds. Magazines with 
space for the essay format have been totally decimated in 
both languages. But it is also less likely that Hindi and 
English publications will now share the same space.
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Hinglish. But the ability of more than one language to 
become the medium of thought, the mark of genuine 
bilingualism, is very much in doubt.
Globalisation and a new identity
India’s gradual reintegration into the world economy is 
a contested process. But on balance, globalisation has 
brought immense economic benefits to India. India has 
experienced an acceleration of aggregate GDP growth 
rates to an average of eight per cent over the last four 
years. Aggregate manufacturing growth has jumped 
to more than seven per cent, and the growth rate in 
the service sector has been even more phenomenal. 
Indian companies, rather than withering away under 
competition, are boldly venturing into the global 
market, acquiring companies all over the world. Since 
liberalisation in 1991, India has not been subject to a 
serious economic crisis; its external balance of payments 
situation is more robust than ever. There has been a 
secular decline in poverty rates, though albeit at a much 
slower rate than defenders of globalisation had hoped. 
India still has unconscionably high rates of poverty, 
illiteracy, malnourishment and morbidity. But there is a 
good deal of consensus that India’s lack of achievement 
in these areas has little to do with globalisation. Rather, 
the delivery of social services is hostage to a domestic 
political economy that predates globalisation. If anything, 
globalisation provides an opportunity to address 
these pressing concerns. Take an example, just in the 
financial year 2006. Government revenues experienced 
a growth of almost 40 per cent, a result of high growth 
rates. These resources gave the state an opportunity to 
address these concerns, and the last three years have 
seen the largest outlays on social sector expenditure in 
India’s history. However, these outlays are not effective, 
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in Hindi. The kind of mass readership high literature 
enjoys in any language is an open question, but at least 
literary awards seem to be considered a reflection of 
the possibilities of that language. The Pulitzers and 
the Bookers have become the object of mass news; but 
even within the Hindi world, the literary world seems 
more distant. Just the ways in which prizes in the two 
languages are covered suggest as much.
The third disjuncture is of course about cultural 
self-confidence. For all the bluster about the arrival 
of the postcolonial generation, we still could be said 
to privilege external modes of validation over our 
own (consider the ridiculous obsession over winning 
Oscars, for example). Of course it is the content of the 
standards that should count, not their provenance. But it 
is mildly disturbing that despite all the rhetoric of India 
having arrived, the lack of external validation in some 
important spheres is still seen as some kind of deficit. 
This is then compounded by sheer ignorance about the 
cultural possibilities and ground that we stand on. For 
instance, one distinction often mapped on to literature is 
the construction of the vernacular as the parochial and 
rooted, the English as the cosmopolitan and universal. 
This identification is bizarre, but widespread. But 
intellectually nothing could be farther from the truth. 
As Kunwar Narain, one of modern India’s greatest 
poets, himself once wrote, there is a sense in which 
Hindi writers have had to write with an even deeper 
sense of self-consciousness about three traditions: what 
he called Hindu, Indo-Islamic and Western. In that 
sense, vernacular literature has carved out its freedom 
through appropriation of a wider world. But we will not 
be in a position to make those choices if we cling to an 
avoidable monolingualism, and a set of narrow standards 
to judge what is truly important. The babble of Babel 
will continue, producing even new linguistic forms like 
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between foreign policy with pluralism and a new kind of 
multilateralism. Ask the question: what kinds of societies 
are, over the long haul, going to be best able to take 
advantage of globalisation? One element of the answer 
is going to be pluralism and openness. Japan’s economy 
is suffering because it has in some senses remained a 
closed society incapable of accepting immigration as a 
solution to its demographic woes. Europe is struggling 
to acknowledge that it has become multicultural, and 
the sense of identity of some of its nations is so fragile 
that a headscarf can put it at risk. Even China’s capacity 
to negotiate pluralism is still an open question. For all 
its warts, India has the capability of positioning itself as 
a negotiator between different civilisations and ways of 
life. Although India can be hostage to intolerance and 
extremism, India is one of the few societies in the world 
that is capable of negotiating a deep pluralism. This 
inheritance is also an asset in a globalising world; it 
ought to be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.
Finally, both economic globalisation and 
pluralism have to be linked to what can be described 
as a multicentric multilateralism. This is not the 
multilateralism centred on a moribund institution like 
the UN. It is a multilateralism that enduringly binds 
nations in webs of interdependence through a series of 
overlapping institutions. India is now seeking to join 
almost any multilateral arrangement that will admit it 
as a member, from APEC to G-8. These arrangements 
involve sovereignty trade-offs. But the underlying 
vision is that these sovereignty trade-offs are more 
than compensated by the real power that accrues from 
participation in these institutions.
The three elements of this foreign policy reinforce 
each other: uninhibited economic openness, pluralism and 
membership of multilateral institutions. Genuine economic 
openness is not sustainable without an open society and a 
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because less than 20 per cent of these resources reach 
the intended targets. The obstacle to sharing the gains of 
growth is not globalisation; it is the fact that the state has 
not reformed itself enough to fully capitalise on the gains 
of growth. While India has negotiated its globalisation 
largely on its own terms, its capacity to translate the 
gains of globalisation into the well being of all, will 
depend on the reform of its state.
But these economic trends do not capture the 
vitality and dynamism globalisation has induced in 
India. Perhaps most importantly, globalisation has 
brought about a fundamental transformation in India’s 
sense of itself. While India’s economics and political 
aspirations have expanded, arguably the most profound 
effect of globalisation will be on its sense of identity and 
its place in the world.
Behind this transformation in identity lies a new 
and sophisticated understanding of the currency of 
power in the modern world. India’s approach to the world 
had for decades been hostage to some fundamental 
misconceptions. It confused autonomy with autarky, 
sovereignty with power, and interdependence with a lack 
of independence. Its insecurities and inhibitions had 
created a conceptual fog around how power operates in 
international society. That fog has now been decisively 
lifted. There is more recognition of the fact that the more 
India engages with the global economy, the more our 
power will grow. This is not just because of the obvious 
fact that an increasing share of world trade and investment 
will make India important. It is also because the only 
sure path to peace is to create powerful constituencies in 
other countries that have a vested interest in supporting 
your cause. Trade and investment create the lobbies that 
transform relations between states.
But what is remarkable is a new and sophisticated 
thinking emerging in certain quarters about the link 
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episodic rather than spread across a wide range of 
domains; it sees international rivalries as a zero sum 
game; it has little potential for learning from the rest 
of the world and thumbs its nose at international 
institutions and norms.
In the second scenario, the same nationalist party, 
with similar anti-minority sentiment, comes to power 
in a context where it has to recognise that the health 
of the economy and, by implication, national power, 
depend upon a certain level of international credibility. 
It recognises the need to attract investment and have a 
plausible face to carry in forum after forum. It learns 
quickly that mutual interdependence is a surer path to 
national power than autarky, that power is not a zero sum 
game and that the international system can be engaged 
with only in terms of reciprocity. It learns that a mere 
declaration of sovereignty cannot be confused with real 
power, and that there might be something to be learnt 
from how other nations got to be influential. It does not 
take much to figure out in which scenario the nationalist 
party will be forced to tame its belligerence.
It would be complacent and false to believe that 
integration into the world economy will tame fanatical 
nationalism by some overdetermined logic. Nationalism 
and anti-minority sentiment are products of political 
choices. There is no guarantee against political fanaticism. 
But it could be argued that globalisation is a contributing 
factor to that moderation.
India always cared a good deal about what the rest 
of the world thought of it but it now cares for a more 
tangible measure of its success: its ability to attract 
investment and jobs from overseas. It is difficult to 
think of this as mattering unless India had greater 
aspirations to integrate into the global economy. In 
subtle ways, the desire to present India in a certain light 
has forced the Government to confront questions about 
Culture in Modern India
willingness to participate in regional arrangements signals 
a commitment to openness and dialogue.
Globalisation opens up two intriguing possibilities 
for Indian identity. First, by relentlessly pursuing Free 
Trade Agreements with the rest of Asia, including 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
India is once again striving for connections in its own 
natural neighbourhood. It has signalled its willingness 
to integrate economically with the rest of Asia and it 
is possible that over time this will revolutionise the 
way in which India conceives of the region. In utopian 
moments it is possible to imagine India’s border 
regions culturally and economically relinking with 
their traditional trading zones: Tamil Nadu with Sri 
Lanka, the North East with South East Asia. It is now 
feasible that these regions can establish economic 
linkages, yet remain firmly wedded politically to India. 
The idea is that India will need a strong centre, but 
not necessarily a well-defined circumference. What 
is striking is the degree to which this vision is being 
talked about and is likely to be the cornerstone of 
Indian policy. There is some consensus that by letting 
India integrate with the rest of Asia (a free trade zone 
from Kabul to Manila!) India will make it easy for its 
neighbours to open links with it in the context of wider 
regional cooperation.
The second intriguing possibility it opens up for 
Indian identity is this. There is no doubt that greater 
integration into the world economy, or even the 
aspiration, transforms an understanding of national 
identity. Think of two scenarios. In the first instance 
there is an emerging nationalist party, with significant 
anti-minority sentiment. But this party has none of the 
following aspirations. It does not feel obliged to send 
signals that can attract foreign investors and depositors; 
its routine engagements with the outside world are 
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parliamentary system from England and so on.’ Rau is 
reported to have replied, ‘Before independence we used to 
worry about these things. What is the point of being free 
if you cannot take any history and make it your own?’ 
The inner life of culture depends upon transcending 
culture without making culture despicable.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta is President of the Center 
for Policy Research, a New Delhi-based think tank. 
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India’s credibility. It has nudged it to make sure that 
India gets the headlines for the right reasons.
Belligerent nationalism feeds on a politics of 
anxiety. Compared to the early 1980s, the politics of 
anxiety seems to have diminished in intensity. This is, in 
no small measure, due to two factors. India has become 
more confident of its ability to deal with the rest of the 
world, and it is difficult to imagine this confidence in 
the absence of the process of globalisation. Rather than 
producing an identity crisis, globalisation has given an 
opportunity to India to feel less insecure. In an autarkic 
world, we had no sense of how we might prove our 
possibilities. Globalisation, by providing opportunities 
for international success, has made that anxiety less 
pressing. If Indians feel that they are ready to take on the 
world, they might feel less compelled to take it out on 
each other. If Indians are more confident that this sort of 
recognition is in their grasp, it might ease their anxieties. 
This is still only a hope. But freedom and openness suit 
India’s character more. That is the only identity that can 
sustain it in the long run.
If we are looking at the inner life of culture, this 
fact is of some importance. For the first time in modern 
Indian history, Indians are cutting across different 
sections of society, beginning to have the sense that the 
future will be better than the past, and they have the 
ability to shape their destiny. This aspiration has serious 
political and economic ramifications, but it can also be 
the source of a new cultural confidence. What will be the 
values that shape it remains an open question. But there 
is some reason to be optimistic that despite the deep 
stresses of change, a pluralisitic India will endure. When 
the Indian Constitution was framed, one of its drafters, 
BN Rau, was asked, ‘This is a great constitution. But we 
don’t see what is Indian about it. Directive Principles 




Cultural Pluralism in Indonesia:  
Local, National and Global Exchanges
Azyumardi Azra
Cultural pluralism and diversity are striking 
realities in Indonesia. As the prominent American 
anthropologist Robert Hefner argues in The Politics of 
Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia (2001), few areas of the 
non-Western world illustrate the legacy and challenge 
of cultural pluralism in a manner more striking 
than in the Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia. In fact, JS Furnivall, a 
British administrator and political writer before World 
War II, introduced the concept of plural societies in his 
Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (1939/1944), 
and identified the country known today as Indonesia as 
one of its most striking examples.
According to Furnivall, a plural society is a society 
that comprises two or more elements of social orders 
which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one 
political unit. He further maintained that this situation 
is accompanied by a caste-like division of labour, in 
which ethno-religious groups play different economic 
roles. This social segregation in turn gives rise to what 
Furnivall regarded as these societies’ most unsettling 
political trait: their lack of common social will. Facing 
this unfortunate situation, Furnivall asserted that 
unless some kind of formula for pluralist federation could 
be devised, Indonesian pluralism seemed doomed to a 
nightmarish anarchy.
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culture and tradition. For instance, the idea of 
personhood in relation to parents, families and society 
is based on the ‘traditional’ norms considered to be 
most appropriate for each group; ‘communalism’, or 
rather ‘collectivism’, is often much more important than 
individualism, for instance.
Therefore, when centralised political power in 
Jakarta during the Soeharto regime had destroyed 
certain aspects of that ‘traditional culture and tradition’ 
through its monocultural policy, there was a sense 
of loss, and violation of pluralism; now people are 
increasingly longing for and talking about ‘local 
wisdom’ possessed by local cultures and tradition. 
They believe that each local ethnic culture has its own 
geniuses that are instrumental in the maintenance of 
socio-cultural stability and harmony.
Indonesian national and local cultural diversity 
in the last few decades has been enriched by a more 
cosmopolitan culture resulting from increased 
globalisation. At the same time, the introduction 
of various new cultural forms found their way into 
Indonesian society, creating cultural confusion, 
disorientation and dislocation among young people 
in particular. Global lifestyles like individualism, 
liberalism, materialism and even hedonism are 
generally considered as incompatible with local and 
national culture. But since those kinds of lifestyles are 
so intrusive through instant communication, it is now a 
public discourse that Indonesian and local cultures are 
under threat from global culture.
Language of nationhood
The Indonesian archipelago – the largest one in the 
world, which consists of more than 17,800 islands, 
isles and islets – and its history make Indonesia an 
Furnivall’s ‘doomed’ scenario by and large 
fortunately failed to materialise. In contrast, a 
post-war Southeast Asia saw the establishment of 
an independent Indonesia and other countries. But 
this national independence was assumed to have 
paradoxically stimulated the rise of ethno-religious 
sentiment in the struggle for control and power of 
the new state. Indonesia saw outbreaks of communal 
violence in the late 1950s and 1965; more shocking yet, 
Indonesia was shaken by bitter, though intermittent, 
ethno-religious violence from 1996 – the final years that 
President Soeharto was in power – up to 2005, when all 
communal conflicts from Ambon (Maluku province) to 
Poso (Central Sulawesi province) and Aceh were finally 
peacefully resolved.
Competing cultures
Indonesia is indeed one of the most pluralistic societies 
in terms of ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious 
diversity. Age-old local traditions survived when 
Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17 August 
1945. Since then the so-called ‘Indonesian national 
culture’ gained momentum, competing with and in 
some ways transcending local cultures and tradition. 
The state since the time of independence has been trying 
to strengthen and sometimes to impose a ‘national 
culture’ in the name of national unity and integrity 
through centralised political structure and leadership, 
legislation and education – to name a few.
But the expansion of Indonesian national culture 
has never been able to replace local cultures up until 
today. Many Indonesians today still hold fast to their 
local cultures and traditions. This is not surprising, 
since the young generation is initially brought up 
according to the values and decorum of their ethnicity, 
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from the late twelfth century onwards. The Malay 
language had been considered as a more egalitarian 
language compared with both the Javanese and 
Sundanese languages. That is why it was easier for 
non-Malay Indonesians to adopt the Malay language as 
the national language.
The Indonesian language no doubt plays an 
instrumental role in strengthening the feeling and 
sentiment of nationhood. This national language 
continued to expand, particularly in the post-
independence period when education increasingly 
became available for the young generation at the cost 
of many local languages. Many people are now worried 
that more and more local languages are losing their 
speakers. It might be interesting to note that Indonesia 
has two parallel systems of education: about two-thirds 
is ‘general’ or ‘secular’ education, under the Ministry 
of National Education. Another third is conducted in 
madrasahs under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs; here, the national curriculum is 
obligatory, but there are more Islamic religious subjects 
taught than in the other schools.
At the same time, English continues to gain 
momentum to become a third or second language of 
the people. The first language in many cases is an 
ethnic language, next is the Indonesian language, and 
then English. But with the increased dominance of the 
Indonesian language and the ever-increasing number of 
interethnic marriages, the national language becomes 
the mother tongue of many young people, and English 
becomes the second.
Again, perceptions of the self in each of these 
languages are different. In local and national languages, 
all people are expected to use vocabularies appropriate 
to the age they address; but this is not always in line 
with English.
extremely pluralistic society. There are diverse ethnic 
groups – amounting to 656 ethnic groups, big and small 
– living in the country, having their respective cultures, 
traditions and customs. Up to the 1960s, there was 
little interaction among these different ethnic groups, 
but with the acceleration of economic development 
that brought about improvement in transportation and 
communication, greater contact, communication and 
exchanges were established. As a result, stereotypical 
perceptions and prejudices among various ethnic groups 
decreased significantly, strengthening the feeling of 
Indonesian nationhood.
Not least important, those different ethnic 
groups speak more than 746 different local languages 
and dialects, even though 726 among them are now 
on the edge of extinction; but still, there are now 13 
languages that survive, which are spoken by more than 
one million speakers. Considering these languages 
alone, Indonesia is very fortunate that the Indonesian 
language was adopted as the sole national language 
during the ‘Youth Pledge’ on 28 October 1928, when 
nationalist movements gained momentum under 
Dutch colonialism. It is important to mention that 
the Indonesian language was originally spoken by 
a relatively small ethnic group, the Malay, who lived 
mostly in Eastern and Central Sumatra. One should 
appreciate the tolerance of the Javanese or Sundanese 
who accepted the Malay-based Indonesian language, 
while their languages constituted the first and second 
largest languages, respectively, in the archipelago.
The adoption of the Malay-based Indonesian 
language as the national language was a good example 
of socio-cultural exchanges among different ethnic 
groups in the area. The Malay language had much 
earlier been adopted as the lingua franca, since it was 
the vehicle for the spread of Islam in the archipelago 
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and practising Muslims), and abangan (nominal or ID 
card Muslims). According to Geertz, the priyayi variant 
was heavily influenced by Indic-Sanskrit culture, whereas 
the abangan variant was too indigenous, syncretic and 
even animistic. Therefore, in his judgment, it is only 
the santri variant, with its heavy orientation to Middle 
Eastern Islam, which is the real Islam, and members of 
this variant are numerically few among the population. 
With that, Geertz implies that the majority of Javanese or 
Indonesians are not real Muslims, and Islam is adhered 
to by only a small fraction of the population.
One of Geertz’s fiercest critics is Marshall GS 
Hodgson, a prominent expert of Islamic civilisations 
from the University of Chicago. In his celebrated 
work The Venture of Islam (vol. 2, 1974) he admits the 
importance of Geertz’s Religion of Java; at the same time 
he criticises Geertz for identifying Islam in Java with 
only the modernist Muslims and ascribing everything 
else to an aboriginal or a ‘Hindu–Buddhist’ background. 
In Hodgson’s sharp criticism, Geertz made a wrong 
conclusion that ‘Javanese Islam’ has long been cut off 
from the centres of Islamic orthodoxy in Mecca, Medina, 
and even Cairo.
Recent studies have further refuted much of Geertz’s 
assertion. As I have shown in The Origins of Islamic 
Reformism in Southeast Asia (2004), for the period of the 
seventeenth to eighteenth centuries and beyond, and also 
by Michael Laffan in Islamic Nationhood and Colonial 
Indonesia: The Umma Below the Wind (2003), Islam in 
the archipelago has never been cut off from Islam in 
the Middle East. In fact there are a great many intense 
connections, networks and religious–cultural exchanges 
among Muslims in the two regions. All these in turn 
have influenced the course of Islam in the archipelago, 
including in Java. Islam in fact forms an obvious layer of 
Javanese and, by extension, Indonesian cultures.
Religion as an identity
Religion is also an important part of Indonesian culture, 
and diversity is clearly reflected in religious life as well. 
According to some latest estimates, the total population 
of Indonesia is about 220 million people of which 88.2 
per cent are Muslim, 5.87 per cent Protestant, 3.05 per 
cent Catholic, 1.81 per cent Hindu, 0.84 per cent Buddhist 
and the remaining 0.20 are of other religions and 
spiritual groups. The Indonesian government officially 
recognises the six world religions of Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism.
It is important to point out that, although the 
population of the archipelago converted mostly to 
Islam, the region is known as the one of the least 
Arabicised areas throughout the Muslim world. 
Geographically, it is also the farthest from the Arabian 
Peninsula, or more precisely Mecca and Medina, 
where Islam was originally revealed and developed. 
Furthermore, Islam was introduced by Sufi wandering 
teachers who accommodated local beliefs and practices. 
Therefore, Islam in the archipelago was regarded by 
many outsiders as ‘marginal’ or ‘peripheral’ Islam, as 
‘impure’ or ‘syncretic’ Islam. Moreover, Islam in the 
archipelago was regarded as having little to do with 
Islamic orthodoxy attributed to Islam in Arabia, or the 
region now known as the Middle East.
The most important proponent of this perception 
is the influential American anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz. Having a great reluctance to recognise the 
deep influence of Islam in Java in particular, he called 
his work The Religion of Java (1960) rather than, for 
instance, The Religion of Islam in Java or even Javanese 
Islam. In this seminal work, he proposed that there 
are three variants of Islam in Java particularly and, 
by extension, in the archipelago generally. The three 
variants were priyayi (aristocratic Muslims), santri (strict 
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the 1945 Constitution and regarded it as having no 
incompatibility with Islamic teaching.
Therefore, Muslims’ acceptance of Pancasila 
is one of the most important Indonesian Islamic 
roots of pluralism. For the majority of Indonesian 
Muslims, Pancasila is, in line with a verse of the 
Qur’an, a kalimah sawa, a common platform, among 
different religious followers. Addressing the Prophet 
Muhammad, the Qur’an has this to say: ‘Say: O the 
people of the Book [ahl al-kitab, that is the Jews and 
Christians]; come to common terms between us and 
you; that we worship none but God, that we associate 
partners with him, that we erect not, from ourselves, 
lords and patrons, other than God…’  (Q 3:64).
As the prominent Indonesian intellectual 
Nurcholish Madjid rightly argues in his Islamic Roots 
of Modern Pluralism: Indonesian Experience (1994), 
the Pancasila thus becomes a firm basis for the 
development of religious tolerance and pluralism 
in Indonesia. Madjid cited Adam Malik, once Vice 
President during the Soeharto period, who maintained 
that Pancasila, in Islamic perspective, is in a similar 
spirit to the modus vivendi that was created by the 
Prophet Muhammad in Medina after having migrated 
(hijrah) from Mecca. The Prophet laid down the modus 
vivendi in a famous document called the ‘Constitution 
of Medina’ (al-mithaq al-madinah). The document 
includes a provision which states that all Medinan 
factions, including Jews, were one nation (ummah) 
together with Muslims, and that they have the same 
rights and duties as Muslims. Adam Malik interprets 
the ‘Constitution of Medina’ as a formula for a state 
based on the idea of social and religious pluralism.
Similarly, Robert N Bellah, the American 
sociologist of religion maintains in his important 
article ‘Islamic tradition and the problem of 
In the last two decades at least, Islam has been 
gaining momentum due to the increased attachment 
to religion; more and more of the so-called abangan 
(nominal) Muslims become practising believers. This can 
be seen in the steady growth of the number of Muslims 
attending rituals in mosques and performing pilgrimage 
to Mecca; and the more widespread use of jilbab (hijab, 
‘headscarf’). Islam is getting stronger to become one of 
the personal and collective identities beside ethnic and 
Indonesian national identities.
Islam thus is part and parcel of ethnic and 
Indonesian national cultures. In most cases there is no 
conflict between the three. This is due mostly to the 
nature of Indonesian Islam, which is very accommodating 
and tolerant of local cultures. At the same time Indonesian 
Muslims in general love to practise what I call, ‘colourful 
Islam’, or even ‘flowery Islam’ – that is, Islam which draws 
much on local cultures and particular interpretations of 
doctrine. So, Islam is also an integrated part of the ‘inner 
lives’ of Indonesian Muslims, reflected in many aspects 
of daily life.
Pancasila: politics and culture
Even though Indonesia is known as the largest Muslim 
nation in the world, it is not an Islamic state, nor is it a 
‘secular’ one. Politically and ideologically, Indonesia is 
a state based on Pancasila (five principles): (1) Belief in 
One Supreme God; (2) Just and Civilised Humanism; 
(3) the Unity of Indonesia; (4) Democracy; and (5) 
Social Justice. Proposed initially by Soekarno, the First 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila was 
(and still is) a compromise between secular nationalists 
who advocated a secular state and Muslim leaders who 
demanded an ‘Islamic state’. Muslim leaders accepted 
Pancasila when it was adopted into the Preamble of 
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of Pancasila and the current daily realities of various 
aspects of Indonesian life. Otherwise, people will 
again lose their belief in Pancasila; they will simply 
pay lip service to Pancasila as it will have very little 
meaning in their lives.
Muslims and democracy
Given the fact that Muslims are the single largest group 
of the faithful in Indonesia, it is reasonable to expect 
that they should play a greater and more positive role in 
the development and enhancement of a democratic and 
multicultural Indonesia. Indonesian Islam possesses 
distinctive traits and characteristics that are to a 
large extent different from Islam in the Middle East. 
Indonesian Islam is essentially a tolerant, moderate and 
‘middle way’ (ummah wasat) Islam, given the history of 
its early spread, which was generally peaceful and had 
been integrated into diverse ethnic, cultural and social 
realities of Indonesia.
The majority of Indonesian Muslims belong 
to moderate mainstream organisations such as the 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and many 
other regional organisations throughout Indonesia. All 
of these Muslim organisations support modernity and 
democracy. They support the current form of Indonesian 
state and Pancasila, and at the same time oppose the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia as well 
as the implementation of shariah (Islamic law) in the 
current Indonesian nation-state.
All of these moderate and mainstream 
organisations are also religiously based civil society 
organisations, which play a crucial role in the 
development and enhancement of civic culture, civility, 
democracy and good governance. These organisations 
are very active in the dissemination of the ideas of 
modernization’ (1970) that the Medinan state was a 
root of Islamic modernity and pluralism. He further 
argues that Islam in its seventh-century origins 
was for its time and place ‘remarkably modern… 
in the high degree of commitment, involvement, 
and participation expected from the rank-and-file 
members of the community’. Despite that, the Prophet 
Muhammad’s experiment eventually failed because of 
the lack of necessary socio-cultural prerequisites among 
the Arab Muslims. In other words, the modus vivendi 
failed because it was ‘too modern’ for the Medinan 
society. Looking to the Indonesian experience with 
Pancasila as a common platform, it is a part of what 
Bellah sees as an effort of modern Indonesian Muslims 
to depict the early community as the prototype ‘Islamic 
recognition of pluralism’.
As a basis of Indonesian pluralism, Pancasila 
had unfortunately been used by the Soeharto regime 
as a tool for repression. The forced implementation 
in 1985 of Pancasila as the sole ideological basis of 
all organisations in the country was unfortunate 
and resented by many Indonesians. Through special 
training, Pancasila was forced on Indonesians through 
indoctrination, which in the end gave Pancasila a bad 
name. It is clear that for most Indonesians nothing is 
wrong with Pancasila as such, but when it was abused 
and manipulated for the maintenance of President 
Soeharto’s political status quo, then people rapidly lost 
their belief in Pancasila as an integrating factor within 
plural Indonesia.
In my view, there is no other viable alternative 
to Pancasila as the common platform of a plural and 
multicultural Indonesia. Therefore, it is a serious 
challenge for Indonesia to revive and revitalise 
Pancasila. At the same time, there is an increasing 
need to bridge the gap between the ideal five pillars 
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democracy, human rights, justice, gender equality and 
other ideas that are crucial in modern society. Not least, 
mainstream Muslim organisations have been very active 
in conducting religious dialogues with non-Muslim 
groups at local, national and international levels.
With the Muslim acceptance of democracy, Indonesia 
has been successful in conducting peaceful elections 
in 1999, 2004 and 2009. These general elections have 
been historic landmarks, particularly the election of 
2004, which was the first direct presidential election. 
The success of these democratic elections in Indonesia, 
the largest Muslim country in the world, has shown a 
compatibility between Islam and democracy.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that a good understanding of the 
cultures of people within various ethnic groups and 
nation-states will contribute a great deal to successful 
dialogues across boundaries and differences. With that, 
healthier intercultural exchanges can also take place.
In such intercultural dialogues, it is necessary 
to find and strengthen commonalities among people 
of different cultural backgrounds. By the same token, 
it is also appropriate not to emphasise – let alone to 
exaggerate – differences among them. If we can do that, 
then we have some strong reasons to be optimistic for a 
better future for humankind.
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The Intercultural Imperative  
and Iranian Dreams 
Ramin Jahanbegloo
Culture is not a source of conflict but it can be a valuable 
resource for peace. However, cultural identities can 
clash, as these identities may signify much more than 
ethical values to some people. Perhaps, then, it is not 
surprising that it is currently fashionable to decry the 
fact that people’s particularistic attachments shape their 
ethics. Certainly the sense of belonging to a culture is a 
constituent element of our individuality that should be 
cherished. But this does not mean that universal human 
rights and the ideal of being an autonomous individual 
are merely Western liberal prejudices which could be put 
away once and for all. This suggests a bridge between 
a relativistic, multiculturalist liberalism based on 
tolerance of diversity and an Enlightenment liberalism 
which upholds the ideal of the rational, emancipated 
individual. Accepting the importance of identities does 
not necessarily mean that they are sole narrative models 
for allowing us to enhance our individuality. It is, 
nevertheless, true that, as Herder affirmed, ‘Each nation 
has its centre of gravity within itself, just as every sphere 
has its centre of gravity.’ But each culture is accompanied 
by the memory of what all nations have in common – and 
that is human civilisation. As such, every intercultural 
dialogue is a dialogue on and with humanity. Therefore, 
every culture should be exposed to the virtues of self-
criticism, tolerance, dialogue, openness to change and 
self-control of its own destiny.
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eyes of most religious fundamentalists, societies must be 
constituted on the basis of religious community. There 
ought to be neither singular identities nor idiosyncratic 
quests for a personal meaning. In other words, all 
individuals must belong to a religious collectivity, and 
their everyday lives must be governed by the normative 
traditions of such collectivities.
From the side of the religious fundamentalists, the 
essential aspect of their global struggle with the world is 
about the primacy of religion. Secular fundamentalists, 
who hold that spirituality should have no place at all 
in political life, are often not that different from their 
religious cousins, whom they claim to hate so much; 
they alone know what is best for all, and they alone 
have knowledge of everything. It just so happens that 
the two belong to two diverse groups. In both cases, 
however, we have a dogmatic worldview that fails to 
respect democratic values, including the importance 
of dialogue and compromise. To be more accurate, 
the belief that a separation of religion and state is a 
core feature of democracy does not necessarily mean 
that religious groups should be excluded from explicit 
public life. There is no strict connection between being a 
secularist and being a democrat. In fact, spirituality and 
democracy are not incompatible with each other if both 
function in their well-defined spheres. Democracy needs a 
spiritual force as spirituality needs a political one without 
interfering with each other within politics. Most of the 
cultural and religious communities which feel threatened 
by the network of global civil society and transnational 
solidarities tend to become suspicious and closed-minded, 
and to suppress internal differences, while avoiding all but 
minimal contacts with other cultures. However, diversity 
is desirable not only for ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities, but also for the society as a whole. It adds a 
valuable ethical dimension to society, widens the range of 
Thanks to the global reach of information in 
today’s world, members of even the most traditional 
and isolated societies are daily exposed to different 
forms of ideas, institutions, moral and social practices, 
and forms of life which encourage a sense of common 
belonging to humanity and global citizenship. In 
other words, cross-cultural diversity has become an 
inescapable fact of life in our global century, and attempts 
to dismantle it are undertaken in the name of what 
one could call ‘forcibly universalised particularisms’, 
which is what all fundamentalisms are about. Taking 
one’s particular religious options and preferences 
and trying to impose them is, indeed, nothing but 
particularism-with-violence, or pseudo-universalism. 
Only half a decade ago, fundamentalism would have 
been considered as ‘militant opposition to modernity’. 
In other words, fundamentalism emerges very often as 
a violent rejection of modernity and as retrogression 
to pre-modern religious fundamentals. However, the 
most important feature of ‘fundamentalism’ in our 
world is the politicisation of religion and the process 
of ideologisation of the tradition. A common definition 
of fundamentalism points to religious movements that 
strive to reestablish socially, culturally and politically 
core elements within a religious tradition. Therefore, 
fundamentalism is reactive to and defensive towards 
pluralism of values, and a hermeneutical methodology 
applied to religious traditions. On the contrary, in 
fundamentalist movements, there is an affirmation 
of the absolute validity of the fundamentals of a 
tradition. This is the reason why it is easier to establish 
a fundamentalist movement where core principles are 
spelled out explicitly in a sacred text. The authoritarian 
and absolutist dimensions of fundamentalist movements 
manifest themselves, among other elements, in the 
ideological manipulation of a religious tradition. In the 
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Second, on the ethical side there has been the effort of 
Iranian intellectuals to defend the truth against lies and to 
promote the ethical and political capacity to pass judgment 
on those who are responsible for the conduct of affairs in 
the public domain. Finally, the third pillar has been the 
horizontal relationship of cooperation and mutual support, 
instead of tension and conflict among the Iranian citizens 
themselves, as actors of the Iranian civil society.
Factionalism at the top of the political hierarchy has 
allowed the rest of the society to find spaces to engage 
in politics. People who were not part of the leadership 
– young people, university students, intellectuals and 
others – could delve into politics precisely because 
politics at the top was so openly fractious. The tumult 
in the parliament, and the daily battles among those 
running the country, emboldened people to criticise 
and even resist the authorities. Had there been a solid 
consolidation of power and ideological coherence at the 
top, such spaces would not have been opened and such 
resistance would not have been possible.
The idea of civil society has also penetrated the 
day-to-day politics of the country, in the slogans of 
candidates for various offices. Three principal positions 
have emerged in the civil society debate now raging 
in Iran. First, there are those who regard the whole 
concept as antithetical to the basic values and ideals of 
an Islamic society and state. These are the hard-line 
conservatives, who occupy the most powerful positions 
within Iran’s political establishment. They control all the 
means of violence in Iranian society (the Revolutionary 
Guards, the security services), and they hold much of 
the economic power as well. Second, there are those 
who want to Islamicise the idea of civil society, to make 
it compatible with the existing norms and values of the 
present order. They advocate an ‘Islamic civil society’ 
that would be clearly distinguishable from its secular, 
moral and cultural empathy, and encourages critical 
self-ref lection. In short, there is no moral progress of 
humanity without cultural pluralism. No democratic 
society, then, can ignore the demands of diversity. 
One’s self-respect is therefore closely bound up with 
respect for other cultures and ways of life as long as 
they do not violate human rights. As such, no culture 
or tradition is beyond criticism and moral sanction of 
humanity. If it were so, we would leave no secure and 
effective space for humanness.
This is where civil society as a sphere of citizenship 
which is ‘always already becoming’ holds a promise for 
the future of individual autonomy and for the protection 
of collective diversity beyond political and religious 
sectarianism. Civil society, more than any other topic, 
is the subject of intense debate and contention in Iran 
today. Looked at from the Iranian context, civil society 
is not a homogeneous entity. More than a ‘voluntary 
sector’ or a ‘charity sector’ it is an ‘ethical sector’. 
As a matter of fact, talking about civil society in the 
context of a theocracy like Iran leads one to speak of a 
society of citizens, as opposed to a society organised 
on grounds of religiosity. In the Iranian context, the 
obvious question is: what political culture has been 
the most conducive to the development of civil society? 
It is certainly not a religious culture, nor necessarily 
a secular one. But it is certainly an anti-sectarian 
one. I think the conditions for the formation and 
consolidation of a civil society in a fundamentalist 
society like Iran have been threefold. First, there has 
been a great effort on the issue of ‘publicity’, in the 
domain of what citizens know about public life. The 
struggle of independent journalists to create journals in 
order to inform citizens not only about local conditions, 
institutions and interests but also about the government 
has been one of the pillars of the Iranian civil society. 
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Iranian intellectuals in late nineteenth century, was 
replaced after the Second World War with a broader 
romantic ‘revolt against the Western values of capitalism 
and liberalism’. Surprisingly, the universal sameness 
of Iranian traditions in opposition to the supposedly 
universal otherness of modernity became a common 
denominator in both right-wing romantic nationalism 
and in Marxist anti-imperialist nationalism in Iran. In 
both cases, this romance of the authentic cultural and 
national body was characterised by feelings of cultural 
relativism and traditional anxiety. Different attempts to 
generate a sense of national pride, triggered by a growing 
awareness of Iran’s backwardness vis-à-vis the West, 
were translated into serious calls for Europeanisation, 
internationalism and pan-Islamism. One must not 
forget that the sense of ancient nationhood, particularly 
in contrast with the Western form of temporality, was 
a useful mechanism of voicing opposition in Iran 
against different political status quos while being a 
strong argument for a discourse of ‘authenticity’. As 
a matter of fact, because of the double structure of 
romancing but at the same time rejecting the West, a 
constant oscillation was generated between democratic 
universalism and Iranian particularism among Iranian 
intellectuals. Particularism and universalism did not 
form an antinomy but rather mutually reinforced each 
other. The building of an imaginary glorious past under 
the old Persian kings or the narrating of a utopian 
Iranian secular or religious society were different modes 
of particularistic thinking among Iranian intellectuals, 
who thought of themselves as universalistic without 
coming across the otherness of the other. One must 
not forget that all along in the twentieth century, many 
Iranian intellectuals joined Arab, Asian and African 
intellectuals around the world in extolling the virtues of 
Iranian traditions as a tool for purifying the non-West 
Western counterparts. Third, there are those who view 
the concept as ideologically neutral in terms of the 
ultimate goals and values of society, but useful as a 
basis for structuring state–society relations, protecting 
the relative autonomy and freedom of citizens and their 
associations, and promoting a more tolerant, pluralistic 
and democratic order. Post-revolutionary Iranian civil 
society is undergoing today, from my point of view, 
a period of transition from utopian thinking and a 
quest for an ‘ideological modernity’, to a non-imitative 
dialogical exchange with modernity and the West. 
Taken as the capacity for choice among different 
alternatives, negative liberty has become the central 
framework for a plural view of Iranian history where 
teleological and deterministic perspectives are replaced 
by the adoption of a self-creative perspective through 
choice-making. The centrality accorded to dialogue with 
the outside world in the constitution of the new Iranian 
intellectual space reveals once again the affinities of the 
new generation of intellectuals with the imperatives of 
an intercultural dialogue.
Iranian intellectuals and the intercultural dialogue
The spectre of democracy has haunted Iranian 
intellectuals for more than 150 years. For over 150 years 
Iranian intellectuals embraced and appropriated Western 
political and cultural values while at the same time 
keeping a critical distance. Actually, in both achieving 
a discourse on democracy and creating a distance from 
it, they contributed to the creation of a dual attitude, 
in which a magnanimity towards modernity was 
coupled with a wounded sense of national pride and 
a resentment of the cultural and political intrusion 
of the West in Iran. The initial romantic ‘fascination 
with Western liberalism’, which took shape among the 
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equality. Among them were the playwright Mirza 
Fath Ali Akhundzadeh (1812–1878), the writer Abd-al 
Rahim Talebov (1834–1911), the socialist thinker Mirza 
Aqa Khan Kirmani (1854–1896) and the modernist 
Mirza Malkum Khan (1834–1908). The latter is most 
often credited for his nationalistic views and for his 
call on the struggle against government autocracy and 
increasing domination of Iran by imperial powers. 
After Naser al-Din Shah banned Malkum’s Freemason 
society (the Faramushkhaneh) and sent him into exile, 
Malkum began to publish a liberal journal by the name 
of Qanun (Law) from London. In his widely circulated 
and read editorials, Malkum denounced openly the 
lawlessness and tyranny of the Qajars and demanded a 
popularly elected assembly. As Hamid Algar argues in 
his book on Malkum Khan, ‘This call for parliamentary 
government was a new element in Malkum’s political 
pronouncements. Earlier in his treatises, he had proposed 
only the establishment of law and had even defined Iran, 
in a kind of draft constitution, as “an absolute monarchy 
operating through law”. But his disgrace and dismissal, 
coming at a time of growing discontent and rebellion in 
Iran, caused him to address himself to a wider audience 
with more radical proposals.’ Malkum, however, was not 
among those Iranian intellectuals who rejected religion 
in general. Still, ‘his view of Islam suggests that he did 
not grasp the implications of its fundamental role in 
Persian society, nor its inherent tension with modernity. 
Instead, he saw Islam simply as instrumental in bringing 
about a program of political action.’
Unlike Malkum Khan, many other secular 
intellectuals of the late Qajar period dissociated religion 
and politics. Akhundzadeh is the most significant 
representative of the Iranian secular Aufklarers. 
Despite being Turcophone, Akhundzadeh identified 
deeply with Iranian nationalism. In his Maktubat, 
from the contamination of Western domination. 
Such romantic resentment was often portrayed as a 
gesture of emancipation and liberation. For the Iranian 
intellectuals the ‘return to roots’ and the affirmation of 
the Perso-Islamic heritage as much as the acquisition 
of Western democracy was considered as the protection 
of one’s civilisation against outside civilisation. That 
is to say, in the past 150 years the Iranian intellectual 
movement has gone through a cycle of erratic oscillations 
in which moments of democratic hope and promotion of 
democracy have alternated with times of ideologisation of 
politics and tradition.
Although the making of the two Revolutions of 1906 
and 1979 in Iran involved a short and fragile alliance 
between intellectuals and social and political actors of 
the religious class, most of the mainstream historians 
of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978 agree that Iranian intellectuals played 
an important role in both events in terms of developing 
ideas of progress, equality, constitutionalism and reform 
through their encounters with the modern world. The 
intellectual background for such a contribution was 
laid down in the nineteenth-century writings of Iranian 
intellectuals that challenged absolutism and arbitrary 
political power. It was in relation to this theme that the 
idea of parliamentary liberalism was formulated. A shared 
conception of law among the leading intellectuals of this 
period was the direct outcome of the reading of European 
thinkers and writers. These included Francis Bacon, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Voltaire, Rousseau, Bentham, Hume 
and John Stuart Mill. Such contact with Western ideas 
helped to create a fertile ground for intellectual changes 
and later political reforms in Iran.
In the late nineteenth century, a number of 
Iranian intellectuals living inside and outside Iran 
became advocates of political liberalisation and social 
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who was deeply influenced by the Tanzimat reforms. 
His experiences in Istanbul as a Qajar ambassador 
to the Ottoman Empire awakened him to the need of 
applying modern solutions to Iran’s social and economic 
problems. What grieved Mirza Huseyn Khan more than 
anything else was that the Iranian ruling class and the 
king himself were so alien to the idea of a parliamentary 
government. In a dispatch to the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry he expressed his distress: ‘I am grieved and 
know that I am seeking the impossible. I know that what 
I wish for my country cannot be achieved overnight, 
and must be attained gradually. But the reason for my 
sadness is that, not only have we made no effort in 
this direction yet, but that we do not even believe there 
is anything wrong with our state, or that our affairs 
need improvement. To the contrary, we believe that 
we have reached the highest degree of progress, and 
there is nothing we have to do or to worry about.’ Mirza 
Huseyn Khan never took the risk of challenging openly 
the Iranian ulama and that was the basic reason for 
his failure to accomplish his reforms during his own 
lifetime. His efforts, however, did create a new dynamic 
within Iran’s political and judicial institutions. His 
strong belief in the advancement of European civilisation 
was translated into a wide range of innovations, 
from installing gaslights in Tehran to encouraging 
the Iranian aristocracy to pay more attention to the 
new methods of education. Mirza Huseyn Khan’s 
reforms did not have an immediate impact on his 
contemporaries, but considering the considerable lack of 
resources for the reforms and the inadequate executive 
authority to enforce them, it is a miracle that Mushir 
od-Dowleh’s principles came later to be considered as 
the standards of modernisation in Iran.
While Mushir od-Dowleh was trying to develop 
and sustain a coherent theory of judicial and political 
Akhundzadeh promoted free thinking and freedom 
from religious terror and he strongly invited Iranians 
to liberate themselves from despotism. However, this 
could only be ‘achieved via knowledge and knowledge 
could not be acquired unless through progress, and 
progress could not be achieved unless by being liberal, 
and being liberal is not possible without getting rid 
of [religious] beliefs’. For Akhundzadeh, religion in 
general and Islam in particular were obstacles to 
social and intellectual progress. That is the reason 
why he considered as a free thinker somebody who ‘is 
not subject to religious terror, and does not believe in 
what is beyond reason and outside the law of nature’. 
There is no doubt that Akhundzadeh was a reader 
of John Stuart Mill and David Hume. His purported 
‘Letter from David Hume to the Muslim Clergy of 
India’ written in 1860 and his commentary of Mill’s 
On Liberty are strong evidence for this argument. 
But one can conclude by reading Akhundzadeh’s 
writings that he ‘did not share Hume’s scepticism and 
was instead a firm adherent of nineteenth-century 
positivism’. An examination of Akhundzadeh’s life and 
writings suggests that he was an outspoken advocate 
of secularism and tried to curb clerical power in Iran 
whenever he found an opportunity.
The obsession with religion and with liberal values 
remained a salient character of Iranian intelligentsia 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Two of the 
most influential advocates of judicial and economic 
modernisation in nineteenth-century Iran were Mirza 
Yusef Khan Mostashar od-Dowleh and Mirza Huseyn 
Khan Mushir od-Dowleh. These two, in the same 
manner as Kirmani, Malkum Khan and Akhundzadeh, 
laid some of the groundwork for the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906, in the decade of the 1870s. Mushir 
od-Dowleh was the reformist statesman of his day 
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of 1906. These Iranians were converted to the cause 
of constitutionalism after reading Yek Kalameh, which 
reassured them that borrowing from Europe did not 
necessarily mean the loss of their religious and cultural 
identity.’ However, the lack of acknowledgement by 
Mirza Yusef Khan of the fundamental discrepancies 
between European and Islamic traditions did play a 
delaying role in the making of the secular mind in 
Iranian intellectual history.
It is not surprising that these ‘men of the pen’ 
referred to themselves as modernists (mutajaddidin). 
Most of these intellectuals avoided the extremes of 
either full identification with the West or full retreat 
to ‘traditional’ values. Instead, the majority of them 
found in Western culture ideas such as liberalism, 
rationality and nationalism. In other words, the 
odyssey of the Iranian intellectuals in the twentieth 
century began by searching for ways to best incorporate 
rationality and democratic values in the Iranian 
culture. Nowhere can this incorporation be more clearly 
seen than in the political life and in the intellectual 
work of Muhammad Ali Furughi, one of the Iranian 
precursors of Iranian liberalism who in his political 
and philosophical writings reflected the first genuine 
attempt by an Iranian intellectual to articulate a 
systematic understanding of modern political and 
philosophical traditions. Furughi belonged to the 
second generation of Iranian intellectuals, who, thanks 
to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, were able 
to participate more actively in the political life of the 
country. The hope and goal of Furughi was to create 
suitable conditions for the implementation of modern 
and liberal principles in Iran, by concentrating his 
efforts on ‘reforms from above’. In order to achieve 
these goals, Furughi attempted to influence not only 
the political actions of Reza Shah (who ruled from 1921 
reforms, Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar od-Dowleh, 
whose major work, Yek Kalameh (One Word) played an 
important role in the process of constitutionalism in 
Iran, was challenging the political backwardness and 
economic stagnation of Qajar Iran by acknowledging 
the major achievements of the West. Answering the 
question: ‘What was the secret of Europe’s progress?’ 
the author reminded his readers that the answer was 
only one word, yek kalameh, a state of law. According to 
Mostashar od-Dowleh the Muslim thinkers ‘had failed to 
understand that the basis of Europe’s power was not its 
technological and scientific achievements, but its political 
and administrative organisation as well as its judicial 
machinery’. As a French-speaking Iranian diplomat 
influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, 
Mostashar od-Dowleh envisioned a constitutional Iranian 
state with laws modelled on those of France helping to 
create new institutions and social forms. The comparison 
between Islamic law and French law led him to talk about 
the logical, popular and immanent nature of the French 
law (loi) as a basis for the establishment of a constitutional 
form of government. He did not, however, talk about 
secularism as a required element for the modernisation 
of Iranian society. Indeed, it may very well be argued 
that Mirza Yusef was more critical towards the Iranian 
officials and leaders than towards the Iranian ulama. 
He truly believed that the Qajar aristocracy had failed to 
modernise Iran and that as long as Iran was not bound 
to overcome backwardness and stagnation by adopting 
a European model, it was in danger of being dominated 
by European powers. Ultimately, modernisation did not 
come about as Mostashar od-Dowleh had envisioned it 
in Yek Kalameh, but ‘his strategy of presenting European 
ideas under the mask of Islam left a profound impact 
on some educated and religious-minded Iranians who 
played an important role in the constitutional revolution 
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these two powers from each other and invested them 
in two separate groups.’ For Furughi, the raison d’être 
of laws is precisely to prevent misuse of power, and 
sovereignty belongs only to the nation. It is within 
the context of these ideas that Furughi introduces 
Montesquieu’s idea of separation of different branches of 
power and the concept of a just and lawful government. 
What comes across in Furughi’s writings is an absolute 
belief in the idea of progress, as well as a discussion of 
the separation of powers and the rights of the people 
under a liberal constitution. First and foremost in 
Furughi’s thought is the idea of the inevitability of 
progress and the fact that progress in the West has been 
entirely responsible for a liberal re-organisation of the 
social, economic and political spheres. Furughi was 
among the first Iranian intellectuals and statesmen to 
deal with these ideas in a serious and systematic way. 
This is why one can say that Furughi’s influence on 
the genesis and development of Iranian liberal heritage 
is without parallel. Of all statesmen and intellectuals 
involved somehow with the spirit of constitutionalism 
and the project of liberalism in Iran, Furughi stands out 
as the most prominent and also as the most relevant for 
a renaissance of liberalism in Iran.
In contrast to Furughi as the paradigmatic 
intellectual of his generation, who repeatedly endowed 
the individual as the beneficiary of modern subjectivity, 
someone like Ali Shariati considered the same 
human subjectivity as the privilege of the Iranian 
masses. Unlike Furughi and Malkum, who in their 
non-ideological approach to modernity were in search 
of creating the dialogical bridge between democratic 
individualism and its materialisation in the concept 
of law and rights of citizenship, Shariati’s crucial 
emphasis on the role of free human volition found its 
ontological and anthropological grounds in an ideal 
to 1942), by involving himself in the different branches 
of government, but also by introducing modern 
philosophical, economic and political ideas to Iranians 
through translations, speeches and writings.
Also, all through his career Furughi advocated 
liberal forms of citizenship. Actually, Furughi’s general 
interest in the history of philosophy came about 
partly because he considered philosophy as a mode 
of ‘Enlightenment from Below’ helping Iranians to 
become more mature in their political judgment and 
everyday reasoning. Indeed, for him philosophy was a 
continuous process of thinking, which stemmed from 
his pragmatic view of human intervention in the world. 
Without philosophy, he contended, no tangible and 
pragmatic results could be obtained in Iran. For Furughi, 
as for Mirza Malkum Khan before him, freemasonry 
was an institution dedicated to striving to spread the 
ideals of modernity in Iran through universalisation and 
promotion of western principles of freedom, education 
and secularism. As a follower of the principles of the 
French Enlightenment and namely Montesquieu, 
Furughi insisted on the idea of the separation of the 
different branches of government. As he wrote in 
Huquq-e Asasi Ya’ni Adab-e Mashrutiyat, published in 
Tehran in 1907: ‘The duty of government is to be the 
protector of the rights of the people, that is, to be keeper 
of justice. The government will not be able to undertake 
its duty unless it acts according to laws. The existence 
of laws will not be realised except by two means: first, 
through making laws, and second, through execution of 
laws. Therefore, the government has two powers: first, 
the making of laws, and second, the execution of laws. 
If the powers of legislation and execution remain in the 
hands of a single person or a single group, the conduct 
of government will result in despotism… Therefore, 
government is constitutional only when it has separated 
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They also had to face the emergence in the early 1990s 
in Iran of those who came to be known as the ‘religious 
intellectuals,’ as their cultural and political rivals. More 
than 15 years after the creation of the Islamic Republic, 
the religious intellectuals became the architects of the 
reform movement in the Iranian presidential elections 
of 1997. For eight years, after the landslide victory of 
Khatami in 1997, the ruling clergy continued to resist 
the establishment of a political platform for debate and 
rational discourse, and the question remained whether 
Khatami’s presidency had been an utter failure and 
therefore a mere footnote in the evolution of Iran’s 
Islamic Revolution. What is certain is that Khatami’s 
landslide election in 1997 was a positive step in the 
transition to popular sovereignty. The enthusiastic 
participation of a new generation of voters in 1997 
increased the pressures for political pluralism. Iran’s 
youth, many previously too young to vote or alienated 
from the political system, made up a large part of the 
20 million who gave Khatami his surprise victory. They 
were joined by unprecedented numbers of women. Both 
groups perceived Khatami to be an agent for change. 
That they believed they could achieve change by means 
of the existing political system speaks well for the actual 
contradictions inside the Iranian political system. As for 
Khatami, he used Islamic vernacular and nationalistic 
symbols to articulate a new discourse of governance in 
Iran based on popular sovereignty.
It can hardly be contested that Khatami’s election 
and his eight years of presidency had popularised the 
discourse of democracy in Iran and opened once again 
the debate about democratisation in Iran. However, the 
main issue in this debate was less the transition to some 
kind of multiparty democracy than the consolidation 
of Iranian civil society and the improvement of civil 
liberties. The genie of democratisation was certainly out 
Islamic ideology. Shariati introduced rationalism and 
philosophy of history in Shiite Islam and succeeded in 
mobilising Iranian religious intellectuals in a social 
movement that led to the 1979 revolution.
When the revolutionary movement started in 
1978 and the Shia clergy appeared as its central force, 
it was hard to find any intellectual who doubted the 
anti-intellectual, anti-modern and anti-Western attitude 
of the Iranian revolution. At the same time, even those 
who were at some point close to the Shah’s regime 
(either as university professors or public servants) 
found themselves attracted by the revolutionary wave. 
That is the reason why the Iranian revolution was not 
accompanied with an intrinsically critical response 
among the Iranian intellectuals, which would impel 
them to speak truth to power. As a result of this, Iranian 
intellectuals entered the first period of the revolution as 
weak and subordinate allies of the Islamist forces.
One can distinguish in 1979 two main groups of 
intellectuals in revolutionary Iran: on the one side, there 
were those who supported the Iranian revolution, and 
on the other side, there were those who were victims 
of it. The less radical and less political intellectuals 
who had adopted a much more democratic and tolerant 
discourse in the early 1980s because of their liberal 
views (people such as Mostafa Rahimi and Shahrokh 
Meskoob) or were listed as the followers and courtesans 
of the Shah’s regime (such as Daryush Shayegan and 
Jamchid Behnam) were among the first to be expelled 
from the political, social and cultural spheres. Most of 
them had to face either a cultural persecution or to leave 
Iran for exile in the European capitals such as Paris 
and London. Practically all these non-revolutionary 
intellectuals had to face a public sphere dominated 
by anti-intellectual and ideological discourses, and 
controlled by Islamic and Marxist-Leninist slogans. 
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Khordad, Sobh-e emrouz, Neshat, Mosharekat, Asr-e 
Azadegan and Bahar, depended on the role and presence 
of these intellectuals. In the broad sense of the term, 
religious intellectuals were considered as all those 
individuals (cleric or non-cleric) who were interested 
in the ideas of Iranian Muslim thinkers and politicians 
such as Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, 
Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari. No need 
to add that while criticising the conservative wing of the 
regime, most of the ‘religious intellectuals’ like Mojtahed 
Shabestari, Hamidreza Jalaeipour, Abdlkarim Soroosh, 
Alavi-Tabar or Mohammad Khatami and many others 
supported fully the Revolution and never denied clearly 
their past affiliations with the Islamic regime as either 
members of the Council of the Cultural Revolution or as 
members of the Revolutionary Guards and the Security 
Forces. Among these, Mohsen Kadivar was the only 
one who spent a year and a half in prison for doubting 
the velayat faqih, the rule of Islamic jurists, as it was 
conceived by Ayatollah Khomeini.
If we go back to the first years of the Iranian 
Revolution, we can say that the key question for a 
historian of contemporary Iran is: why did most of 
the Iranian intellectuals align themselves with the 
forces of the Revolution while others remained silent? 
The answer resides certainly in the absence of ‘ethical 
responsibility’ among those that we can name as the 
‘revolutionary intellectuals’ in Iran. These intellectuals 
supported the revolution for two reasons. First, because 
of the seduction of the concept of ‘revolution’ and 
what surrounded it. This was accompanied by a sense 
of ‘utopian idealism’ and a deep attitude of ‘political 
romanticism’, which was very common in the 1960s and 
1970s among the Leftist intellectuals in Iran. However, 
the revolutionary quest of the leftist intellectuals in 
Iran was characterised by a series of political, strategic 
of the bottle and could not be forced back into it. Yet the 
struggle of the reformists for eight years showed that the 
institutional configuration and the fractionalised nature 
of Iranian politics did not allow quick reforms. Still, 
the fact remained that, since Khatami’s election, a new 
political discourse gained currency whose main themes 
were: the rule of law, tolerance versus violence, inclusivism 
versus exclusivism and the need to move towards a civil 
society. Also, the political opening via electoral politics 
increased the integrative capacity of the Islamic political 
system and enhanced the regime’s survivability. Of course, 
since Khatami presented himself as a supporter of people’s 
sovereignty (mardomsalari) and not necessarily an advocate 
of the Iranian civil society, he never spelled out clearly the 
development of civil society against the arbitrary political 
powers, such as the myriad courts that in many cases 
over the eight years of his presidency stifled public debate, 
freedom of the press and cracked down on dissident 
intellectuals. While the reform movement, which started 
with the 1997 elections that brought Mohammad Khatami 
to power, did not fully achieve any of its engagements, it 
nevertheless produced one big change in the way politics 
was practised in the Islamic Republic of Iran: elections 
became the most important place where the struggle for 
power had to occur. It was with the aim of stopping the 
expansion of the electoral process as the centre of Iran’s 
political system and thus preventing it from becoming the 
primary tool for the creation of political authority, that the 
conservative forces opposed fiercely the reform movement 
and finally reached their aim of annihilating it.
Despite all the uncertainties and challenges during 
the Khatami years, journalists, intellectuals and artists 
found a greater place and presence in the Iranian public 
sphere. The activities of most of the influential reformist 
newspapers in the late 1990s (which reached circulation 
of more than a million), such as Salaam, Jame’eh, Tous, 
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intellectuals who remained faithful to the Islamic regime 
adopted an instrumentalist view of Islam as a mobilising 
political ideology and tried to bridge the gap created by the 
modern institutions during the Pahlavi regime between 
intellectuals and clergy. This philosophical–political 
attitude, which could be called the ‘Al-Ahmad syndrome’, 
could be considered the first anti-intellectual discourse 
elaborated by modern intellectuals in Iran.
While the revolutionary intellectuals had failed to 
present alternative narratives and alternative perspectives 
on politics to the dominant discourse of the Iranian 
revolution, because they failed to construct fields of social 
existence, the ‘religious intellectuals’ of the 1990s tried 
to reconsider and rethink from a new perspective the 
old clash between modernity and tradition. Today, the 
religious intellectuals are divided into two diverse groups 
in Iran: on one side, we find the reformists and on the 
other side the neo-conservatives. The reformist group 
is represented by figures such as Abdolkarim Soroosh, 
Mohsen Kadivar, Alavi-Tabar, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, 
Mojtahed Shabestari, and many others. The unifying 
traits of these intellectuals include their recognition 
of reform in Islamic thought, democracy, civil society 
and religious pluralism, and their opposition to the 
absolute supremacy of the Faqih. The rise of religious 
intellectuals can be followed through the writings of 
Soroosh. Soroosh’s main idea is that there are perennial 
unchanging religious truths, but our understanding 
of them remains contingent on our knowledge in the 
fields of science and philosophy. Unlike Ali Shariati, who 
turned to Marxism to bring a historicist perspective to 
the Shiite thought, Soroosh debates the relation between 
democracy and religion and discusses the possibility 
of what he calls ‘Islamic democracy’. According to 
Abdolkarim Soroosh, who is now living in England, 
the role of the philosopher is to try to reconcile religion 
and philosophical shortcomings. In other words, their 
ideological preoccupations with the cultural and political 
dimensions of the Iranian reality was accompanied by 
a lack of coherent and systematic analysis of Iranian 
history and of the Western philosophical heritage. 
Many of these ideological attitudes are reflected in the 
Leftist intellectual literature of the late 1970s and early 
1980s. These works were written mainly to convey a 
revolutionary message based on a process of utopian 
thinking, rather than to serve the cause of critical 
thinking as the paradigmatic element of intellectual 
modernity. Second, many among the pro-revolutionary 
intellectuals strived to defend new strategic positions 
in the new revolutionary society of Iran. For some of 
them, intellectual purges at the level of universities 
and government offices made room for new faces and 
new ways of thinking. Unfortunately, as time went by, 
only those who were close to the regime and presented 
no danger for it could find a solid place inside the 
institutions controlled by the government. Thousands 
of Leftist scholars and students were expelled from 
universities during Iran’s Cultural Revolution in the 
early 1980s. As a result of this, the same revolutionary 
intellectuals who supported the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979 in the name of anti-Westernisation, anti-
imperialism and struggle against Iranian capitalists 
were considered as the enemies of Islam and dangerous 
elements for the future of the Islamic regime in Iran. 
Many of these Leftist intellectuals had to flee for their 
lives, abandoning behind them the Revolution and 
the hope of one day seeing a socialist Iran. Others 
who stayed in Iran suffered imprisonment and death 
and found themselves not only disenchanted and 
disillusioned by the political defeat of the Left in Iran, 
but also betrayed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
However, those among the Islamic revolutionary 
156 157
The Inner Lives of Cultures The Intercultural Imperative and Iranian Dreams
against concepts such as democracy, civil society and 
pluralism. This movement includes figures such as Reza 
Davari Ardakani, Qolam-Ali Haddad Adel and Mehdi 
Golshani. The famous personality among these is Reza 
Davari Ardakani, who as an anti-Western philosopher 
is very familiar with the works of Martin Heidegger. 
Davari Ardakani, unlike Soroosh, takes some of the 
features of Heidegger’s thought, mainly his critique 
of modernity, and puts it into an Islamic wording. He 
rejects the Western model of democracy, which is based 
on the separation of politics and religion. President of 
the Iranian Academy of Science, Reza Davari Ardakani 
could be considered the philosophical spokesman of 
the Islamic regime. This is to say that for the past 30 
years the Iranian intellectual arena has been left in 
between two dominant intellectual trends: on the one 
hand, an intellectual wave of critiques of modernity and 
democracy, and in favour of a pure return to the Iranian-
Islamic traditions; and on the other hand a softer trend 
which emerged in the 1990s among the Islamic followers 
of the Revolution looking for an Islamic answer to the 
problems of modernity and democracy.
It is a fact that reformist and neo-conservative 
intellectuals do not dominate the entire Iranian 
public sphere. Next to them, one can consider a new 
generation of Iranian intellectuals who do not attempt 
to promulgate any ideologies or to struggle for the 
establishment of an Islamic democracy in Iran, and yet 
they undermine the main philosophical and intellectual 
concepts of the established order. This generation is 
mainly characterised by the secular post-revolutionary 
intellectuals, such as Javad Tabatabai, Babak Ahmadi, 
Hamid Azodanloo, Moosa Ghaninejad, Nasser Fakouhi 
and Fatemeh Sadeghi, who are in their forties and fifties, 
and who can be referred to as the ‘dialogical intellectuals’ 
(in contrast with the revolutionary intellectuals of the 
and freedom, to give an understandable new definition 
of religion and to link democracy and religion. What 
Soroosh has been trying to do during the past decade 
is convince his fellow citizens that it is possible to be 
Muslim and to believe in democracy. Soroosh stresses 
that there are two views of religion, a maximalist and a 
minimalist one. In the maximalist view, according to him, 
everything has to be derived from religion, and most of 
the current problems in Islam come from this view. But 
the minimalist view implies that some values cannot be 
derived from religion, like respect for human rights. For 
Soroosh, the maximalist view of religion has to be replaced 
by a minimalist view, otherwise the balance between 
Islam and democracy would not be possible. Therefore, for 
Soroosh a democratic Islamic society would not need any 
Islamic norms from above.
Mojtahed Shabestari is among the rare religious 
intellectuals in Iran who have challenged the monistic 
view of Islam. According to Shabestari, the official Islamic 
discourse in Iran has created a double crisis. The first crisis 
is due to the belief that Islam encompasses a political 
and economic system offering an answer relevant to all 
the historical periods; the second crisis is entailed by 
the conviction that the government has to apply Islamic 
law (shariah) as such. These two ideas have emerged, 
according to Shabestari, in relation to the Islamic 
revolution and the events that followed it. But the fact 
is, according to Shabestari, that Islam does not have all 
the answers to social, economic and political life at all 
times in history. Also, there is no single hermeneutics of 
Islam as such. Therefore, the relation between religion 
and ideology is simply unacceptable and leads to the 
desacralisation of religion.
Unlike the reformist intellectuals, the neo-
conservative intellectuals in Iran are in favour of 
the supremacy of the Supreme Guide (the faqih) and 
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is no longer reduced to the status of a simple technical 
and instrumental object or rejected as a dangerous 
enemy of the Iranian identity. Maybe for the first time 
since Iran’s encounter with the West, modernity is finally 
considered as a process which could provide us lessons 
for the affirmation of our own identity without having 
fears of recognising the heritage of modern times as ours. 
In helping to maintain this dialogical exchange with 
modernity, the new generation of Iranian intellectuals 
frees itself from the intellectual blackmail of ‘being for 
or against the West’. At a closer look, things become 
more complex and modernity is no longer considered as 
a ‘package deal’, but as a destiny that invites us to face up 
to the questions of our time. The question of globalised 
modernity and its debate with the concept of Iranian 
traditions has become the central question of Iranian 
intellectuals 30 years after the Iranian revolution. Also, 
the moral crisis due to the Islamic Revolution and the 
problems faced by a society confronting a theocratic 
state has increased the attractiveness for the idea of 
secular democracy among the new generation of Iranian 
intellectuals. It is true to say that the Islamic Republic 
of Iran has not achieved a relatively well-functioning 
transition to the process of democratisation and does not 
seem to be deepening or advancing whatever democratic 
progress exists. But there is a wide gulf today in Iran 
between the actions of the political elites and the will of 
the post-revolutionary intellectuals. Unlike Latin America, 
where civil society is used overwhelmingly to designate 
popular social movements and the organisations of the 
excluded and the poor, Iranian civil society bears a great 
resemblance to that of East and Central Europe in the 
1980s, where the projects are strongly identified with the 
intellectual movements.
As in Eastern Europe, the new generation of 
Iranian intellectuals has played an important role in 
1970s and early 1980s). In other words, for this new 
generation of Iranian intellectuals, the concept and the 
practice of dialogue provide an ontological umbrella for all 
the political and cultural meanings and understandings. 
The very objective of this ‘culture of dialogue’ is to no 
longer consider the other as an ‘enemy’ (who needs to be 
terminated as an individual or as a social class), but to 
promote a full acknowledgement of the other as a subject. 
In this case different intellectual attitudes are asked to 
coexist side by side, to find an intersubjective basis for 
their search for modernity and democracy.
This move away from master ideologies among 
this new generation of Iranian intellectuals is echoed 
by distrust in any metaphysically valorised form of 
monist thinking. Unlike previous generations of Iranian 
intellectuals, the critical thinking of modernity has taught 
the new generation to adopt a general attitude that consists 
of being at odds both with ‘fundamentalist politics’ and 
with ‘utopian rationalities’. This philosophical wariness 
is not joined to any kind of dream of rearranging totally 
the Iranian society. The intervention here is not only a 
reflection upon the pluralistic mechanisms of politics, but 
also upon the political self. This issue of value-pluralism 
also raises the question of the West as the ‘other’ in 
the context of modernising projects. As an antidote to 
the ‘monolithic’ and ‘one-view’ formulas of previous 
generations, the political and intellectual urgency of 
Iran’s encounter with globalised modernity leads to an 
ethos of ‘dialogical and cross-cultural exchange’. This 
dialogue is an exposure of the Iranian consciousness to 
the ‘Otherness’ of the modern West. It requires from the 
Iranian intellectual a willingness to risk preconceived 
political and intellectual attitudes and to plunge headlong 
into a transformative process, instead of being in the 
position either of full imitation, or ideological rejection 
of modernity. In this cross-cultural dialogue, modernity 
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the possibility of identifying a set of common goals 
and purposes best described by Iranian intellectuals 
as the idea of accountability and responsibility. The 
two concepts of ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ 
can introduce a new complexity and sharpness to 
assessments of the difficulties facing the process of 
democratic transition in Iran, both in establishing 
preconditions and dealing with its consolidation. It 
is true that cultural globalisation could lead to the 
empowerment of civil society in many countries 
including Iran, and the new generation of Iranian 
intellectuals can influence Iranian youth by helping 
them to understand how the world is changing. But the 
process of democratisation is not fully dependent upon 
the progress of globalisation; it depends on the idea of 
‘globality’, which is linked to the idea of ‘responsibility’. 
As we can see from their writings, Iranian intellectuals 
do not identify their role any more as that of engaging 
in ideological politics, but of expressing critical views 
concerning the anti-democratic and authoritarian aspects 
of Iranian political and social traditions.
Today, Iran is going through a cycle of erratic 
oscillations in which moments of democratic hope (the 
eight years of Khatami’s presidency) alternate with times 
of great despair (the victory of Mahmood Ahmadinejad 
in the presidential elections of June 2005). Yet this 
erratic situation of uncertainty is accompanied by the 
absence of a romantic and dogmatic view of the Iranian 
intellectual as an avant-garde guardian of ideologies. 
The shock of the revolution and the reevaluation of 
political ideals have been part of a learning process that 
has generated a collective sense of responsibility among 
the post-revolutionary intellectuals in Iran, and led 
them to opt for cultural dissent rather than ideological 
politics. Thirty-eight years after the Revolution, the 
distinctive contribution of the new generation of Iranian 
the formation and the strengthening of Iranian civil 
society. Actually, in the case of the new generation 
of Iranian intellectuals, the disillusionment with the 
given boundaries of traditional politics and traditional 
religious thought and with the restrictions of ideological 
politics, provoked interest in civil society as a means 
of rejuvenating Iranian public life and preparing the 
democratic transition of thinking in Iran. This was 
mainly accompanied by the collapse of the intellectual 
models that dominated post-Second World War 
understandings of politics and modernity. This collapse 
gave a new currency to the idea of democracy and 
democratisation against ideology and ideologisation 
of the tradition. The very notion of ‘ideology’ has lost 
much of its coherence among the new generation of 
Iranian intellectuals and it has accompanied the crisis 
of political legitimacy in Iran. This crisis was felt in 
Iran as a vacuum that was left by the ontological and 
political failure of creeds such as Marxist-Leninism and 
Islamic Fundamentalism. This vacuum is filled today 
by the category of ‘civil society’, which could serve as a 
conceptual and practical key to the democratic transition 
in Iran. The concept of civil society is used today in the 
literature of the new generation of Iranian intellectuals 
not only as an institutional package, but also mainly 
as a particular mode of thinking and a special mode 
of political conduct. As a matter of fact, the category 
of civil society has a true significance for the new 
generation of Iranian intellectuals both as a critical tool 
and as a regulative principle for the democratisation in 
Iran. Taken at this level, the idea of civil society as it is 
discussed by Iranian intellectuals today embodies the 
debate on Western modernity and raises the question 
about the significance of the historical experience of 
Western politics. The point here is not about the imitation 
of democratic practices and institutions, but about 
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principally not only at the level of human beings, but also 
at the level of our responsibility for the non-humans. 
Our future is at risk and this risk is directly related to 
the nature of our responsibility towards the non-human. 
This understanding of the close relationship between 
the human and the non-human, beyond all processes 
of the inhuman, is the true ontological ground for all 
future culture of dialogue. To learn to think beyond the 
inhuman, as an absence of dialogue, we not only have to 
unsettle and shake up our well-entrenched concepts and 
categories; but also our task is to resist our comfortable 
familiar ethical and political categories which turn us 
away from an ethical and spiritual definition of life and 
sink us deeper into barbarism. We should not forget 
that, as Diderot said, ‘From fanaticism to barbarism is 
only one step.’ If we do not want the ultimate tendency 
of our civilisation to be towards barbarism, we need to 
manage tensions and violence in our world through a 
nonviolent dialogue of cultures; otherwise, we should 
be prepared to accept barbarism. A dialogue of cultures 
is humanity caring for dialogue, culture and the future 
of the globe. If we can really understand this challenge, 
the answer will come out of it, because the answer is not 
separate from the challenge.
Ramin Jahanbegloo is an Iranian-Canadian philosopher 
and intellectual. Having studied at the Sorbonne 
University, he has held various posts at Harvard 
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of Toronto (where he now teaches Political Science). In 
2006, he was detained by the Iranian authorities in Evin 
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intellectuals to the Iranian democratic debate is not how 
to choose between morality and politics in a country 
where dogmatism and confusion cover the voices of 
common sense and decency, but how to forge a politics 
of responsibility in the absence of which democracy 
would become a void concept. In other words, for the 
new generation of Iranian intellectuals the revolution of 
yesterday has become the dissent of today.
Conclusion
Today, we are living in a very exciting moment in history. 
Something profound and wonderful is happening, 
which can be seen only if we stand back and observe the 
spectrum of cultures and religions that have been evolving 
over the centuries. If we can do this and enter into an 
interreligious and intercultural dialogue, something 
amazing begins to show itself, a deep pattern that has 
been centuries in the making. It appears that the different 
religions and cultural worlds converge in a common 
horizon of acting and judging ethically. Civilisation is a 
difficult and daunting task. It is an unending quest for 
excellence and exemplarity. It is the thin distance that 
mankind has placed between itself and barbarianism. 
That is the reason why the intercultural dialogue is a 
deep change in our being. It is not simply standing where 
we are in our particular worldviews and speaking out to 
others or listening to others from afar. It calls for a true 
ethical challenge and a true responsibility. It means a 
willingness to revise and transform our global culture 
in a critical and dialogical way. But it also means that 
this consciousness of dialogue and this essential task 
of mutuality and togetherness is an effort at making 
a global ethics across cultures and religions. As such, 
today there is no true ethics which does not aspire to be 




Goodbye to All That
Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo
 
The idea of a Mexican culture
I find it extremely difficult to say anything meaningful 
about Mexican culture – either in the traditional sense 
of a national culture as spiritual way of life (attitude, 
identity, national character), or in the more complex 
sociological sense of culture as a structure of meanings 
tied to a system of social relations. Nowadays, if one 
listens carefully, almost everything that is said about 
Mexico and the Mexicans sounds shallow, fake, sham.
It is not Mexico that is at stake, but the idea of 
Mexico: not the nation itself, whether or not it exists and 
how, but the nation as symbol, meaningful in everyday 
life. And not only because of the dazzling regional 
diversity that has long nurtured the idea of ‘Many 
Mexicos’; not only because of the outrageous disparities 
that make Mexico one of the most unequal societies on 
earth – gathering several of the richest men on the planet 
and nearly 40 million people living under the poverty 
line. There is almost nothing new there – maybe some 
sharpened regional differences, a steeper concentration 
of income in the past 20 years. The real change lies 
elsewhere. It is the idea of the nation in itself, the image 
of the country as such and all its emotional connotations 
that seem to have lost weight and strength. The idea of 
Mexico, for the Mexicans, has lost its grip.
One easy way to grasp this loss of meaning is to 
look at the projects for the bicentennial anniversary of 
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arrangements according to any international standard. 
To suggest something like that would have amounted 
almost to high treason, since it would have meant 
letting the country be dragged into the sphere of 
American (or Soviet) imperialism.
As time went by and revolutionary enthusiasm 
withered, the Mexican Way gradually lost its original 
appeal. Little by little, the colloquial language gave a 
new meaning to expressing nationalist clichés. To do 
anything according to the Mexican Way came to mean to 
do it in an irregular, dirty or dubious way. An arranged 
election, a corrupt deal or a job poorly done was the 
Mexican way (‘a la Mexicana’), compared with an 
indeterminate ‘international way’ – supposedly clean, 
efficient and modern.
The decay and final dissolution of the revolutionary 
regime was a long, protracted process that took more 
than 20 years. It implied the dismantling of many 
public enterprises and protectionist legislation, the 
gradual acceptance of multiparty elections within a new, 
competitive electoral framework, and the loosening of 
political networks linked to the ruling party. In the long 
run it meant the end of the nationalist economy and the 
nationalist ‘Third Way’ in politics, and carried with it 
not only the crisis of nationalism but of the very idea of 
a Mexican nation as a meaningful source of identity in 
everyday life.
This implied not only the watering down of 
the rhetoric initiated in the early 1980s, but also the 
stripping down of the legal, economic and political 
mechanisms of the Old Regime – mechanisms that for 
decades had sustained the hegemony of the ruling class 
and the plausibility of the Mexican imagined community.
To be sure, the language of nationalism persists in 
the Mexican public sphere up to the present. In fact, it 
can be argued that it has acquired a new impetus as a 
national independence that took place in September 
2010. There were memorial coins and stamps, to be sure, 
dozens of useless history books, parades and plenty of 
fireworks on 16 September. But there is no one single 
idea, shared and meaningful to everyone to signify these 
200 years of independent life.
We are just coming out of a century of nationalism 
– and therein lies part of the problem. Starting in the 
1920s and up to the late 1980s, the public sphere was 
dominated by a powerful, pervasive and ubiquitous 
national idea: Mexico and Mexican identity as 
foundation, framework and project that informed almost 
any field of personal experience, from consumption to 
etiquette, from entertainment to corruption. It was tied 
to the ideological project of the Mexican Revolution, 
to the political structure of the revolutionary regime 
and to the economic model derived from it, with all its 
turnabouts and inconsistencies. To be sure, historically 
Mexican nationalism was defined through a distant and 
mediated opposition to Spain and a more immediate 
opposition to the United States. And yet, that was not 
the core of ‘Mexican identity’, which indeed had more to 
do with an idea of a future society. That is what we have 
lost – a sense of Mexico.
The fate of nationalism
The manifold abuses of the ruling party for over 
70 years undoubtedly explain much of the current 
discredit of Mexican nationalism, since nationalism 
was the main alibi of the many ‘idiosyncrasies’ of the 
revolutionary regime. There is nothing new in that, 
nothing peculiarly Mexican. National identity and the 
nationalist project were the basics of Mexico’s Third 
Way in politics, economy or human rights regime. 
There was no possibility of tuning our institutional 
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It must be clear by now, but maybe it is not 
altogether futile to stress it, that this change is not 
only a superficial, rhetorical phenomenon, for it has its 
correlates in everyday life – in material culture, in ways 
of production and modes of consumption. In practice, 
it is increasingly hard to locate and identify a national 
culture as such, unique and distinctive. Mexican, like 
any other culture, is ostensibly hybrid, more than 
ever transnational, global and fragmented: it can be 
labelled ‘Mexican’ in a traditional sense only in details, 
oddities and vestiges, and only with a degree of irony 
(and maybe a tinge of nostalgia or disgust).
Which way to the border?
There is nothing mysterious or surprising in all of 
this. Mexico is now facing the consequences of a 
‘modernisation’ process brought by the revolutionary 
regime, propelled to a significant extent by a nationalist 
rhetoric that has been outdated by its own success, or, to 
be fair, by its various successes and failures. Just to name 
a few of these: a sweeping industrialisation crippled by a 
small national market at first and crucially dependent on 
the American market afterwards; a small but considerable 
middle class, unquiet, insecure about its own status in a 
still hierarchical society, and fundamentally detached from 
the revolutionary clichés of the Old Regime; a massive 
urbanisation process, still under way after 50 years, that 
has altered habits, kinship networks and ways of life 
without providing a new, stable environment in cities 
frequently lacking basic urban facilities.
Alongside the modernisation process, the United 
States was simultaneously model and antagonist – the 
cipher of a tacit aspiration and a very explicit threat used 
to bolster nationalist fears and alibis. The US had riches, 
science and technology; they were powerful and affluent 
consequence of the globalisation process under way. But 
its meaning has been substantially altered. As the language 
to express opposition to globalisation, it is increasingly 
understood as a class language. At the same time, and due 
to the same process, a new anti-nationalist and even anti-
Mexican discourse has gained strength in the public sphere. 
It is a reaction against the economic and political ways 
of the Old Regime, against its rhetoric and institutional 
arrangements, but it bears quite plain and clear classist 
undertones: the reasons for our underdevelopment are 
the Mexicans, which means, of course, low-class, peasant, 
unionised Mexicans, not fully integrated into the global 
economy – and dependent upon State protection.
Mexican identity, thus, day by day appears more 
as the name of a cleavage within Mexican society – not 
anymore as a hallmark of our shared values, expectations 
and commitments. The idea of Mexico is increasingly 
a cultural battleground for a belligerent ‘Mexicanism’ 
that clings to the more obvious and stereotypical traits of 
Mexican identity, and a disdainful, lofty cosmopolitanism 
– equally Mexican and, equally insecure.
In between lies the new ‘indigenous’ militancy: 
basically an offspring of the EZLN (Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation) rebellion and its aftermath. This is 
not the product of an indigenous intelligentsia, but of a 
handful of anthropologists and philosophers from Mexico 
City, cherished and propagated by international (mainly 
European) NGOs. In a certain sense, the assertion of 
indigenous identity is absolutely modern and absolutely 
cosmopolitan in a world defined by multiculturalism; at the 
same time, however, it is hard for most of the Mexican public 
to distinguish it from the classic Revolutionary Nationalism, 
which incorporated the indigenous past as a fundamental 
trait of Mexican character and identity, a confusion made 
deeper by the fact that in public appearances of the EZLN 
leaders there was always a much visible Mexican flag.
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that matters, not even faith or religious practice, but 
the recognition of the image of Guadalupe as a shared 
symbol – an iconic token of ‘Mexicanness’).
From the 1960s onwards, the ambivalent and 
uncomfortable relationship with the United States 
crystallised in the notion of ‘periphery’. It gained 
currency in the public sphere for several reasons: 
among them, because the idea of being a peripheral 
nation offered a clear and secure explanation of our 
dilemmas. It made clear who was to be blamed for our 
underdevelopment but it also offered the image of certain 
remoteness: underdevelopment was in a sense a measure 
of our distance with regard to the centre. Not anymore.
In the beginning of the new century the United 
States – the image, the model, the economic and political 
reality of the country – cut across Mexican society as 
never before, rendering distance and distinction more 
problematic than ever. Whether we like it or not, our 
economies are entangled together, as are our financial 
systems and our demographic flows, be it in production or 
consumption, labour markets or crime, the asymmetries 
are as evident as the linkages. As if we were living on an 
extended, indefinable borderland. And thus the physical 
fact of the border – the very line of the border – acquires 
an overwhelming importance for both countries: over-
patrolled, heavily guarded, always in the spotlight, it has 
become one of the most violent zones of the world.
Some numbers. Between 10 and 15 per cent of the 
Mexican population now lives permanently in the United 
States. Another 15 per cent has lived for months or years 
in the United States at some point in their life. And maybe 
up to 20 per cent of the population now living in Mexican 
territory depend in a certain measure on remittances 
from their relatives on the other side of the border. A not 
insignificant proportion of menial jobs, agricultural work 
and personal services, from nursing for old people to 
– but also decadent, lacking family values, a sense of 
tradition or any real culture. And, above anything else, 
they were greedy and dangerously close. Thus the 
popular wisdom, seasoned with the official discourse, 
rephrased in many ways the saying attributed to Dictator 
Porfirio Díaz: ‘Poor Mexico! So far from God, so close to 
the United States!’ This saying, by the way, has probably 
been reversed in the past decades on the other side: ‘Poor 
US! So far from God, so close to Mexico!’
That symbolic opposition to the United States was 
to a large extent the template for the assumed Mexican 
character. Mexicans were supposed to be brave to the 
point of temerity, quixotic, selfless and solidary, as 
opposed to the selfish, individualistic and pragmatic 
Americans; Mexicans were supposed to be nostalgic, 
melancholic, deeply wounded by history, and always 
carrying the weight of centuries, as opposed to the 
Americans, oblivious of their past; Mexicans were 
supposed to be sentimental, witty, clever and secretly 
resentful, while the Americans were hard-headed, 
self-confident, practical people. Needless to say, all those 
attributes were at the very least overstatements filtered 
through the class structure of Mexican society. They 
were, nevertheless, widely shared – a sort of chimerical 
national character – for they provided a self-image, more 
or less flattering. (Aside, by the way: during most of the 
nineteenth century, Catholicism was also conceived as 
one of the basic traits of national identity, in opposition to 
the Protestantism of the United States. Nevertheless, the 
separation of Church and State was firmly established 
after the restoration of the liberal Republic in 1867 and 
has not been seriously challenged ever since; religion had 
no place whatsoever in the rhetoric of the revolutionary 
regime and has had only a minor and ambiguous role in 
popular nationalism, mainly as a devotion to the Virgin 
of Guadalupe. To be more precise: it is not devotion 
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The standards are set elsewhere, be it for academic 
performance, social success or political acceptability. And 
this has generated a peculiar sense of insecurity that 
appears as a mimetic desire: class distinctions are, as 
always, cultural distinctions – what is new is that today 
Mexico and Mexican ways appear clearly within one pole, 
as signs of backwardness in a class struggle that spins 
around the idea of Modernity.
There is scarcely anything altogether new in this 
tension between ever-changing Modernity and so-called 
Tradition, not even in its guise as a tension between a 
Mexican and an American way. We might even go as 
far as saying that our blatant ‘Mexicanness’ has been 
our path to (an obviously American) Modernity and it 
has always exhibited a characteristic class hallmark. 
Nevertheless, the de-centring of the elites and the decay 
of the post-revolutionary regime have widened the gap 
between the National Public Sphere and the common 
life of most people. In everyday politics, for example, 
there is an almost unbridgeable breach between local, 
empirical, pragmatic, old-style political knowledge and 
practice, and the abstract, up-to-date, cosmopolitan and 
technocratic knowledge of the elites. And this, obviously 
enough, results in a growing discredit of national politics 
– including special-interest groups of environmentalists, 
human rights activists and the like.
The fate of ‘culture’ in the narrow sense of the 
term can be easily understood. During the best part 
of the twentieth century the State was the single most 
important sponsor of the arts and literature. For better 
or worse, State institutions cared for music, painting, 
sculpture, dance, theatre and literature – they promoted 
production, protected the artists and tried to create a 
massive public for it all, as part of the Revolutionary 
programme. And, if the truth be told, some of the results 
were remarkable in almost every field. Nowadays, with 
gardening and childcare in the United States depends on 
Mexican cheap, illegal workers. Mexican and American 
authorities and bureaucracies ignore this at their peril: 
everyday life, on both sides of the border, has this as one 
basic, unavoidable – even welcome – fact.
Oddly enough, much of what remains of ancient 
Mexican nationalism is much more alive ‘on the other 
side’. Militant, belligerent Mexicanism is more frequent 
among emigrants living in the United States, although it is 
slightly different, anyhow: the National Holiday in Mexico 
is 16 September, the day that marks the beginning of 
the Independence War; whereas the National Holiday for 
Mexicans living in the United States is 5 May, the date of 
the battle of Puebla, in which the Mexican Army defeated 
the French in 1862. That is: to be Mexican, a Mexican 
nationalist, even a belligerent Mexican nationalist, means 
slightly different things on each side of the border.
North America is a massive economic and 
demographic fact that, nevertheless, is hard to conceive 
as a unit, because it is grounded on the asymmetries 
between the United States and Mexico. It is the border 
that creates the huge ‘illegal’, cheap labour force that 
in part sustains both our economies. It is the looser 
Mexican regulation – on environmental or health issues, 
on taxes and fiscal control – that allows for the American 
investment in Mexico. In other words: North America 
has been erected not in spite of the border but because 
of it, not owing to what we have in common but to what 
keeps us apart, unequal and different.
The other side
The emergence of North America has meant a de-centring 
of the Mexican elites. In politics, economy, science or 
art, the Mexican elites are now integrated as periphery 
to a system that has its centre in the United States. 
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truly Mexican is a way of not becoming just second-class 
Americans, whereas for the rest, the assimilation of 
patterns of work and consumption of the United States 
is a way out of their condition as second-class Mexicans.
If I am allowed to end on an even more personal 
note, I would say that Mexico, like any other nation, is a 
work in the making. I would not worry very much about 
the strength and authenticity of its culture or its fate as 
a nation. I find reasons for concern, rather, in the traits 
of the class struggle – with no credible labour unions 
or political parties – and mainly in the lack of political, 
ideological and cultural resources of the elites to figure 
out new ways to integrate this incredibly complex mosaic 
that has always been Mexico.
Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo is a sociologist and 
intellectual renowned for his analyses of Mexican politics 
and culture in books such as Imaginary Citizens and In 
the Eyes of God. Gonzalbo also appears frequently in print 
and television shows in Mexico, as well as teaching at El 
Colegio de México in Mexico City.
the withering of old ideals and standards, or the very idea 
of a National Culture, most of those cultural institutions 
(with a few outstanding exceptions) are adrift and 
mostly looking for approval, for standards, somewhere 
else. The current craze for Frida Kahlo’s paintings is a 
fitting example: it is basically a response to a European 
and American fad. In literature, just to mention another 
example, the universal fame of Carlos Fuentes as true 
representative of Mexican spirit, élan and colourful 
passion, is entirely for international consumption, for 
his novels are of little or no consequence for the Mexican 
public at the beginning of the new century.
Thus goes our elites’ cultural insecurity. As a 
vestige, or at least a token, of their (lost) centrality, they 
need at least some Mexican icons – but only international 
recognition makes them truly Mexican. Another minor 
inconsequence: while aggressively pushing forwards a 
Modernisation process that would at last let us get rid of 
our underdeveloped/Mexican condition, our elites are also 
the most vocal in the defence of traditional arts and crafts, 
folklore, etc. – all supposedly at risk of losing authenticity 
– while the popular classes have no real problem in 
mixing Halloween with the Day of the Dead, an orange 
plastic pumpkin with a handful of cempasuchitl flowers, a 
Mexican flag and maybe a rap rhythm.
The main issue – I will try to restate it again – is the 
idea of Mexico. To state it bluntly: on the institutional level 
‘Mexico’ is a battlefield of sorts, opposing a liberalising 
cosmopolitan elite and the strong and resilient remnants 
of the revolutionary culture; on the cultural level (again, 
in the old-fashioned narrow sense of the term) it can be 
seen the other way round, with the elites standing for the 
defence of an authentic, picturesque, colourful artistic 
idea of the country – of what qualifies as good taste – and 
the majority of the people being much more at ease 




Surrealism and Survival  
in Romania
Carmen Firan
From the perspective of a foreigner, Romania is a 
little-known country, usually associated with various 
media clichés that present it as a predictable part of the 
former Communist block. In fact, it is an unpredictable 
and contradictory country, even for Romanians. This 
paradoxical cultural space has absorbed several cultural 
influences: the French sophistication between the two 
World Wars along with the avant-garde movement that 
emerged in Romania before spreading to Europe, the spicy 
Orient, the rural civilisation of the Balkans and the ethnic 
diversity of Transylvania under the Austrian-Hungarian 
empire. A young state with old roots, Romania was always 
struggling to define and assert itself at the crossroads of 
powerful interests. Yet this country managed to find 
a way to survive, despite its historical wounds and the 
isolation it suffered for decades from international 
dialogue. Today, Romania needs to solve its paradoxes 
and to overcome its own clichés – from the corrupt 
mentalities embedded by decades of Communism, to 
the lament of a nation that is still too little known and 
praised for its contribution to the universal choir of 
cultural values. It also needs to redefine its national 
identity according to the new era of globalisation.
As a member of the European Union, Romania will 
find the right way to redeem itself from its past and move 
forward into the future through a mutual interchange 
and an open dialogue with the world.
178 179
The Inner Lives of Cultures Surrealism and Survival in Romania
a kind of French, English or German arrogance that 
Communism only emphasised. During the totalitarian 
era of the East, these differences were only aggravated.
To rethink and reshape the European consciousness 
was the main goal of the European Union, which 
succeeded in creating, through an effective political–
cultural dialogue, a common roof, protective and open, 
for countries from the West and from the East as well. 
Could the twenty-first century be dominated by a united 
Europe? It sounds very attractive and challenging.
What brings Romania to this optimistic picture? In 
order to answer, a brief cultural and historical X-ray could 
be useful, not only to explain the differences between 
Romania and other countries, but also to highlight the 
similarities and the common spiritual ground.
The Romanian cultural matrix resides in the 
countryside, a rural universe filled with legends and 
tales, with a rich folklore and pre-Christian traditions. 
The symbol of Romania is the peasant. Looking old 
and wise, or just tired, dressed in a long fur coat, a 
shepherd scrutinizing the horizon, or just searching for 
his magical ewe or lamb, he represented the essence of 
this place – agrarian by excellence, resilient over time, 
the iconic image of stability and persistence. One of the 
dramatic consequences of the Communist ideology in 
Romania was the destruction of the villages along with 
their traditions and customs, and the humiliation of 
the peasant torn from his natural surroundings, forced 
to leave his land, his church and his belief and to move 
to the outskirts of the big cities, in order to work in 
socialist mammoth factories, where he lost his ancestral 
identity, where he felt depersonalised and estranged 
from his native environment.
The genuine peasant changed into a no man’s land 
inhabitant and the word ‘peasant’ itself was distorted, 
symbolising a rude, primitive human being. The national 
National surrealism and cultural paradoxes
I grew up in Communist Romania, the only country 
of Latin language origin in Eastern Europe, but the 
language didn’t help us escape dictatorship. Actually, 
to quote South America’s experience, all you need is a 
Latin language and a dictatorship for surrealism to be 
born. I’m thinking not only about the artistic trend, 
but also about our everyday life, full of ‘surrealism’ and 
discrepancies for more than 40 years.
We were not in Latin America though, but in 
Europe, although during those times a huge gap 
separated East and West inside the same Europe.  
We were completely disconnected from Europe’s soul, 
from the open dialogue of values, and enclosed in a 
dark territory of fear and poverty. Europe represented 
our lost dream of freedom, our natural home, 
artificially quarantined by the Communist ideology. 
After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, 
reintegration into mother Europe was another painful 
process for a country isolated for decades, where 
everything was upside-down, from damaged economy 
to corrupt mentalities.
There are different perceptions of Romania and 
several clichés. It depends if you look at the country 
from the outside or as an insider. For a Westerner, 
it is hard to define it at first sight, and even harder 
to understand it due to its peculiarities, paradoxes 
and controversies. Probably the West never had a full 
understanding of Communism. The utopian idea of 
Communism was more resisted in the West, where it 
remained just an abstract idea, than in Eastern Europe, 
where the experiment affected generations in a negative 
way and distorted national and individual destinies.
In reality, we all know that there were always two 
Europes. Even before the First World War, we could 
speak about a sort of ‘historical superiority’ of the West, 
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Romanian culture can be situated between pan-Slavism 
and pan-Germanism, according to some philosophers.
The period of glory for Romania is considered 
by many to be the era between the two World Wars. 
After the unification of all its territories in 1918, 
Romania looked like a fairly large and prosperous state, 
going through a time of important reforms, a time of 
economic and cultural flourishing, development of 
its industrial sector, and it became one of the most 
important exporters of oil and wheat. Bucharest, 
nicknamed ‘little Paris’, as rumours have it, could stand 
next to any major European metropolis. A new artistic 
movement emerged, the Romanian avant-garde, which 
eventually conquered Europe and contributed to the 
birth of surrealism in visual art, literature and cinema. 
Between the two World Wars, Romanian culture was 
for the first time in sync with the latest Western trends 
in Paris or London, becoming a strong participant 
in the international dialogue of values. Remarkable 
avant-garde and surrealist talents emerged in Romania, 
featuring a cosmopolitan cultural attitude. In 1916, 
Tristan Tzara, a Romanian émigré to Zurich, invented 
Dadaism. There were three distinctive groups of artists: 
modernist – focused on Western, urban and intellectual 
culture; traditionalist – oriented towards the religious 
orthodoxy of the rural world; and the third, proclaiming 
the birth of the national character, situated at the 
crossroads between tradition and modernity.
But even this time of prosperity had its paradoxes: 
except for a few big cities and the wealthy elite, the rest 
of the country was still impoverished and illiterate and 
there was no time left for profound changes. The rise 
of fascism began before the First World War and then 
Communism took over. After the Second War World, 
the brutal human rights violations dominated the 
country making way for Soviet propaganda, which for 
Communism dreamt of producing ‘a new man’, a 
hybrid trying to redefine himself for decades to come, 
in search of his lost national identity and his belonging 
to the European spirit.
Romania has always been a rich country with 
poor people. A country that has everything: natural 
resources, the Danube Delta, the Carpathians and the 
Black Sea, fertile soil. Once Romania was called the 
‘granary of Europe’. The Romanian paradox has many 
layers, extended through its whole history. The state, as 
it is now, was created only after the Second World War. 
Romanian principalities, provinces and territories were 
separated for centuries, but the Romanian language 
and culture has a surprising unity across all of them. 
The Romanian people were stronger than borders and 
the spiritual boundaries overcame imposed territorial 
fractures or farces of history.
The state is young, but Romanian roots on 
these territories are old, dating back long before the 
Roman Empire. And there is yet another paradox: 
although the Romans ruled for a relatively short time, 
the Latin language had a huge impact, creating the 
Romanian language, while later on, other empires, 
although they dominated for centuries, from Turks to 
Austrian-Hungarians to Russians, left feeble marks on 
the language. But they had strong influences, good and 
bad, on local mentalities. A small country saving its own 
identity while surrounded by powerful empires is another 
form of surrealism.
Romania can also be described as a country rich 
in ethnic diversity striving to preserve its uniqueness at 
the crossroads between the East and the West, between 
the Balkans and the Orient, with a people that displays a 
Mediterranean temper in the South combined with Balkan 
customs, a Slavic pace in the Northeast, or a rigorous 
diligence in Transylvania. The characteristics of the 
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hospitable, enthusiastic, genuine and warm; inclined 
towards constant ridicule, with a predisposition to 
mock everything.
After the fall of Communism, other clichés 
became associated with Romania, describing a 
country still haunted by the ghosts of the Communist 
nomenclature which was soon back in power, by stray 
dogs, orphans, AIDS victims infected by contaminated 
blood which they had received in hospitals, human 
traffic, impoverished Roma population, pickpockets and 
thieves making headlines in the Western media. I’m 
not fighting against clichés. They are based, after all, 
on reality, however exaggerated or generalised it might 
be. But Romania, despite all its problems, continued 
to produce an intense cultural life. Even during the 
totalitarian era, culture had symbolised resistance 
within the Communist censorship, defence from the 
absurdity of the system and an underground form 
of freedom. In the late 1980s, a visitor from England 
remarked in awe: ‘This country looks surreal to me. 
You have nothing to eat but wait in line for hours to buy 
theatre tickets and books…’ It was our form of survival, 
sanity and refusal to submit to alienation.
We lived under one of the toughest dictatorships 
in Europe, watched by the secret police, and isolated 
from the rest of the world. We did our best to survive 
within a closed society. One way was to get together in 
groups selected on the basis of affinities which had to do 
with art, literature, philosophy or simply a few common 
tastes. Our lives were simple. We didn’t care about 
cholesterol, pollution or the negative effects of smoking; 
nor did we worry about the dangers of obesity, drug 
addiction or violence. We didn’t need anti-depressants, 
although we had good reasons to take Prozac. No one 
sought psychoanalysis, therapists or shrinks, although 
we had good reason to be depressed. When you live 
several decades ruled Romanian culture by ideological 
censorship. At the same time, through purges, Stalin 
and the local Communist leaders annihilated any trace 
of intellectual opposition. Between 1948 and 1964, 
one Romanian out of nine (meaning about two million 
people) was sent into a Communist concentration 
camp. The official literature, or so-called socialist 
realism, glorified Stalin, his politics and the new 
proletarian class.
Romania thus entered the harshest dictatorship in 
Europe, weakened and humiliated by the Fascist regime 
and the Iron Guard that compromised the country’s 
prestige during the Second World War. Years of terror 
followed. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Communist 
gulag continued the Fascist horrors. For almost 50 
years, Romania experienced isolation and was cut off 
from the West.
Despite all the official oppression, intellectuals 
gathered in informal discussion groups to keep their 
sanity and, slowly, a counterculture was born. Several 
groups of artists rejected the aggressive intrusion of 
the Communist propaganda, bringing along a fresh, 
nonconformist subversive voice, opposed to the official 
ideology. Although Romania didn’t have an organised 
Samizdat, individual voices of courage made themselves 
heard, like the political dissident Paul Goma in 1977 or, 
later, the ‘Blue Jeans generation of writers’.
Over the years, Romanians were perceived 
through various stereotypes, more or less warranted: 
a people hesitating between excessive praise and 
self-disparagement, between laments or victimisation 
and an ostentatious superiority; coming up with dark 
plots and conspiracies to explain historical events, 
but also with an interesting, rich culture and a lively 
artistic life, with sophisticated intellectuals; xenophobic, 
nationalistic, but still tolerant in many respects; 
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As writers, the metaphor was our main weapon to 
evade political censorship. Although biographies and 
memoirs were almost impossible to squeeze through 
the tight net of censorship, poetry and prose could 
be enveloped in a protective shell of metaphor and 
allegory, esoteric enough to get the forbidden truth 
out regardless of whether it was about political or 
social reality. Communism disregarded metaphors. 
It identified the soul as its main enemy. Demolishing 
churches and synagogues was not enough. That 
merely eliminated places of worship, but they also got 
to destroy the metaphors of spirituality, making them 
appear weak and misleading.
Another source of refuge was humour, carelessness 
or frivolity. In spite of our bad times, we managed to 
maintain our sense of humour. There was no shortage 
of jokes in those days, which acted like some sort of a 
safety valve. We seemed to be a surreal people who could 
not stop laughing, even while we were slowly dying! We 
were like patients in a militarised hospital, subjected to 
a utopian treatment for an imaginary disease, feeling 
both guilt and absolution. Guilt, because of the cowardice 
each one of us had to practice; absolution, because the 
collective farce so perfectly played on us.
We invoked many alibis in our defence, from 
the geo-political conditions to the curse which had 
supposedly been placed on this part of the world long 
ago. Barbarian invasions, foreign-born monarchs 
imposed on us, orthodoxy, our former dependence on 
Constantinople, and later on Moscow, the cruelty of fate 
itself and the cunning plotting of our neighbours, the 
games of the superpowers and so forth – all of these we 
perceived to be working against us.
Everyone was living at least two parallel lives 
and, without putting up any opposition, we were more 
resistant than history itself – ultimately the universally 
in a cave, with few choices, all sorts of self-defence 
mechanisms spring into action. One is interpersonal 
communication. In a society like ours, communication 
involved sincerity and spontaneity. People talked loudly, 
gesticulated profusely and even cursed often; they lived 
and hated passionately. They used to make grandiose 
plans in the evening, over many glasses of alcohol, 
only to discard them as impossible to achieve the next 
morning. And yet these people were authentic in their 
despair and passionate in their fantasies. Paradoxically, 
in such an abnormal and repressive society, they were 
anything but alienated.
In fact, they practiced a type of group therapy, 
unorganised and without clear goals. In that Balkan 
atmosphere, their conversations in the shadow of ruined 
‘little Paris’ were delightful, a never-ending chatter, 
spectacular and useless, over full ashtrays and cheap 
alcohol, all-night-long discussions and hung-over 
mornings. They weren’t in a hurry to get anywhere. 
They had no place to go.
In the opaque world of Communism, time meant 
nothing. The dictatorship seemed permanent. To keep 
our sanity, we had only the refuge of books and an inner 
language of freedom, parallel to the official one. Words 
had no power to change our destiny, but they could keep 
us sane. And our soul? Nobody mentioned it, but it was 
there all along, in the arabesques of our lamentations, 
in the last cigarette butts crushed at sunrise against 
the background of a hideous smoking factory at the 
outskirts of the city.
People learned not to trust the official language in 
the press, in schools, and at work. Most of them doubted 
any official political speech and cultivated disbelief 
and irony as part of their self-defence mechanism. 
Everybody was aware of living in a ‘make-believe’ world, 
fully aware of its duplicity.
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Freedom scared a lot of people, who, for years 
and years, had been used to acting according to the 
crowd, hiding behind the excuse that one cannot assert 
oneself in a repressed society. Now suddenly thrust into 
freedom, they felt terribly insecure. The old value system 
had been reversed, forcing everyone to come up with 
new motivations and methods of survival. Under these 
circumstances, it became quite fashionable for people to 
reexamine their past in a ‘new’ light, to reevaluate history 
and culture from ‘different’ points of view.
The lustration law was not accepted in Romania 
but a witch hunt started. Hundreds of dissidents, 
revolutionaries with diplomas, and fighters for democracy 
appeared overnight. They faked their biographies. Some 
suddenly lost their memory, conveniently forgetting what 
they had been, and pretending to be completely clean, 
uncompromised, hoping the world would thus forget their 
past and forgive their sins. There was an overabundance 
of upholders of the law, fine intellectuals preaching 
about the truth, about the need of a moral cleansing, 
about regaining the ‘national identity’, about putting 
Communism on trial and restoring the dignity of the 
nation on the international arena.
Essentially, everyone tried to save himself, to secure 
for himself a place as close to the top as possible, whether 
that meant a seat in parliament, or a profitable business, 
an apartment, a house from the government, or a 
scholarship to study abroad, now that freedom caused 
another reversal of values, based on new but equally 
deficient criteria.
There was the same old poverty, but with the 
added ingredient of insecurity, the first signs of the 
transition to the market economy and the consequences 
of the attempts to reform the economy, resulting in 
unemployment, a dramatic rise in prices, housing 
shortages and a lack of a social net. The political scene 
accepted cause of our misery. History was constantly 
the enigmatic character to whom we could quietly 
attribute our glory, guilt and dramas. It could justify 
any aberration.
Some areas of our history were inexcusably 
expanded upon, while others were glibly glossed 
over by the official powers. The same history that 
can only be one and the same was undergoing subtle 
changes from year to year, with whimsical erasures 
and additions, with heroes and events disappearing or 
reappearing as the rulers dictated, victories or defeats 
being reinvented at will. We were all running rings 
around history, juggling with time, hurtling from era 
to era, either condemning or forgiving it. History was 
being subjected to all sorts of manipulations by both 
the mighty and the weak. It was, by turns, our pride 
and our stigma. It was converted into the ingenious 
instrument of governing. We were about to be 
swallowed up by history, fed up with it and yet outside 
it, our eternal insecurity and our sole certainty.
After the fall of Communism, the Romanian 
people had to face a new drama. This time it was 
the paradoxical drama of freedom. With no tradition 
in civil society, with no community spirit and no 
training for the democratic exercise, people discovered 
themselves unprepared for the great challenge they 
had longed for for so long. What proved to be the 
hardest was living in freedom. Suddenly the people 
found themselves in the spotlight. Alone. With only 
its limitations, inabilities and failures which were now 
starkly showing in the unforgiving, glaring light of 
international public scrutiny. Freedom highlights a 
person’s individuality, stripping the crust of collective 
protection through which a dictatorship levels out 
a society, bringing it to the lowest denominator, an 
easier way to manipulate and conquer it.
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The transition to the market economy was slower 
than in other former Communist countries, but from the 
political point of view, Romania was stable despite the 
poor performance of its leaders. It is also a safe country, 
far from the violence that occurred in Russia, for example, 
soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Survival
Like other countries in Eastern Europe, Romania today 
is struggling to find its place in the promised land of 
capitalism. After the fall of Communism in December 
1989, the country experienced a decade of economic 
instability and decline, caused in part by an obsolete 
industrial base as well as by the lack of much-needed 
structural reform. Starting from 2000, however, the 
economy reached a stage of relative macroeconomic 
stability. Joining the European Union in January 2007 
was nevertheless the most significant event since the 
fall of Communism.
After the prolonged age of generalised shortages 
experienced during Communism, when people 
famously could have money but nothing to buy with 
it, the consumerist cornucopia blessed Romania with 
food franchises and supermarkets, fancy restaurants 
and malls. Romania was just a new market that became 
more and more interesting as the buying power of its 
inhabitants increased slowly but steadily. Romanians are 
big consumers. They will spend the last penny for good 
food, nice clothes, travelling or to indulge themselves. 
From this perspective, during the early 1990s, and even 
more so now, after its admission into the European 
Union, Romania shows a social energy and vitality that 
reminds one of the simple, basic dream of being free 
and enjoying life. Unfortunately, it is not that easy to 
reach this dream. Over the years many qualified, honest 
was dominated by the same old apparatchiks, in search 
of a retouched biography, while the former police 
officers found prosperity in business, buying factories 
and lands for nothing, and quickly spreading the new 
slogan: ‘We are not selling our country’. Instead they 
divided it among themselves. ‘The Revolution was 
made especially for them, to benefit them. All the shed 
blood was in vain’ was the refrain heard everywhere. 
Tens of parties and mediocre leaders were spending 
their energies in useless infighting. The members of 
parliament were quite pathetic, the members of the 
government hesitant, incompetent, still influenced by 
the old mentalities. They constantly invoked the costly 
legacy of Communism, and again blamed the state of 
the country on the cruel and ruthless history.
Disappointment, pessimism and hopelessness set 
in little by little. Within a short time, a parallel black 
market economy was created, a banking mafia, against 
the backdrop of the sudden devaluation of the national 
currency. Corruption was spreading like a plague.
During those times I had an obsessive question: 
‘Was it the same in the other ex-Communist countries?’ 
Some essayists answered, yes. Others claimed that 
Ceausescu’s dictatorship was the toughest in Eastern 
Europe, that it was much worse than in former 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland or Hungary, with 
no liberties at all and a very strong secret police that 
controlled the country. As a consequence, the poverty was 
overwhelming; the fall of Communism was the result of 
a bloody revolution; the corruption was higher. On the 
other hand, although there were some national problems 
in multiethnic Transylvania, with its mix of Romanians, 
Hungarians and Germans, they didn’t escalate into 
territorial ruptures like in Czechoslovakia, or into tragic 
conflicts like in the former Yugoslavia. Romania didn’t 
experience big religious passions either.
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areas. The differences between the rich and the poor are 
striking, as the middle class is emerging very slowly. 
Nevertheless, Romanians like to show off. Although 
the average monthly wage is under 300 euros, there are 
beauty salons where women pay 100 euros for a hair-
styling session. For an ambitious young Romanian girl 
it is sometimes better to live on an empty stomach than 
without a fancy dress or a French perfume.
Everybody hopes that accession to the European 
Union will speed up the country’s development. 
However, everybody is aware that this process takes 
time and most young people gradually lost their initial 
euphoria in the early 1990s, hope in the late 1990s and 
patience in 2000. The working class left the country for 
better work opportunities and the most desperate ones 
abandoned themselves to underground jobs. The ones 
who leave Romania fall into three main categories: those 
who decided to leave for good, the students and teachers 
who left for small babysitting or summer fruit-picking 
jobs for some pocket money, and those who left in order 
to continue their education in schools abroad or just for 
adventure. In a study published by the World Bank called 
‘Migration and money transfer: Eastern Europe and the 
ex-Soviet Union’, it is reported that 38 per cent of the 
Romanians who live abroad send money home regularly. 
The massive migration abroad is also causing many 
problems. Tens of thousands of young families have gone 
abroad, leaving their children in the care of relatives back 
home. These children become a social problem, as many 
of them abandon school, use drugs, practice prostitution 
or fall prey to shady adults. The elders who have left home 
do not enjoy a better life; in a country where extended 
families and care for the elders was a social tradition, one 
can now see long waiting lists for those who have applied 
to be admitted into nursing homes, as they no longer have 
relatives to take care of them.
and hard-working young people left Romania in search 
of opportunities abroad. If you wanted to ‘make it’ in 
Romania, with some notable exceptions, you had only 
two options: either have some good connections, or 
bribe your way into a good position. In other words, one 
needs to join a complicated social game that involves 
negotiating moral values. A game that defines the Balkan 
context, which emerged 500 years ago as the Turkish 
Empire was requesting tribute from the territories in 
their possessions. During the early 1990s, the ‘must 
have-a-connection’ game was played by ex-Communist 
apparatchiks, who possessed two key elements: the right 
information and some foreign currency. As a result, a 
new social class emerged in the mid 1990s: the nouveaux 
riches. Later on, as six or seven governments rotated, five 
parliaments changed and three presidents were elected, 
this social structure changed, embedding more and 
more social networks.
During the process of integration into the 
European Union, a great deal of political pressure from 
international organisations accelerated the process of 
self-definition of the Romanian social and economic 
framework into a more functional and less bureaucratic 
structure at all levels. Ordinary Romanians were more 
eager than the politicians to join the EU. They were 
hoping that corruption would slow down, and that 
the country would be under strict surveillance by the 
international institutions. The majority of Romanians 
saw the European Union as a salvation from the 
self-destructive games played by corrupt politicians 
or officials. Like many times throughout its history, 
Romania looked abroad to find salvation.
Despite its economic development, despite having 
more than 17 million cell phone owners and almost 14 
million internet users, poverty is still a big problem, and 
the effects of modernisation are hardly felt in the rural 
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its soul and to reassert its new identity. Romania is 
anything but boring. Its real potential will be seen in 
the years to come. In the long run, its voice will hopefully 
add fresh and rich nuances, creative and powerful 
tonalities, to the chorus of a united Europe.
Carmen Firan is a poet, essayist, journalist and fiction 
writer, whose subjects range from literature, politics 
and women’s studies to emerging democracies and civil 
society. Originally from Romania, she has been living 
and publishing work in New York since 2000.
On the other hand, there is a booming outsourcing 
market in Romania. According to a global IT IQ report, 
the world’s most important agency that conducts online 
research on professional qualifications, Romania already 
has in Europe more than 16,000 certified specialists. 
The research has studied the qualifications of the labour 
force in various fields: software, general knowledge, 
finances, health, industry, information technology, 
foreign languages and communication, management and 
executive positions. The research indicated that Romania 
ranks second in Europe in professional competence and 
intellectual training.
During Communist times, there was a split between 
the real beliefs of the people, shared in the privacy of 
their homes, and the demagogic declarations of the 
Communist media. At that time, the biggest problem 
was the absence of a common social project to which 
people could adhere, and this resulted in generalised 
indifference. Nowadays, Romania seems to experience 
another type of discrepancy between the official 
reports and the people’s feelings; on one hand, the 
government agencies report economic growth, yearly 
increase of personal income, quality of life, increase of 
life expectancy; on the other, you hear the complaints 
of ordinary people (especially the elderly) who declare 
themselves to be unhappy and poorer than ever.
Romania appears thus as a country of 
controversies and paradoxes, with sophisticated 
intellectuals, rude people, a promising new generation, 
kitschy palaces or casinos and beautiful monasteries, 
upscale resorts, magnificent geography and bad 
roads. There is as much hope in this country as there 
is resignation created by tough economic times or 
national political turmoil. Romania is young and old, 
joyful and sad, sometimes disappointing, sometimes 




Unwritten Rules, Open Secrets, 
Knowing Smiles
Alena Ledeneva
Myths, signals and ‘non-translatables’
There is a certain mythology that Russia is a land 
of irregularities and paradoxes, to a large extent 
impenetrable for outsiders. At the level of clichés, the 
‘Russian soul’ and ‘Russian chaos’ are often given some 
taken-for-granted explanatory power. Among other usual 
suspects, clues such as a ‘traumatic past’, ‘kleptomania’, 
or ‘size matters’ point to important dimensions of 
the analysis. A common assumption behind all these 
ideas is that there is some kind of disorder in Russia, 
which makes it different and distinct from more 
orderly economies. A certain non-transparency of the 
‘rules of the game’ in Russia has become an accepted 
commonplace. A similar conclusion could be drawn 
from the analysis of emerging post-Soviet discourses 
referring to the ubiquitous workings of the informal 
economy. Many of these are incomprehensible without 
cross-cultural translation and even then their meanings 
deviate in translation. Yet these ‘non-translatables’ 
and ‘linguistic innovations’ are the best indicators of 
fundamental changes in society – they signal and point 
to the existing unwritten rules, known only to insiders.
I argue that in order to make the rules of the game 
transparent, one should start by altering the approach. 
Rather than looking only at what does not work in Russia 
and why, one should concentrate on what does work and 
how. This essay is based on the assumption that there 
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Given the scale of the informal economy in Russia,3 
there is no shortage of examples that illustrate how 
unwritten rules operate. Tax evasion practices alone 
provide an excellent ground for studying the informal 
order of things. On the one hand, there are commonly 
used ways of reducing the tax liability and of evading 
taxes, which are considered dysfunctional for the 
economy. On the other hand, ‘saved’ taxes are often 
used for investment, as there are few other sources for 
investment in the economy. What looks like capital flight 
can in fact make its comeback in the form of foreign 
investment. The fact that, in the 1990s, Cyprus was both 
the most popular offshore zone for Russian business and 
one of the country’s top five foreign investors, matching 
the level of France and the UK, is indicative of this. In 
other words, the informal order balances off the formal 
one. This accounts for why things are never so bad or 
so good as they seem in Russia and draws attention 
to unwritten rules prescribing the ways in which the 
informal order of things intervenes with, compensates 
for or diverts the formal one.
Another striking set of examples derives from the 
role of the state as a major shareholder in many large 
corporations. Insider deals have prevailed (particularly 
since 1995) as a method of state asset disposal, and 
other opaque corporate governance arrangements have 
proliferated. Since the 2000s, similar methods have 
been used for the state to reassert its control over the 
strategic sectors and key industries. These deals are 
impossible to decode without understanding the logic of 
unwritten rules, just as it is impossible to decipher fully 
the ‘information wars’ and ‘kompromat (compromising 
material) wars’ omnipresent in Russia of the 1990s. 
Unwritten rules have also played a part in regulating 
non-monetary exchanges. Barter chains redistributing 
income among the ‘inner circle’, as well as among firms 
is order in Russia and that it is possible, however hard 
it might be, to grasp the logic and articulate the rules 
of that order which counteracts the change. Let me give 
some examples. Corruption and the ineffectiveness of 
the rule of law in Russia is one of the main obstacles to 
Russian economic and political development.1 Not only 
does the weak rule of law deter foreign investment in 
the Russian economy, it also undermines efforts to rein 
in acute problems such as property rights, capital flight, 
tax evasion and abuses of corporate governance. Many 
reforms were designed to remedy the inefficiency of the 
rule of law but failed at the stage of implementation.2 
Why? Following our alternative perspective, one should 
ask, ‘If the rule of law does not work in Russia, then what 
does?’ Indeed, if legislative reforms and law enforcement 
in Russia do not operate in the expected way, it is logical 
to suggest that something is working against them and 
working really efficiently. What is it?
A tentative answer can be found in popular 
wisdom: ‘Russia is a country of unread laws and 
unwritten rules.’ Or, as they say, ‘the imperfection of 
our laws is compensated for by their non-observance’ 
(nesovershenstvo nashikh zakonov kompensiruetsya 
ikh nevypolneniem). It is not that the requisite 
components of the rule of law are absent in Russia; 
rather, the ability of the rule of law to function 
coherently has been diverted by a powerful set of 
practices that has evolved organically in the post-
Soviet milieu. Taking such an outlook as a point of 
departure, I will argue that the ‘rules of the game’ 
in Russia can actually be understood if so-called 
‘unwritten rules’ are taken into account. Adopting 
a perspective of unwritten rules and understanding 
how they work can help to make the rules of the game 
in Russia more transparent and therefore subject to 
positive change and reform.
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practical skill in its implementation, and knowing the 
literal meaning of a word does not automatically mean 
that one will use it correctly in context. In Wittgenstein’s 
terminology there are practices of ‘rule-following’ (i.e. 
being able to continue the sequence of numbers 2, 4, 
6, 8…) that are distinct from rules that are interpreted, 
explicated and understood (i.e. an ability to figure out 
the formulae of this sequence). In a classic example of 
chess playing, Wittgenstein shows that certain mastery 
and expertise can be achieved only by dealing with 
constraints in practice.
A distinction between a rule and mastery of the rule 
can be illustrated by the metaphor of driving in Russia. 
To drive ‘properly’, one has to mix both formal (traffic 
rules) and informal rules (conventions); to apply them 
as needed in appropriate contexts and to switch fluidly 
between them; and, crucially, to negotiate oneself out of 
trouble if caught. This is apart from struggling to avoid 
the holes in the roads by radical manoeuvres and watching 
others doing the same. In other words, unwritten rules are 
not only about how to follow the rules of the game but also 
about how to break them. They imply that the rules of the 
game are mastered with particular expertise. 
Unwritten rules are the know-how needed to 
‘navigate’ between formal and informal sets of rules and 
between the rules and their enforcement. Without being 
articulated, they ‘prescribe’ which rules to follow in 
which context and ‘set’ the best approach for getting 
things done. Applying one formal rule rather than 
another, using restrictions (quotas, filters, etc.) and small 
print, and enforcing some decisions but not the others 
are examples of how constraints can be mediated. The 
focus of unwritten rules is not on constraints per se, as 
in the case of formal and informal codes, but on the 
enabling aspects of those constraints. To put it more 
bluntly, unwritten rules define the ways of circumventing 
and their multiple subsidiaries, have revolutionised 
practices of ‘give-and-take’ and have provided them with 
a legally amenable form.
All of these phenomena of the new Russian economy 
share an important feature: agents at all levels employ 
practices that have come to be known as extralegal or 
informal. These practices are to a large extent responsible 
for the non-transparency of the ‘rules of the game’ in the 
Russian economy, mainly because they are regulated by 
what is referred to as informal arrangements, unwritten 
codes or unspecified rules. All these are elusive in nature 
and need further clarification.
Unwritten rules
Nobel laureate, economist Douglass North has defined 
institutions as the ‘rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction’.4 ‘They [institutions] are perfectly 
analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team 
sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as 
well as typically unwritten codes of conduct that underlie 
and supplement formal rules, such as not deliberately 
injuring a key player on the opposing team. And as this 
analogy would imply, the rules and informal codes are 
sometimes violated and punishment is enacted. Taken 
together, the formal and informal rules and the type and 
effectiveness of enforcement shape the whole character of 
the game.’ His distinction between formal and informal 
types of constraints has become revolutionary for the 
neo-institutional analysis.
Unwritten rules should not be confused with 
informal constraints. The unwritten rules are not about 
knowing the rules, they are about following the rules. 
Knowing a rule does not imply an ability to follow it, or 
mastery of it, just as knowing a recipe does not assure 
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unpredictable harvests and a generally hostile environment 
– gave rise to a vigorous culture characterised by a specific 
set of traits: caution, calculation, resoluteness, stoicism, 
endurance and, above all, an orientation around survival. 
Over the centuries, Keenan claims, these traits manifested 
themselves in the three distinct but compatible cultural 
settings of medieval Muscovy: the peasant village, 
the court and the bureaucracy. These share certain 
common features which constitute the enduring 
elements of Russian political culture:
 · The operational basis of each setting is informal and 
traditional (lacking a necessary connection between real 
power and formal status)
 · Decision-making is corporate and conspiratorial
 · Stability and risk-avoidance are favoured over innovation 
and progress
 · There is a reluctance to promulgate systematic codified 
law (those who need to know the rules know them)
Keenan suggests that the peasant, court and bureaucratic 
cultures fused during the Soviet period – especially 
since Stalin – in a way that strengthened and purified 
the ‘deep structures’ of Russian society in a modern 
regime: a strong leader and corporate rule (‘grand prince 
and boyars’ became ‘general secretary of Communist 
Party and Politburo’), conspiratorial politics and 
pervasive informality (‘it is more reliable to depend upon 
informal and personal relations than it is to rely upon 
the impersonal legal procedures and institutions that are 
favoured in other societies’).
Keenan’s conclusions about the nature of the Soviet 
system (his analysis predated the end of the USSR) have 
relevance for our examination of the post-Soviet era as 
well. Distant and sceptical attitudes to the law produce a 
fundamental problem of public governance and limit the 
constraints, both formal and informal, of manipulating 
their enforcement to one’s own advantage and of avoiding 
penalties by combining the three elements of the rules of 
the game creatively.
Unwritten rules exist in all societies,5 but 
predominate (and even become indispensable) in 
those where enforcement, formal and informal rules are 
not synchronised and do not constitute coherent rules of 
the game. North shows that when people perceive the 
structure of the rules of the system to be fair and just, 
transaction costs are low and enforcement costs are 
negligible, which helps the efficiency of the economy. 
When people perceive the system to be unjust, the costs 
of transacting go up. In other words, if one cannot follow 
both formal and informal sets of rules coherently, this 
will be reflected in their merger and certain patterns of 
rule-following or unwritten rules. It might be tempting to 
think that unwritten rules are generally disadvantageous 
for the system. This is only true, however, if the rules of 
the game – formal and informal constraints and their 
enforcement – were tied to the public interest and were 
beneficial to economic performance. As this has not 
always been the case in Russia, the impact of unwritten 
rules is rather ambivalent.
Cultural traditions in Russia separate the concept 
of justice from that of formal law, which is grasped 
in a discrepancy in connotations between the terms 
spravedlivost’ (justice) and zakonnost’ (lawfulness). In his 
study ‘Muscovite political folkways’,6 Edward Keenan 
explains such a gap between the informal and the formal 
in terms of political culture. He argues that Russian 
political culture has been strongly influenced over time 
by both the psychological attitudes and the practical, 
adaptive techniques that were developed by the earliest 
Slavic settlers. The conditions of economic and social life 
that faced them – isolation, poor land, a severe climate, 
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time but in a select number of cases. Punishment thus 
becomes a resource in short supply that is distributed 
according to extralegal criteria
 · Unwritten rules come into being to compensate for the 
defects in the rules of the game and to form the basis for 
selective punishment
 · Violation of unwritten rules can result in enforcement of 
written ones, which paradoxically makes it more important 
to observe the unwritten rules than the written 
The latter in turn feeds back into the non-transparency of 
the ‘rules of the game’ in the Russian economy.
I believe that these attributes of the system have not 
changed much during Russia’s transition to a market 
economy. In the same way that the planned economy was 
not really a planned economy and was actually run with 
help of tolkachi (‘pushers’ for the completion of plans 
in industry), blat (use of personal networks for getting 
things done) and other informal arrangements, the 
market economy today is not really a market economy. 
This is due primarily to the key role that unwritten rules 
still play in the system,7 and their Soviet roots.
Open secrets
The common knowledge about the gap between the 
official discourse (planned economy) and the ways 
in which things are done in practice (like tolkachi 
and blat) constitutes a grey area worthy of research. 
Commonplaces and other trivial aspects of day-to-day 
life can sometimes reveal profound features of societies 
and political regimes that are hidden when tackling them 
directly.8 Open secrets of socialism express tensions in 
the relationship between the individual and the political 
regime. The tacit knowledge of open secrets of the Soviet 
regime translates into ‘doublethink’, and the social 
constituency for the effective functioning of the rule of 
law. The disregard of the law is coupled with disregard of 
the state. The state is partly responsible.
Over the course of the 1990s, the public felt betrayed 
by the outcomes of privatisation and placed all the blame 
on state institutions and bureaucrats who found ways to 
prosper while abandoning the general population to its own 
devices. A widespread sense of injustice fuelled the use of 
informal practices. For instance, before recent tax reforms, 
the nominal rates of all taxes often resulted in cumulative 
rates of more than 100 per cent of revenues. Economic 
agents who feel compelled to evade taxes blame the state for 
forcing them into such a position. The state is scapegoated 
as corrupt and incompetent, further diminishing its 
legitimacy and deepening attitudes of civic passivity. When 
taken together with deep-rooted historical legacies, these 
tendencies present serious obstacles to the development 
of the rule of law, a full-fledged democracy and a market 
economy and sustain an arena for unwritten rules.
Thus, there is little prospect of transparency in the 
Russian economy so long as the conditions are in place 
that make the rules of the game in Russia dependent 
upon unwritten rules. Let me summarise the nature of 
such dependency:
 · The ‘rules of the game’ in the economy are non-transparent 
and frequently change, because the existing legal framework 
does not function coherently
 · Anybody can be framed and found guilty of some violation 
of the formal rules, as the economy operates in such a way 
that there is always something to be caught for
 · Due to the pervasiveness of the offence punishment is bound to 
occur selectively on the basis of criteria developed outside 
the legal domain
 · While everybody is under the threat of punishment, the 
actual punishment is ‘suspended’, but can be enforced at any 
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often require explanation for outsiders. The ambiguity 
involved is a real and significant one. There is a tacit 
acceptance that what is known remains in shadows. Open 
secrets occupy areas of tension, where a public affirmation 
of knowledge would threaten other values or goods that 
those involved want to protect. This point is noted in Georg 
Simmel’s celebrated discussion of secrecy, which reveals 
its complexity and subtlety. Simmel defines secrecy as 
‘consciously willed concealment’ – open secrets are clearly 
still secrets according to this definition. Simmel makes the 
point that secrecy is a relative phenomenon, at least as soon 
as it is shared: ‘a secret that two know is never a secret’.9
Goffman takes the idea further by opposing 
diplomatic, official and strategic secrets to secrets 
that are, to various degrees, ‘open secrets’ because of 
everyday familiarity with one another’s doings.10 The 
degree of openness is likely to correspond to the reaction 
when the secret is broken or spoken about. If the knowing 
smile is the likely reaction to bringing up the subject of 
blat, the type of reaction of breaking ‘closed secrets’ or 
‘dark secrets’ – the opposite of open secrets – might be 
rather different.11
Dark secrets are usually confined to very small 
groups bound by strong emotions that effectively 
block what may be ‘known’ yet never admitted to. A 
telling example is provided by the movie, Capturing 
the Friedmans, which deservedly sparked much debate 
when it first appeared. The film has a curious history. 
The filmmaker originally set out to interview one of the 
brothers in the family, who was a very well-known clown 
in New York City. During the course of the interviews, 
it became apparent that more powerful emotional 
dynamics were at work in his family milieu. Subsequent 
long interviews with his brothers, mother and father 
brought to light a history of sexual abuse by the father 
involving young boys in his care (whether he abused 
competence of handling them with a knowing smile.
In the famous folklore definition of the six 
paradoxes of socialism every paradox points to an open 
secret – an informal practice, widespread but hidden 
from outsiders: absenteeism in ‘no unemployment 
but nobody works’; false reporting in ‘nobody works 
but productivity increases’; shortages in ‘productivity 
increases but shops are empty’; blat in ‘shops are empty 
but fridges are full’; unfair privileges in ‘fridges are full 
but nobody is satisfied’; cynicism in ‘nobody is satisfied 
but all vote unanimously’. These practices were not really 
unknown but ‘shameful’ for socialism and therefore 
hidden from the official discourse – thus making them 
its open secrets of socialism.
Belonging and complicity expressed in knowing 
smiles reflect on the key paradox of the totalitarian power 
that generated a ‘Homo Sovieticus’ who has brought it to its 
end. So goes the seventh, post-socialist paradox: ‘all voted 
unanimously but the system has collapsed anyway’.
As a phrase, ‘open secret’ is similar to Torstein 
Veblen’s paradoxical concepts of ‘trained incapacity’, 
‘conspicuous consumption’, ‘trained incapacity’, 
‘business sabotage’ and ‘sagacious restriction of output’, 
in which mutually exclusive parts clash in order to 
create a new meaning. People’s reactions to paradoxes of 
socialism – knowing smiles – are the acknowledgement 
of understanding of such meaning, the meaning of the 
failed purpose.
One might think that an open secret is not a secret at 
all, since it concerns things that ‘everyone knows’, whether 
within a particular group or more widely in a society. This 
view would be a mistake, however, because open secrets 
are only partly open. Open secrets are secrets in the sense 
that they are excluded from formal or official discourse. 
But they are open in the sense that they are familiar and 
referred to in idioms and language games, though these 
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ways in which socialism failed to satisfy individual needs. 
‘Satirised’ images of the Krokodil were acceptable because 
they never targeted the intrinsic failures of the Soviet 
system. Just about every part of everyday life was satirised, 
if not in the controlled discourse of the Krokodil, then in 
anekdot. The failures of the system were out in the open 
but not acknowledged as systemic. They did not appear in 
the proceedings of the Central Committee. That is what 
censorship did – it did not allow the formal admission of 
a failure on the part of the system; one could never come 
to the conclusion that the system that had emerged in the 
Soviet system was intrinsically doomed to failure.14 The 
regime could not exist without people circumventing its 
own declared principles. The regime needed people to take 
care of its systemic defects and to lubricate the rigidities of 
its constraints. But the regime was unwilling to admit it. 
The failures of the Soviet system,15 which all the insiders 
were complicit in reproducing, were its main open secrets, 
satirised, smiled at and… kept!
Thus, on the one hand, blat was a commonplace 
and its instances could make the front page of the 
Krokodil in 1980s (without using the word blat). On 
the other, the political regime keeps its reliance on 
informal practices hidden and shifts the responsibility 
for engaging in informal practices on individuals. The 
Krokodil helped to promote the narrative of the ‘grand 
misrecognition game’: everybody does it (engages in 
informal practices, unofficial discourse, doublethink) 
but it has nothing to do with socialism. Although 
designed to create humour, the Krokodil could not help 
being part of the political repressive machinery designed 
to introduce and reinforce moral/political standards. 
Uncovering a form of politics that pretends to be 
humour reveals new dimensions of symbolic violence.
As a form of controlled critique, the Krokodil 
exercised the power of tension management in a number 
his own sons never became fully clear). All the family 
members seemed aware of what was going on, but the 
issue was never discussed in the domestic context itself, 
only revealed obliquely in the interviews – and in videos 
which the family routinely made of one another.
In contrast, depictions of open secrets in late Soviet 
movies, such as Danelia’s Afonia (1975), Mimino (1977), 
Osennii maraphon (Autumn Marathon, 1979), Riavanov’s 
Ironiia sud’by (The Irony of Fate, 1975), Sluzhebnyi roman 
(An Office Romance, 1977), Garazh (The Garage, 1979) 
and Bortko’s Blondonka za uglom (The Blond Around 
the Corner, 1984), convey attitudes to informal practices 
that are light and playful, even if meant to be corrective.12 
They are ‘satiricised’ rather than genuinely satirical and 
target particular groups that engage in these practices 
themselves. Similarly to the Krokodil images, satirical 
films claim to co-opt Soviet audiences into a stigmatising 
laughter, but at the same time they introduce techniques of 
handling open secrets and define the boundaries of what 
is possible. By the 1980s, understanding of the formal 
(and enabling) nature of constraints and acknowledging 
the possibility of circumventing them became almost 
universal – a variety of know-how was shared by insiders 
of a circle, a group or society as a whole. Depending on 
the reference group, open secrets varied in degree of 
openness. Blat is an example of a widely acknowledged 
open secret (even 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, only seven per cent in an all-Russia national survey 
found it difficult to define blat, in contrast to 27 per cent 
having difficulty in defining telefonnoe pravo (political 
pressure on the judiciary), for example.13
Commonly recognised but rarely registered in 
written sources, apart from their ‘satirised’ or ‘critical in a 
controlled way’ images, inevitably linked with the defects 
of particular individuals rather than attributed with a 
systemic character, these practices testified to various 
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that – the social psychology of the Soviet power and its 
emotional content has never been unpacked or smiled at 
knowingly by researchers.
Knowing smiles
The very question, ‘Why do people smile about 
commonplaces that are strictly speaking neither funny 
nor enjoyable in any obvious way’ may already suggest 
an answer. Just as it is different from the reactions to the 
disclosure of ‘closed secrets’, a knowing smile is different 
from a smile of joy or laughter. Even if reminiscent of the 
Russian literary tradition of ‘laughter through tears’,18 the 
knowing smile is relieved of intense emotions because of 
the mundane nature of blat – the familiarity that brings 
contempt rather than laughter or tears.
I identify a knowing smile as acknowledgement and 
competent mastery of ‘open secrets’. When reciprocated, 
it is a sign of sharing awareness and ability ‘to read 
between the lines’, ‘to see behind the façade’, with some 
complicity in ‘beating the system’ but without shouting 
about the ‘emperor has no clothes’ secret. To put it 
in Simmel’s terms, ‘although at first sight an empty 
form, [a knowing smile] is an excellent symbol of that 
reciprocal apprehension, which is the presumption 
of every social relationship’.19 The ‘emptiness’ of the 
knowing smile may signify the inability to articulate 
tacit knowledge (the actual workings of paradoxes are 
complicated)20 but it enables the reproduction of daily 
interactions without pressure of recognition of one’s own 
compromised behaviour or the failures of the regime. It 
allows people to go on with their everyday lives and helps 
the system to reproduce itself. The ‘emptiness’ of the 
knowing smile is also relevant in the sense that knowing 
smiles in the stagnation period would not be the same 
as a knowing smile under Stalinism – its content is 
of ways. Being the main official publication that refers 
to informal practices, the Krokodil – itself perhaps being 
a form of false reporting – claimed to perform the 
functions of producing Soviet satire, of eradicating social 
ills and of giving a platform for revealing critique and 
self-critique (samokritika) for the system, but could not 
deliver. Officially published and therefore working within 
the boundaries established by the regime, the Krokodil 
was not about satire – it was about the adequate ‘framing’ 
of social ills and their ‘satirisation’ (with an appropriate 
sound association with ‘sanitisation’). By introducing 
themes and boundaries – where, how and what to smile 
at – the Krokodil socialised and educated the Soviet public 
on the matters of everyday life.16 On its pages one can 
see some realities of the 1930s, 1950s, 1980s, but not 
others, and therefore conclude what can be discussed, 
criticised and satirised and what cannot (this function of 
the Krokodil would be similar to satirical publications in 
other societies). While claiming the task of eradication 
of social ills, the Krokodil was engaged in educating the 
public on how to react to certain themes and concerns 
– what could or should be smiled at, and how – it was a 
pedagogical device, like all Soviet mass culture, assisting 
the ‘misrecognition game’ of the regime.17 The ways of 
revealing social ills to the public were also the ways of 
concealment. Most importantly, the Krokodil inverted the 
role that satire has in other societies – to criticise – into 
one that it does not have in other societies – to de-moralise 
people and to make them complicit in the failures of the 
regime. One of the things we still do not know about the 
Soviet system (despite all the academic literature about the 
one party state, the redistributive economy, nomenklatura 
and its pathologies) is the way in which people were made 
to accede to power within the system. It was not just force, 
oppression, or rewards for co-optation or inclusion that 
brought people into that system. There was more to it than 
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implication of dividing us and them, ‘subconsciously 
indicating secret pleasure from co-operation’ between 
us against them. ‘Us’ implies complicity of people in 
the circle who care about each other. ‘Them’ refers 
to the state, strangers, or outsiders, who take care of 
themselves. Such division is representative of what 
Gudkov has referred to as ‘negative identity’.24
Other knowing smiles associated with guilty 
pleasures include the one of the ‘pleasure of doing 
something wrong’, the ‘pleasure of perversion’, 
the ‘pleasure of crossing boundaries in the society 
which is overregulated’. Empowering an individual 
through crossing some boundaries, conscious or 
unconscious, feeds into one of the central themes in 
my study of informal practices – the enabling power of 
constraints. Knowing smiles (audacious, mischievous or 
naughty) can imply active use of constraints; ‘positive 
opportunism’, the experience of turning the weaknesses 
of the system (prokoly sistemy) to one’s advantage, known 
as ‘cheating the state’ or ‘beating the system’, all point to 
satisfaction from a covert system of rewards and abuse of 
state institutions in totalitarian regimes.
Reactions associated with indifference and a weak 
emotional charge – the knowing smiles of ignorance, 
apathy or acceptance – are no less important. Dismissive 
smiles ‘undermine the significance of the issue or 
indicate lack of interest or concern’ while accepting 
smiles ‘can display anything from admission of the 
necessity of blat involved, directly or indirectly’, the 
individual helplessness vis-à-vis the regime, as well as 
the overall acceptance of the ways things are, failure or 
not. Often, the knowing smile is a way of disguising 
ignorance and erroneous associations.25 In such cases, 
the knowing smile is a cover for not understanding the 
processes at work – ‘of course I understand what’s going 
on’ – when in fact this is a form of laziness. Neutral 
contextual and defined by whatever social competence 
may be involved in a particular period.
The meaning of the knowing smile about blat is 
elusive, inevitably defined by period, place and context. 
But personalities and relationships are just as essential 
to interpretations of knowing smiles.21 Now that it is 
possible to ask people to articulate their views on informal 
practices without constraint (just as in the 1950s, those 
who left the Soviet Union were able to describe their blat 
experience in the Harvard Interviewing Project,22 the 
collapse of the Soviet Union has made blat a matter of 
the past and thus enabled people to articulate it), I have 
conducted a number of interviews about knowing smiles 
and ad hoc experiments, testing for the emotions behind 
them, to determine that ‘empty’ signs of competence could 
be emotionally charged in articulation and hide a varying 
degree of personal involvement, or an implicit relationship 
with informal practices. Some emotions were associated 
with knowing smiles about blat much more often than 
others and could be divided into three nominal groups – 
‘positive,’ ‘neutral’ and ‘negative’ – accordingly.
At a very basic level, chats about blat produce a smile 
of linguistic recognition. As was brilliantly grasped by 
Zhvanetskii, ‘only those who belong would understand…’ 
(tol’ko svoi ponimaet kak prinosit’ pol’zu obschestvu vopreki 
ego zhe zakonam). The pleasure of sharing untranslatable 
‘games of words’, behind which, in Zhvanetskii’s satirical 
piece, hide the untranslatable ‘games of deeds’ – what I 
call informal practices – provides a sense of belonging 
to a circle of people who ‘know how’.23 Just as it is a 
pleasure to recognise a foreign idiom or understand a 
joke, it is enjoyable to recognise a native ‘language game’ 
that points to an open secret that might be tricky for a 
foreigner to understand. A knowing smile of belonging 
(‘we are all complicit in our own oppression and in our 
own corruption’) is most common but it also has an 
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The Party intellectual knows in which direction his memories 
must be altered; he therefore knows that he is playing tricks with 
reality; but by the exercise of doublethink he also satisfies himself 
that reality is not violated… [T]he essential act of the Party is to use 
conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose that 
goes with complete honesty… To tell deliberate lies while genuinely 
believing in them… all this is indispensably necessary.29
Taken out of humorous contexts and into the 
everyday workings of society, the knowing smile – 
whether as a sign of recognition, misrecognition or both 
– serves to point out open secrets, tensions or situations 
of moral or logical squeeze, that individuals are forced 
to resolve themselves whether they deny or accept, fight 
or benefit from the existing gap between the official 
story and reality. The inadequacies of the system shifted 
onto the individuals to handle is well illustrated in an 
anekdot. A politburo member is giving a speech about 
industrialisation and 20-storey skyscrapers recently built 
on Karl Marx Street in Kharkov. Suddenly one of the 
listeners interrupts him:
‘Comrade Kalinin, I am from Khar’kov. I walk down that street 
every day, but I have not seen any skyscrapers!’ 
‘Comrade,’ replies Kalinin, ‘instead of loitering on the streets you 
should read newspapers and find out what’s going on in your city’.30
In tune with this folk wisdom, Hannah Arendt 
theorises totalitarian ideologies as those aiming not 
at the transformation of the outside world but at the 
transformation of human nature.31 Yuri Levada’s 
empirically backed analysis results in the idea of  
Homo Sovieticus:
smiles emphasise the openness of open secrets and 
the widespread scale of blat practices but also provide 
an escape route from taking them seriously by turning 
them into a smiling matter. They tackle uncertainty and 
display a passive habit of acceptance, the habitus26 of Homo 
Sovieticus that ensures that one does not articulate or 
even question what the open secret really is about while 
smiling knowingly. Neutral knowing smiles are similar 
to what Goffman identifies as ‘civil inattention’, and are 
thus most functional in signalling and testifying normality 
(‘the unserious nature of practices as opposed to the big 
corruption scandals’) and enable people to ‘go on’.27
Negative knowing smiles are generated by 
emotions associated with embarrassment, shame and 
guilt. These smiles (shifty, awkward, uncomfortable, 
nervous smiles) show involvement and present a way 
of ‘easing out of the situation’ or represent a defence 
mechanism. Defence mechanisms are essential to 
protect one’s positive and altruistic self-image.
All types of knowing smiles have a common 
denominator – social competence of handling open secrets 
and dealing with situations of moral squeeze, regardless 
of expressed attitude or emotional load. Social competence 
embraces tacit knowledge about what is normal, the 
ability ‘to go on’, a skill to turn formal constraints to one’s 
advantage and a capacity to play the ‘doublethink’ game 
in self-defence and in the defence of the system people 
live under. It implies ambivalence about the idea of being 
honest, upright and dedicated to official goals. ‘Someone 
who readily believes whatever official discourse says has 
no independent thought.’28 ‘Independence’, ‘individualism’ 
and ‘civic rights’ in totalitarian societies are channelled 
through ‘distance’, ‘doublethink’ and ‘double-deed’. In his 
classic novel 1984, George Orwell defines doublethink as 
‘the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s 
mind simultaneously’.
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smiles actually serve to de-moralise people and not 
to allow one to moralise. Individual dependence is 
replicated at societal level, where the political and the 
economic system are dependent on informal practices 
in their inner workings.36 In his 2001 analysis, Levada 
phrases it sharply and suggests little change for the 
Homo Post-Sovieticus.
At the individual level, the whole system of deals made with the 
state, which was intrinsic to the Soviet arrangement, inevitably led 
to moral corruption, the acceptance of sham, the padding of figures, 
string pulling, bribery, and doublethink. These conditions were 
necessary if society and the economy were to function. The collapse 
of the Soviet system did not introduce anything fundamentally new; 
it only eliminated the social and institutional (punitive) regulators 
that had limited the effect of the corrupting mechanisms.37
Following Goffman’s methodology, one should 
suggest that the system will change when people stop 
smiling knowingly at references such as blat and other 
unwritten rules still propping up the existing regime. 
Levada’s survey data are revealing in this respect.38
In conclusion, I must emphasise that smiling at 
open secrets is a universal practice, not restricted 
to the Soviet doublethink or even to its post-Soviet 
reincarnation. Due to the inherent duality of informal 
practices and their paradoxical role in subverting 
the formal systems which they penetrate and exploit 
but also support,39 they find their uses in post-Soviet 
contexts and in other societies that feature a gap 
between the official and the unofficial. People do not 
have to live under the Soviet system to smile at the 
anekdot of its six paradoxes above. The context of telling 
an anekdot prepares one for smiling and provokes a 
smile of recognition of a different kind, not necessarily 
of familiarity with the reality of socialism but of an 
The Soviet experiment produced not so much a new human type as 
an individual who was wholly adapted to Soviet reality, one willing 
to accept it as a given, with no alternative. A society that was closed 
on all sides, even from its own historical reality, raised generations 
who could not imagine any way of life except the one they were given. 
The lack of alternatives turned the universal practice of adaptation 
into a habit, a mass behavioral structure that was neither dissected 
nor subject to analysis.32
The near ubiquitous exchange of ‘knowing 
smiles’ in everyday contexts is exactly that behavioural 
structure that, up to now, has escaped dissection and 
analysis. Yet it is the basis of normality and routine 
interaction that is so fundamental for the modus 
operandi in societies according to Goffman.33 The 
function of knowing smiles is that, by dismissing 
their importance and by accepting commonplaces 
that rule out reflection upon them, they reproduce 
unwritten rules and open secrets and thus the system 
of power based on everybody’s complicity in it. In other 
words, smiling at open secrets is allowing them to go 
unchallenged. Knowing smiles are an integral part 
of maintaining the yawning gap between the official 
discourse of the political regime and the unwritten 
rules it relies on. One is forced to keep open secrets 
a secret while also following the unwritten rules and 
engaging in informal practices that bridge the gaps 
between formal constraints of the regime and its 
informal impositions. Such an engagement makes one 
the insider of the system but also makes one complicit 
and fundamentally dependent on the regime. One is 
forced to put oneself in a compromised position and 
to apply self-control under the ‘system of suspended 
punishment’, only applied ‘where necessary’.34 
The system makes people complicit in their own 
demoralisation and their own corruption.35 Knowing 
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elegant unfolding of paradoxes or by proxy of one’s own 
experiences. The manipulative use of the formal rules 
and using them to one’s own personal advantage may 
be particularly strong in repressive systems but is not 
limited to them. This is illustrated by the studies of 
corruption and rent-seeking behaviour in the Middle 
East, Latin American and African resource-rich 
economies, as well as in the recent analyses of the 2008 
sub-prime crisis elsewhere.
It is not the wrong-doing but the reaction to 
it that often determines the difference between 
societies. Although there might be some cross-cultural 
recognition and smiling at the subject matters of blat 
and corruption, there is a great deal of serious public 
awareness, academic interest and policy concern in the 
UK and the US, Finland and Norway.
Given the importance of personal background and 
experience in producing knowing smiles, one might 
imagine that changes in bringing up and educating 
younger generations will lead to the evaporation 
of Soviet-style practices. To date, the legitimacy of 
informal practices among the younger generations 
in Russia suggests otherwise. Levada’s data suggest 
that the legacy of the ‘doublethink’ is still relevant. 
Thus, groups under 40 find evasion of military 
service justified: the youngest respondents, directly 
subject to conscription, are more than twice as likely 
to justify draft evasion as to condemn it.40 Future 
knowing smiles, competence in unwritten rules and 
the doublethink on civic duty are thus set in motion. 
Unless such open secrets are articulated, explained 
or integrated into policies and cultural exchange, the 
fundamental non-transparency of societies is not going 
to diminish.41
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From Otherness to Ideology
Hamid Ismailov
Once Khodja Nasreddin, a folkloric hero of Oriental  
people, went abroad and when he was asked by a passerby:  
‘Is today a night of a full moon, because as you see the moon  
is full in the sky?’ – he replied: ‘Sorry, I’m a stranger in this 
city, so I don’t know…’
As an Oriental writer I spend the majority of my 
time and maybe efforts describing that ‘otherness’ or 
the particularities of mentality, and specifics of outlook 
of the Uzbeks, or Russians, or Soviets, or strangers in 
the West, so it’s not a strange theme for me at all. So 
here is an article about so-called ‘Uzbekness’, which was 
written in 1989 while Uzbekistan was still part of the 
Soviet Union. It’s useful to see also how this ‘Uzbekness’ 
of Uzbeks is changing or has changed in the 20 years 
which have passed since the article was written. In the 
second part of the paper I try to analyse how the concept 
of ‘Uzbekness’ was put as a cornerstone of the new state 
ideology and how the Uzbek authorities used its different 
parts for their political and pragmatic ends in different 
spheres of social life. Many of these observations could 
be applied not just to Uzbeks but also to their neighbours 
in Central Asia, though the ‘otherness’ of every ethnicity 
or nation in Central Asia and post-Soviet territories may 
differ from each other.
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guzars. The world is the Family and vice versa. This is what 
the Uzbek expects to see when he opens his eyes. But he 
finds he is in a bezhik (wooden cradle) bound hand and foot, 
and rocking violently. This initial commotion imprints itself 
to persist in his swaddled conscience for the rest of his life.
In the Family, Grandfather is the head, Grandmother 
controls, Father provides, Mother feeds, Brothers protect, 
Sisters foster, the Home stands, the Child grows. 
Generation follows generation and life builds up in the 
manner of Uzbek words – from the root upwards, to 
infinity.
The decay of the Home and the Family began long 
before we passed from the feudal to the socialist patriarchal 
home. In his novel, Night and Day, Abdulhamid Chulpon, 
a great Uzbek writer of the twentieth century, shows the 
stages of this destruction: the traditional house – house of 
rendez-vous – house of prostitution.
In many works, his counterparts Mahmudhodja 
Bekhbudi and Abdurauf Fitrat argued that patriarchal 
Uzbek life must be disrupted from within. The latter 
even believed that all our ills derived from the pillars of 
patriarchal family life: the desire to identify or replicate 
the social life with the family one and to observe etiquette. 
Be that as it may, the Home is falling, Accord is about to 
crumble, the Family is on the brink of decay – but we still 
have a long way to go to the end of the Uzbek sentence. 
We’ve just begun.
2
The Child grows and one day it takes its first steps, and 
at the very start of the Road it discovers a Garden. The 
World is like a Garden – this is what the Uzbek lives 
for in the midst of the two giant Deserts in the Oasis 
he has created. His language is a Garden of Words, his 
art a Garden of Ornaments, his philosophy a Garden of 
Contemplation, his paradise is a Garden with a River.
Uzbekness, 1989
Who are we, Uzbeks, and what do we think of the world?
In Uzbek the words and their order would have been: 
‘We, Uzbeks, who are we and of the world what do we 
think?’ The sentence reflects a fragment of the language 
system. The verb (action) comes last, after those 
concerned and their misadventures have been described 
and all the other words said. Not until the end of the 
utterance can one tell whether what is being said is a 
question or a negation. There is also no morphological 
distinction of gender – a grammatical feature peculiarly 
echoed in Uzbek men’s complete disregard for woman 
(the veil for them!). However, with today’s equal rights, 
she has fully replaced him in the cotton fields. Besides, 
Uzbek word-building is agglutinative and progressive; 
words grow with assiduous consistency, like trees – from 
the roots upwards.
Such, in outline, is the Logos of the Uzbeks. When 
my friend, a French poet Jean-Pierre Balpe, saw today’s 
life of the scions of the great thinkers and conquerors like 
Beruni, Timur, Al Khoresmi, Babur, Navoi and Ulugbek, 
he said patience was the first feature of the Uzbek 
character and also its last.
We too shall patiently traverse the Road of the Uzbek 
Cosmos, but let us first deal with the small things.
1
An Uzbek legend begins: ‘In the land of the Body, ruled by 
Reason and Love, a child was born, and was called Heart.’ 
For the Uzbek the world begins as Home, Accord, and 
Family. Family means accord in the home and home in 
accord. The Uzbek homes in a makhallya, or a guzar, stand 
shoulder to shoulder as in a line of defence. The makhallya 
(also sometimes called guzar) is a family of homes with 
its own hierarchy and ethics, the foundation of peace and 
accord. The kishlak, or city, is a family of makhallyas and 
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circumcision feast awaits him when he is back; the send-
off feast when the boy leaves for the army; the kaitish feast 
to welcome him back home. (By the way, in accordance 
with the non-existent linguistic feminine gender there’s 
nothing similar for girls). Marriage is a sequence of small, 
larger and great feasts – the wedding ceremony. ‘When the 
Uzbek grows rich, he builds a house and calls a feast’, says 
the proverb, though this is not quite correct. The Uzbek 
will put a feast together even if he has been robbed of his 
last coin and his last shirt.
The vision of the world as a feast is profoundly 
philosophical. We are all guests here, but unfortunately, 
it has not been ordained that we see the Host. Ah, to 
take the Host’s place for a moment! Can there be greater 
bliss? And are any meats too good for the guests in this 
fleeting world?
Have you ever been to an Uzbek wedding? Songs, 
askiya (competition of wits), performers – all passers-by 
welcome. But the host is always in the background. Modesty 
will never permit showing off. His business is to arrange 
the feast, for there will always be others to manage it.
This situation is quite similar to what we had seen 
often in Soviet times: a ‘limited contingent of leaders’ 
hailed from Moscow to popular gatherings, with 
packages of ‘justice and honesty’ and a conductor’s baton 
to direct the national instruments.
However, Uzbeks say ‘a guest is dearer than 
one’s father’ and will sooner give up a parent’s life 
than hurt a guest’s feelings. An Uzbek writer of the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Makhmud-khodja 
Bekhbudi, speaks of this in his play Patricide, as does 
contemporary poet Khurschid Davron, in his poem 
of the same title. It reminds us of the readiness to 
renounce religion, customs, script, and to forget our 
origins for the sake of etiquette.
But the feast goes on.
Uzbekness
There’s no Home without a Garden, no Family without 
Children. To plant and to grow a tree is tantamount to 
giving birth to and fostering a child. The field is the exile 
of the garden, cotton its imprisonment.
Over the last century, after invasion by Russia in 
1864, the area of the fields under cotton increased almost 
hundred-fold, as did the yields. Over the last 15 years, the 
areas allotted to gardens have shrunk to one-fifteenth of 
what they were – and today make up a mere one per cent 
of the arable lands of Uzbekistan.
Therefore, the Garden World is rather a Dreamland 
Garden. Actually, today the Uzbek sees the world as 
cotton. His language is technical cotton, his art its chaff, 
his philosophy: ‘cotton is the pride of the nation’, even his 
football team is Pakhtakor (Cotton-picker).
Two decades ago a famous Uzbek poet, Abdullah 
Aripov, appealed to the Uzbek to stand straight and take 
at least one look at the stars. Ten years ago another poet, 
Shavkat Rahmon, adjured the dwarf-tree itself to grow taller 
and bitterly surmised that spines could no longer unbend.
Today, the Aral Sea is drying up, the land salinating 
and turning into deserts, people are being poisoned 
(some figures of USSR Ministry of Public Health said the 
pesticide content in food has increased by 26 per cent). 
But the heraldic cotton-boll reigns supreme, shielding 
contemporary slavery from the eye with its whiteness. 
Meanwhile, discussions and sessions ramble on, as we 
continue formulating the Uzbek sentence, in which the 
verb (action), as we know, comes last.
3
The currently oft-referred-to expression, ‘feast in the 
midst of a plague’, is of British origin; but it is made for 
the Uzbek. Nothing can overcome his craving for the 
feast, or toi. The Child is hardly out in the Garden when 
the event is joyously celebrated in the cradle feast. The 
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Thus, set off by the rocking cradle, life in the 
chaihana moves or stands still in a tangle of the tragic 
and the ridiculous. Remember Roman Yakobson: ‘An 
utterance centred on itself breeds a poetic function 
in the language.’ In much the same way, communion 
centred on, and concerned with, itself is the chaihana. 
Hence the abundance of poets in ancient Herat and 
contemporary Uzbekistan.
5
All the above is but one scale in the balance of truth. The 
other is, of course, the Bazaar. An outstanding Uzbek 
writer and a poet of the twentieth century Gafur Gulyam’s 
most Uzbek work, ‘The Mischief-Maker’, shows that 
the path of the Uzbek proceeds from and returns to the 
Bazaar. He is an habitué of the Bazaar, which may easily 
cause the delusion that he is a profiteer. This is not so.
Today he only sells what he has harvested himself. 
He wouldn’t be able to buy fruit and vegetables 
even if he did want to make a profit on reselling. In 
Tashkent, a kilogram of apples costs six to eight rubles, 
in Moscow two to three rubles (NB Soviet prices of 
1989). One needn’t be a Marxist to understand that 
trade is an agreement, just and equitable. On it rests 
civil law, and hence the civic society we are to become. 
Marx’s commodity exchange theory is, for the Uzbek, 
nothing but materialised communication. Therefore, 
communication is intellectual exchange – exchange of 
information. Consequently, he is as fully justified in his 
formula, ‘The world is a bazaar’, as the Russian in his, 
‘The world is bedlam’.
Trade is always an equation which brings extremes 
together (‘a newspaper article equals 1.5 ladies’ boots’ or 
‘159 strokes of the weeding blade equal one kopeck’).
But Marx warned that value relations were between 
people, not commodities. A case in point:
Uzbekness
4
There is a more quiet, ‘gastronomical’ version of the feast 
– the chaihana, or tea house (a Central Asian analogue of 
the pub); no obligations, no involvement.
A few kopecks to pay for the tea, an onion to go with 
the shared pilav, and one can ponder to one’s heart’s 
content the burdens and vanity of life hearkening to Khodja 
Nasreddin’s anecdotes in the company of one’s peers.
Afandi lost his purse and told his wife everyone was losing 
purses at the bazaar today.
‘Did you lose yours?’ she asked. ‘Yes. I was the first.’
Uzbeks like to laugh and poke fun, and they will spare 
no one, not even themselves. To witness a contest of 
wits, one need not travel to a special festival – suffice it 
to enter any chaihana. They make fun of each other and 
of themselves, and in this way gradually overcome and 
sublimate the ancient belligerence of the steppe, as well 
as today’s propensity to speak subversively. The famed 
epic, Baburnameh, by the founder of the Great Mogul 
empire, provides an excellent example of this disregard 
for authority in humour:
While at a game of chess, a famous Uzbek poet of the 15th century, 
Alisher Navoi, stretched his leg out. It touched his counterpart Binoi’s 
bottom. Navoi said, ‘You can’t stretch out a leg in Herat without touch-
ing a poet’s bottom.’ Binoi answered, ‘It’s the same if you fold it under.’
Speaking of poets. Rocked from side to side, since 
the cradle, from their very birth, these wits and quipsters 
write poetry and songs of such profound sorrow that, 
with the same Abdullah Aripov, one wonders: ‘If the 
song about this life is so impossibly sorrowful, how then 
could men endure the sorrow of life itself?’
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Alas, trade is always controlled by the buyer. One of 
the most important junctions of the Great Silk Route and 
the most ancient centre of world trade is currently in a 
state of paralysis. Indeed, who else sells cotton at half the 
world price? At a price that does not reflect those dried 
up seas and rivers, the 54 kilos of pesticides per hectare, 
the annual 300,000 cases of hepatitis, the 42,000 
annually incapacitated, and the 82,000 born mentally 
handicapped (NB Figures of 1989). Some profiteers, 
these Uzbeks! They can’t even trade properly today. 
They’ve forgotten how, have been made to forget. The 
same in all things, not only the bazaar.
6
Can the Uzbek’s world be regarded as the world of the 
Great Mosque? Or, in other words, is it based on the idea 
of council, or assembly – what is known as sobornost in 
Russian? Is there an ‘Uzbek idea’ as such? To what extent 
does Islam cover what we spoke of above? After all, much 
of this also applies, say, to the Tadjiks.
The question would have been out of place before 
1917. In Chulpon’s novel, Night and Day, a mullah and 
a jaded or a reformist argue about ‘nation’. The mullah 
says that for a true believer his nation is Islam, and 
when asked about his nationality he should reply, 
‘Ibrahim Halilullakh’, which means, ‘I’m from the 
nation of Abraham’.
Theoretically, the Uzbek idea has always been part 
of the broad context of Islamic and/or Turkic unity. 
Later this idea acquired – not without outside help – the 
tinge of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. Clearly, the 
addition of ‘pan’, which replaced the idea of unity with 
the threat of world conquest, was neither theoretically 
nor practically justified, whereas the idea of unification 
has as much right to existence as the idea of Pan-
Americanism or a common European home.
Uzbekness
‘Where do you grow your pomegranates, old man?’
‘Kuva. No better place in the world for pomegranates!’
‘So you’re from Kuva? Where do you live?’
‘Finkelstein’s plot.’
‘Then you must know Tolib the butcher, son of Ruzvan-bibi?’ 
‘Sure, I buy meat from him every day.’
‘Tell him you saw me – and all the best cuts are yours.’ (Putting 
aside the best pomegranates) ‘You and I are almost relatives, then. 
I’m not asking the price – here, three rubles. I’m off home. My kids 
adore pomegranates.’
‘Hey, what’s your name?’
Here is another.
‘How much are your dried apricots?’
‘Three rubles.’
‘How about three kilos for eight rubles?’
‘Agreed.’
‘Then five kilos for twelve, or six for fourteen, or rather eight for six-
teen, even nine for seventeen. Could you weigh them by the kilo?… 
Good. Here’s the first 1.5. On second thought, one kilo will do. I’ll go 
see what other people have to offer.’
‘Phew, thank Allah, he’s gone.’
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are all within you and such is your destiny.’ I’d suggest 
the ghazal as the epitaph for our hero’s gravestone.
Let us now consider ‘the world as an Assembly’. 
A great Uzbek writer of the twentieth century, Abdullah 
Kadyri’s Days Gone By, the most Uzbek of all books (the 
first novel of the Kadyri school), is essentially a sequence 
of assemblies of varied nature and composition. This 
feature determines the novel’s form.
The Uzbeks still have the tradition of the ‘assembly 
of the refined’ – both among men and among women. It 
is called gap (‘word’, ‘dialogue’). These are the gatherings 
where friends discuss poetry or arts, music or books and 
also entertain themselves with nice music, dances, food. 
Thus do Uzbek Logos and Psyche draw together. If one 
is consistent (Uzbek-wise) and returns to what caused 
this assembly of assemblies, then one can assume that 
the proposed Cosmos–Psyche–Logos can be narrowed or 
expanded (Eros, Ethos, etc.). However, just as the author 
is judged only by the laws of his own work, ethnoses 
can adhere to their own hierarchies of universalia, 
their understanding of the world can derive from their 
own notions of it, and they can count on being able to 
structure life in their own likeness.
The sacred Thought–Word–Action sequence 
proclaimed by Zoroaster, who lived where we live today, 
meticulously collected and drew in, before the final 
Action, a multitude of various Thoughts and Words. 
Today’s collection (assembly), blending Islam and 
vulgarised Marxism, Zoroastrian deification of entirety 
and Nils Bohr’s principle of complementarity, ideas of 
perestroika and the nomad tribe’s love of freedom, etc. – this 
assembly, or collection, is the Field of his Lot, not of Destiny, 
and on this Lot today’s Uzbek rushes around. The Place of 
Judgment between Hades and Paradise is called Arosat. 
Arosatda kolmok (‘to be stranded in Arosat’) signifies 
unresolvable intermediacy, perennial hesitation, a certain 
Uzbekness
By ‘outside help’ I do not refer to the remote 
1917, when 26-year-old Fyodor Kolesov brought down 
Turkestan’s first democracy, the coalition government of 
the Turkestan Autonomy, which had been proclaimed 
by the region’s Muslim assembly. It was made up 
of representatives of local Muslims (95 per cent of 
the population) and of all the European parties and 
movements – from Zionists to Dashnaktsutyunites 
(Armenian nationalist party). The ‘help’ in question is 
the division by Russia’s Council for Religious Affairs of 
the Central Asian Muslim Board and that of Kazakhstan. 
To follow that line of reasoning, one can expect the 
opening of a Karakalpakian Directorate as compensation 
for the dried-up Aral. This, naturally, to meet the desires 
of the working faithful.
It is characteristic of the Uzbek to move forwards 
with his face turned backwards. Similarly, our hero, 
finding himself in the mosque and looking into the 
past, would have to admit that Turkestan’s Islam had its 
own deep and independent traditions. Suffice it to recall 
the great theologians Imam Bukhari, Imam Termesi, 
Burkhanitdin Marginoni, and the founders of the major 
orders of Sufism: Nadjimiddin Kubro of Kubravia, 
Ahmad Yassavi of Yassavia, and Bakhoutdin Nakshbandi 
of Nakshbandia.
A need unfilled keeps thought on the move and, as 
he thinks of the future, the Uzbek is in a state of perennial 
intermediacy, assigned to him as his main idea.
7
Alisher Navoi has a wonderful ghazal. In it he queries 
his Soul: where does his mortal suffering come from? 
The Soul blames the Body, the Body blames the Heart, 
the Heart accuses the Mind, etc… etc. Finally the poet 
exclaims, ‘Each has claimed it is not involved and gained 
pardon. Therefore, suffer till the hour of death, for they 
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just because of the Uzbek authorities’ U-turn. After these 
preliminary and rather schematic arguments, it’s easier 
to refer to what happens in the ideological sphere of the 
now independent and sovereign Uzbekistan.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has 
given such an unexpected independence to Uzbekistan, 
as well as other Central Asian republics, the key concept 
of identity, around which the new state was meant to 
be built, was the notion of Mustakillik – Independence. 
At the same time, in the ideological sphere after the 
discreditation of the Communist ideology, another key 
concept – Uzbekchilik, or Uzbekness – has been steadily 
introduced and a new ideology has evolved around this 
concept. Therefore it is interesting to relate this concept 
to various aspects of life in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan.
Uzbekness and the President
Now it is easy to explain why I have started from that 
relationship. The President himself has inherited the 
ideology of Uzbekness largely from the first informal 
grassroots movements of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika 
era – ‘Birlik’, ‘Erk’ and others, which were recently crushed 
as oppositional by the President himself. In turn, these 
national–democratic organisations have learned and, to 
some extent, developed the idea of Uzbekness from the 
Jadids –  the liberal-reformist Islamist movement of the 
beginning of twentieth century.
(The Institute of Strategic Studies under the 
President quite ‘scientifically’ determines Uzbekness 
as: ‘a concrete reflection of national character and spirit 
of the common people, as expressed in moral and 
spiritual values, cultural heritage, historical continuity 
of generations and implemented in specific forms of 
tradition’.) The President himself, in his book Uzbekistan 
on the Threshold of the 21st Century, calls the resurgence 
of spiritual values and national identity the main 
Uzbekness
congenital unpredictability, an abruptly discontinued 
Uzbek sentence. The only way for our hero to leave 
Arosat is to arrive at the Verb. He’ll either be dead and in 
Paradise or alive and in today’s Hell, where only the Fire 
of the scorching sun and of his burning heart is eternal 
and immutable – since Water is gone, Earth killed by 
pesticides, and Air poisoned by chemical waste.
Where should the Uzbek turn his steps – where 
among the spiralling circle of stellar assemblies, 
glittering like cotton, like tears, like sand? This Cosmic 
question blends with the age-long query: ‘Or should he 
stand still forever…?’
From otherness to ideology
Writing about Uzbekistan, and especially about its 
‘otherness’, is easy and difficult at the same time. Easy 
because, as in any country with a super-authoritarian 
rule, only the preferences, beliefs, knowledge and ideas 
of the state head – the President – play a role. At the same 
time it’s difficult because, as in the case of an iceberg, 
everything else of importance lies under the thick layers 
of water. Because of this paradox, Uzbekistan is a country 
which is predictable and unpredictable at the same time. 
Predictable in the sense that you are able to calculate 
the President’s direction, meaning that you are able to 
guess where this very traditional, patriarchally organised, 
monolithic-conformist society is moving. The most 
obvious example is the outcome of two votes in 1992 on 
the preservation of the Soviet Union. At the beginning 
of the year, in a referendum organised by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, then still in power, over 95 per cent of 
Uzbekistan’s population voted for the preservation of the 
USSR, since the leadership of Uzbekistan was for it; and 
at the end of the same year the same percentage of the 
population voted for independence and sovereignty, again 
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Uzbekness and history
Uzbekistan first appeared on the world map under its 
current name in 1924 after the Leninist–Stalinist national 
demarcation, which followed the creation of new socialist 
nations. Prior to that, Central Asia was respectively 
configured according to the power of a ruler or conqueror. 
Before the Russian conquest of that territory in the late 
nineteenth century, the Uzbek territory consisted of 
two Khanates and one Emirate (kingdoms). This fact in 
particular explains the diversity of ethnic identifications 
in certain parts of Uzbekistan at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Since gaining independence, when 
the concept of a socialist nation was cut at its root, it was 
necessary to look deeper than the length of 70 years. On 
the one hand, historians have been mobilised to create a 
new history of the Uzbek people, stretching back two and 
a half thousand years. The first sign of a new historical 
view was an article by two academics, challenging the 
fact of Uzbeks deriving from Turkic origins. On the other 
hand the Uzbek historiography, headed by the President 
himself, started to build up a new emblematic figure, 
similar to what Lenin was to the Soviet ideology. As an 
emblem of the new Uzbek independent nation the new 
historians chose a medieval ruler and conqueror, Amir 
Timur, or Tamerlane, known to the West since the days 
of Christopher Marlowe. It was him, and not, let’s say, 
Sheibani Khan, who brought the very ethnonym Uzbek to 
these parts of the Golden Horde in the fifteenth century, 
who was chosen as the key figure.
The capital of his vast Empire, stretching from 
India to Syria was Samarkand, the city where President 
Karimov himself was born. And yet, ethnically belonging 
to the Turkised Mongol Barlas tribe, Amir Timur could 
not be plotted on any of the above graphs, and therefore 
could be accepted by all sub-ethnicities. In addition, as 
a hard ruler he would have legitimised the authoritarian 
Uzbekness
precondition for stability and a guarantee of progress. 
Though the interpretation of the conditions of stability 
and guarantees of progress by the President, as they are 
reflected in his activities, is quite ambiguous: he turns 
one face towards the Uzbek domestic consumers, being 
not shy to appear in front of the indigenous nation as 
an inveterate nationalist; at the same time he is quite 
different towards the external audiences, as well as 
towards the internal Russian-speaking minority, talking 
about tolerance and international harmony.
Uzbekness and Uzbeks
It would be incorrect to assume that the revival of the 
Uzbekness ideology is only the whim of the President. 
It is rather a product of the president’s awareness of 
the reality itself. After all, the reality, calling itself 
now ‘the Uzbeks’ (about 20 million people just in 
Uzbekistan) consists of parts that have self-identified 
themselves 80 years ago as completely separate ethnic 
units. At the beginning of the twentieth century and 
before the creation of the ‘Uzbek’ socialist nation, there 
were disputes on how to name it. Among the options 
discussed were the names of Turks, Sarts, Kipchaks, 
Muslim, and finally Uzbek. In pre-revolutionary 
encyclopaedias for example the number of Sarts in 
Turkestan was 2.5 million, while the Uzbeks were only 
1.5 million. And even now Uzbekistan can be divided 
into at least six ethnic–cultural habitats: Ferghana, 
Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Kashkadarya–Surkhan 
and Khorezm, not counting the Karakalpakstan 
Autonomous Republic, the inhabitants of which differ 
widely in their understanding and implementation of 
Uzbekness. Hence there is the notorious parochialism, 
nepotism and cronyism, which play a significant role 
not only in the organisation of society, but in the power 
structure, and in its ideology.
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appeals at the end to the Creator, the Almighty, with 
the request of support and patronage. And on the other 
hand, under his rule, rather than even during the Soviet 
atheistic times, dozens of thousands of clergymen or 
just ordinary Muslims were thrown into prison on false 
charges of possession of drugs or weapons, or expelled 
from the country. The so-called fight against Islamic 
extremism, fundamentalism and Wahhabism is one 
of the favourite bogeys of the Uzbek leader, willingly 
portraying himself as the sole bulwark opposing the 
Islamic onslaught from the South.
However, there are features in Islam which the 
leadership of Uzbekistan love and even include into 
the Code of Uzbekness, and above all, these are: 
monotheism, with a practical distillation of unity of 
command, and obedience to God, with the earthly 
equivalent of obedience to authority. President Karimov 
emphasises in his wise sayings that the communal 
Islamic character of Uzbeks is their invaluable quality 
in the eyes of the leadership.
Uzbekness and community
The very communal character of Uzbek life in a 
traditional Uzbek makhallya (neighbourhood) was 
chosen by the leadership of Uzbekistan as a basis of 
social organisation of the population. The phenomenon 
of modern Uzbekistan’s makhallya became one of the 
most fashionable topics for Western academic research. 
Branches of self-government, which are increasingly 
used as transmission belts of government and ideology, 
penetrate to the lowest level – makhallyas; on the 
other hand, makhallyas, for example in the old town 
of Tashkent, were regarded as the citadels of religious 
opposition to the authorities, and therefore many 
of them were demolished and their population was 
scattered in urban areas.
Uzbekness
power of the President of the newly independent 
state. And finally, as the subject of attacks by Russian 
historiography, he became a key figure in the new anti-
Russian, anti-Soviet history. In the book of wise sayings 
of President Karimov, which was published recently, 
none of the historical figures feature to the same extent 
as Amir Timur.
Uzbekness and development models
The great historical past is considered in Uzbekistan 
as a basis for the great future. ‘Uzbekistan is a country 
with a great future,’ says one of the most famous 
slogans of the Uzbek President. In choosing that future 
the President was flexible enough in the first years of 
independence, when he used to propose alternative models 
of development initially of Turkey, then South Korea, then 
Japan, and afterwards of China, parallel to his visits to 
those countries; and this gave enough food for his few 
critics beyond the borders of Uzbekistan. In the end, in 
one of his books the President proclaimed that Uzbekistan 
has its own way of development and progress, and by 
doing that he actually stimulated the development of the 
Uzbekness concept as a nation-state ideology.
Uzbekness and Islam
By creating the ideology of Uzbekness, of course, it 
is impossible to circumvent such an ideologically 
significant element of Uzbek consciousness and life 
as Islam. The same double standard of behaviour that 
differentiates the internal and external audiences is 
characteristic of Uzbek leadership in relation to Islam. 
On one hand the President not only took his Presidential 
oath on the Constitution and the Koran, but also visited 
the holiest place of the Muslims – the Kaaba in Mecca, 
an honour which is received by a rare Muslim. In nearly 
every speech which the President delivers in Uzbek, he 
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under the auspices of the President, several bodies were 
established to develop and promote a new ideology of 
Uzbekness, such as the magazines Tafakkur (Thinking) 
and Mulokot (Dialogue), etc.
Uzbekness and literature
As in any traditional society it is literature which has 
played the role of public consciousness in Uzbekistan 
and the same literature primarily prepared the ground 
for the creation of the Uzbekness ideology. However, 
after this ideology had been adopted by the state, 
Uzbek literature found itself in disarray. Shrewder 
were those writers and poets who wrote in Soviet times 
poems and novels about the Party and Lenin; in fact, 
according to the new ideology, it has been sufficient 
to replace the Party with the Nation, and Lenin with 
Amir Timur, or at worst with the President, and this 
literature was in demand. It was more difficult for 
the writers and poets of a literary–nationalist streak 
combined with dissidence which grew during the 
Soviet era. The subject of their dissidence has now 
become a state ideology, and therefore some of them 
were recruited from the opposition to the current 
ruling party, publishing books such as Feeling of a 
Motherland or An Encyclopaedia of Uzbekness; but 
another few, for whom the literature was higher than 
the current politics, were forced to emigrate or go into 
internal exile.
Uzbekness and education
If any segment of the population is able to absorb the new 
ideology and master it as the original one, it is of course 
children and youth. And since nearly half the population 
of Uzbekistan falls into this category, it is clear that one 
of the first acts of leadership in the sphere of ideology was 
reforming the education system. The education system 
Uzbekness
Uzbekness and spirituality
In spite of its ideological seeds, planted in the early years of 
independence, the process of creating and implementing 
Uzbekness pursued more utilitarian and pragmatic goals 
and, in general, repeated the Communist totalitarian 
system of ideological governance. So, now in Uzbekistan 
the process of creating Centres of Spirituality and 
Enlightenment from top to bottom is taking place. These 
are sorts of political departments in the administrative, 
industrial and public education sectors. If you replace, 
let’s say, the emblematic figure of Lenin by Amir Timur, 
or the idea of Communism by the idea of a free market, 
the philosophy of dialectical materialism by the Tasawwuf 
or Sufism, etc., the function of these elements in society 
and the state remain essentially the same. The essence of 
them is the ideology of total control from top to bottom. 
However, as it were, a national audit of spirituality has 
eliminated or sterilised public institutions which were 
in the forefront of Gorbachev’s perestroika, such as the 
Writers’ Union, social movements Birlik, Erk, Tumaris 
and independent student organisations.
Uzbekness and the media
The Soviet style of relation towards the media is also 
characteristic of the relations between the authorities 
and the Uzbek media. Freedom of speech, declared 
by the Constitution, by several laws on freedom of 
journalism and even by the Law on abolishment of 
censorship is, as the Communist phraseology goes, ‘a 
paper tiger’. Media subsidised by the state, in addition 
to a strict political censorship, are also under the yoke of 
economic censorship. Papers of opposition movements 
have been closed and now from time to time publish 
a very limited circulation from abroad; the so-called 
independent press within the country is also under 
the strict control of the system. On the other hand, 
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Uzbekness and the West
Our previous reflections show that Uzbekness is a 
concept used and abused by the Uzbek authorities 
for their political or pragmatic ends. We talked about 
internal and external consumers for whom this concept 
is designed. Thus, in their relationship with the West, 
the Uzbek authorities have learned how to use their 
‘otherness’, expressed through Uzbekness, on many 
fronts. For example, when it comes to the need for the 
democratisation of society, or political reforms, or human 
rights, the Uzbek authorities usually bring the argument 
that the people of Uzbekistan are not yet ready for these 
changes because of local traditions. The same authorities 
are very quick in their own adaptation of some features 
of Western civilisation, when it comes to villas, yachts, 
football clubs or fashion shows, but for the rest of the 
people there’s an imperative of Uzbekness.
The same thing happens with the thesis of 
‘otherness’, which is often used in the counter-
arguments against Western institutions and values: 
the same rulers who fiercely defend their ‘otherness’ 
do not allow the same ‘otherness’ for their subjects; 
the ‘otherness’ in their right to be Westernised stops 
with themselves. It’s obvious that I am not arguing 
against either the ‘otherness’ of other people or cultural 
sensitivity in engaging with them. What I am saying is 
that we shouldn’t fool ourselves when this ‘otherness’ is 
used and abused for political, economic, pragmatic and 
other ends by a few at the expense of many.
I have started my notes with an anecdote of Hodja 
Nasreddin and I would like to conclude with another one.
Once Mullah Nasreddin was in a neighbouring village. On 
the way home, he bought a watermelon. Eager to eat, he cut it 
in half and ate the half, leaving another half on the road and 
saying to himself:
Uzbekness
is still based on the European form of general education, 
though the content has been amended according to the 
above-mentioned Uzbekness paradigms. At the same 
time it was decided to change the alphabet based on the 
Cyrillic system to the Latin script. In this case the form 
of the change was more important than the essence, and 
change of graphics has been implemented for the sake 
of change itself. Arguments about bringing together 
the Uzbek people and Western technology through the 
Latin alphabet, or improving the phonetics of the Uzbek 
language, do not stand up to serious criticism. The 
disastrous consequences of this shift have already started 
to affect Uzbeks in the form of the appearance of a new 
generation of students who cannot read either books, or 
newspapers (all still published in the Cyrillic alphabet), 
as well as a generation of parents unable to help their 
children, having no clue of the Latin alphabet. This 
change of orthography only adds to the problems of the 
Russian minority in Uzbekistan.
Given the fact that the former Communist elite, 
who were in power in Uzbekistan during the Soviet 
era, remained in power in independent Uzbekistan, 
there has developed a very paradoxical situation 
with regard to the alphabet change, since the elite 
themselves don’t read in the Roman alphabet. The 
same paradox is taking place in the official status of 
the Uzbek language, adopted under the pressure of 
informal movements during the Perestroika time. 
These elites are taken hostage by their own decisions 
because they are overwhelmingly Russian-speaking. 
And since the law on the status of the Uzbek language, 
especially regarding its exclusive use in work places, 
is indefinitely delayed, it’s hard to imagine that one 
day the current President of Uzbekistan will suddenly 
deliver one of his speeches on Uzbekness in the Latin 
alphabet newly adopted by himself.
244
The Inner Lives of Cultures
‘Let him who sees this watermelon think that here was a nobleman.’
He walked a bit, then came back, picked up the abandoned half, ate 
it, and said to himself:
‘Let them think that the nobleman was with a servant, who had 
eaten this half.’
He walked a little more, felt sorry, went back, picked up the crust 
and ate it, saying:
‘Let them think that the nobleman had also an ass.’
So sometimes believing in and absolutising the 
‘otherness’ of some people is similar to believing in 
the scenario which greedy and witty Hodja Nasreddin 
prepared for us.
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